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9 Commits
Author SHA256 Message Date
jhkaktus 1cdb3fa784 rewirite to new name 2026-10-14 20:29:22 +02:00
jhkaktus 2120c56f45 make rewirte start 2026-10-13 15:35:07 +02:00
jhkaktus 516cb13dcf feat: Anlass + Endgrund fields for records
Adds two optional free-text fields to describe why a transaction
started ("Anlass") and why it ended ("Endgrund") - chosen names instead
of the technical "Startursache"/"Endesuhrsache". Displayed as own table
columns and editable in the form; legacy records without those fields
render as "-". Payload is encrypted client-side like every other field
(no server change needed, opaque ciphertext).

Verified: node --check, crypto roundtrip incl. new fields, legacy-safe
access (?? ''), pytest 3/3.

🤖 Generated with Codebuff
Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>
2026-10-11 01:04:46 +02:00
jhkaktus c82de902a8 feat: free-text timestamps instead of datetime pickers
Users wanted to type things like "unbekannt" or comments for the date
fields. Start/End are now plain text inputs (max 120 chars) and are
stored/displayed verbatim - no Date parsing, no formatting. Existing
records that contain ISO strings keep working: they render exactly as
stored and refill the edit form unchanged. Also removes a duplicated
block in setup() that had slipped in earlier (double reload/flash).

Verified: node --check, no datetime-local/Date-parsing remnants,
crypto roundtrip with free-text and legacy ISO timestamps, pytest 3/3.

🤖 Generated with Codebuff
Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>
2026-10-11 00:58:19 +02:00
jhkaktus 8d488f44ff fix: edit and delete buttons now actually fire their handlers
The shared el() helper passed every attr through setAttribute(); for
event handlers like onclick a function value gets stringified into an
attribute the DOM compiles as an expression that is evaluated but never
called - so Bearbeiten/Löschen (wired through el()) were silent no-ops,
while addEventListener-wired buttons (Neuer Datensatz, Sperren) worked.

el() now assigns on*-function attrs as properties (node[k] = v), preserving
the real handler. Verified with a DOM-semantics shim: fixed path fires,
legacy setAttribute path provably compiles but never calls.

🤖 Generated with Codebuff
Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>
2026-10-11 00:43:21 +02:00
jhkaktus 168927453a fix: backdrop now actually hidden, no longer covers the page
The #editor-backdrop rule set display:flex, which has higher specificity
than the UA style for the hidden attribute - so the modal overlay was
permanently visible on load and blocked the whole UI underneath (user-
reported: "the new record field hides everything"). Adding
#editor-backdrop[hidden] { display:none } makes the attribute win again;
opening/closing the editor still uses flex centering.

🤖 Generated with Codebuff
Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>
2026-10-11 00:37:57 +02:00
jhkaktus 2df603b32b style+docs: consistent pre-screen styling and first-start UX docs
Setup screen shares the unlock panel look; README gains an "Erster
Start (UX)" section explaining first visit vs returning visit behaviour.

🤖 Generated with Codebuff
Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>
2026-10-11 00:30:51 +02:00
jhkaktus 535a9c9db0 feat: client logic for setup vs unlock flow and wrong-passphrase handling
ui.js now (a) decides setup-vs-unlock from GET /api/records emptiness,
(b) runs the setup flow (double entry check, min length, TOCTOU re-check
that the DB stayed empty), (c) detects a fully failed unlock (all rows
undecryptable = wrong passphrase) and returns to a clean state, and
(d) blocks double submits while Argon2id derives the key.

Verified: node --check passes, live server serves both screens and a
crypto roundtrip proves setup passphrase unlocks on second visit while
a wrong passphrase is rejected.

🤖 Generated with Codebuff
Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>
2026-10-11 00:30:51 +02:00
jhkaktus 863cd1fd3a feat: first-time setup screen for creating a new passphrase
UX fix from user feedback: previously the app only showed an "Entsperren"
form, leaving first-time users without any passphrase confused. The page
now loads with two distinct pre-screens decided by an initial API call:

- empty DB -> "Willkommen" setup form: new passphrase, typed twice,
  minimum 8 characters, with no-reset warning
- existing ciphertext records -> unlock form as before

