Adds two optional free-text fields to describe why a transaction
started ("Anlass") and why it ended ("Endgrund") - chosen names instead
of the technical "Startursache"/"Endesuhrsache". Displayed as own table
columns and editable in the form; legacy records without those fields
render as "-". Payload is encrypted client-side like every other field
(no server change needed, opaque ciphertext).
Verified: node --check, crypto roundtrip incl. new fields, legacy-safe
access (?? ''), pytest 3/3.
🤖 Generated with Codebuff
Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>
Users wanted to type things like "unbekannt" or comments for the date
fields. Start/End are now plain text inputs (max 120 chars) and are
stored/displayed verbatim - no Date parsing, no formatting. Existing
records that contain ISO strings keep working: they render exactly as
stored and refill the edit form unchanged. Also removes a duplicated
block in setup() that had slipped in earlier (double reload/flash).
Verified: node --check, no datetime-local/Date-parsing remnants,
crypto roundtrip with free-text and legacy ISO timestamps, pytest 3/3.
🤖 Generated with Codebuff
Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>
The shared el() helper passed every attr through setAttribute(); for
event handlers like onclick a function value gets stringified into an
attribute the DOM compiles as an expression that is evaluated but never
called - so Bearbeiten/Löschen (wired through el()) were silent no-ops,
while addEventListener-wired buttons (Neuer Datensatz, Sperren) worked.
el() now assigns on*-function attrs as properties (node[k] = v), preserving
the real handler. Verified with a DOM-semantics shim: fixed path fires,
legacy setAttribute path provably compiles but never calls.
🤖 Generated with Codebuff
Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>
ui.js now (a) decides setup-vs-unlock from GET /api/records emptiness,
(b) runs the setup flow (double entry check, min length, TOCTOU re-check
that the DB stayed empty), (c) detects a fully failed unlock (all rows
undecryptable = wrong passphrase) and returns to a clean state, and
(d) blocks double submits while Argon2id derives the key.
Verified: node --check passes, live server serves both screens and a
crypto roundtrip proves setup passphrase unlocks on second visit while
a wrong passphrase is rejected.
🤖 Generated with Codebuff
Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>
Vanilla HTML/CSS/JS frontend served by Flask:
- Unlock screen: passphrase -> Argon2id session key, held in memory
only (never sent to the server); "Sperren" wipes key and DOM rows.
- Records table (Person A/B, start/end, action) rendered via
textContent only (no HTML injection); undecryptable rows are flagged.
- Create/edit modal encrypts payloads with XChaCha20-Poly1305 before
any network call; updates carry the server version (optimistic lock,
conflict toast on 409); delete fetches current version first.
🤖 Generated with Codebuff
Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>