🤖 Generated with Codebuff
Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>
2026-10-11 00:30:51 +02:00
24 changed files with 2702 additions and 5447 deletions
+6 -164
View File
@@ -1,133 +1,10 @@
pastel
# ---> Python # ---> Python
# Byte-compiled / optimized / DLL files
__pycache__/ __pycache__/
*.py[cod] *.py[cod]
*$py.class *$py.class
# C extensions
*.so
# Distribution / packaging
.Python
build/
develop-eggs/
dist/
downloads/
eggs/
.eggs/
lib/
lib64/
parts/
sdist/
var/
wheels/
share/python-wheels/
*.egg-info/
.installed.cfg
*.egg
MANIFEST
# PyInstaller
# Usually these files are written by a python script from a template
# before PyInstaller builds the exe, so as to inject date/other infos into it.
*.manifest
*.spec
# Installer logs
pip-log.txt
pip-delete-this-directory.txt
# Unit test / coverage reports
htmlcov/
.tox/
.nox/
.coverage
.coverage.*
.cache
nosetests.xml
coverage.xml
*.cover
*.py,cover
.hypothesis/
.pytest_cache/
cover/
# Translations
*.mo
*.pot
# Django stuff:
*.log
local_settings.py
db.sqlite3
db.sqlite3-journal
# Flask stuff:
instance/
.webassets-cache
# Scrapy stuff:
.scrapy
# Sphinx documentation
docs/_build/
# PyBuilder
.pybuilder/
target/
# Jupyter Notebook
.ipynb_checkpoints
# IPython
profile_default/
ipython_config.py
# pyenv
# For a library or package, you might want to ignore these files since the code is
# intended to run in multiple environments; otherwise, check them in:
# .python-version
# pipenv
# According to pypa/pipenv#598, it is recommended to include Pipfile.lock in version control.
# However, in case of collaboration, if having platform-specific dependencies or dependencies
# having no cross-platform support, pipenv may install dependencies that don't work, or not
# install all needed dependencies.
#Pipfile.lock
# UV
# Similar to Pipfile.lock, it is generally recommended to include uv.lock in version control.
# This is especially recommended for binary packages to ensure reproducibility, and is more
# commonly ignored for libraries.
#uv.lock
# poetry
# Similar to Pipfile.lock, it is generally recommended to include poetry.lock in version control.
# This is especially recommended for binary packages to ensure reproducibility, and is more
# commonly ignored for libraries.
# https://python-poetry.org/docs/basic-usage/#commit-your-poetrylock-file-to-version-control
#poetry.lock
# pdm
# Similar to Pipfile.lock, it is generally recommended to include pdm.lock in version control.
#pdm.lock
# pdm stores project-wide configurations in .pdm.toml, but it is recommended to not include it
# in version control.
# https://pdm.fming.dev/latest/usage/project/#working-with-version-control
.pdm.toml
.pdm-python
.pdm-build/
# PEP 582; used by e.g. github.com/David-OConnor/pyflow and github.com/pdm-project/pdm
__pypackages__/
# Celery stuff
celerybeat-schedule
celerybeat.pid
# SageMath parsed files
*.sage.py
# Environments # Environments
.env .env
.venv .venv
@@ -137,46 +14,11 @@ ENV/
env.bak/ env.bak/
venv.bak/ venv.bak/
# Spyder project settings # SQLite
.spyderproject db.sqlite3
.spyproject db.sqlite3-journal
# Rope project settings # Instance / state
.ropeproject
# mkdocs documentation
/site
# mypy
.mypy_cache/
.dmypy.json
dmypy.json
# Pyre type checker
.pyre/
# pytype static type analyzer
.pytype/
# Cython debug symbols
cython_debug/
# PyCharm
# JetBrains specific template is maintained in a separate JetBrains.gitignore that can
# be found at https://github.com/github/gitignore/blob/main/Global/JetBrains.gitignore
# and can be added to the global gitignore or merged into this file. For a more nuclear
# option (not recommended) you can uncomment the following to ignore the entire idea folder.
#.idea/
# Ruff stuff:
.ruff_cache/
# PyPI configuration file
.pypirc
# project
venv/
instance/ instance/
certs/ certs/
__pycache__/ __pycache__/
-70
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@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
# crushdb – verschlüsselte Datensätze zwischen Personen
Sichere Datenbank für Transaktionen zwischen zwei Personen
(Person A, Person B, Timestamp-Start, Timestamp-Ende, Aktion).
Alle Datensätze werden **im Browser** verschlüsselt
(XChaCha20-Poly1305, Schlüsselableitung per Argon2id aus der Passphrase).
Der Server sieht ausschließlich Chiffretext – auch bei vollständiger
Serverkompromittierung bleiben die Inhalte ohne Passphrase vertraulich.
## Starten (HTTP; TLS über Reverse Proxy)
```bash
python3 -m venv venv
./venv/bin/pip install -r requirements.txt
./venv/bin/python run.py
# → http://127.0.0.1:8085
```
Die App lauscht auf dem lokalen HTTP-Port (default `127.0.0.1:8085`,
überschreibbar via `HOST`/`PORT`). Ein vertrauenswürdiger Reverse Proxy
(nginx, caddy, …) beendet HTTPS und reicht intern an die App weiter.
Die App selbst muss von außen nicht erreichbar sein.
### Per systemd laufen lassen
Ein fertiges Unit-File liegt in `deploy/crushdb.service` (Reinheit:
nur `instance/` schreibbar, keine Capabilities, Restart on failure).
Nach dem Kopieren nach `/etc/systemd/system/` und `daemon-reload`
startet `systemctl enable --now crushdb` die App dauerhaft.
## Tests
```bash
./venv/bin/python -m pytest backend/test_integrity.py -v # Integrität/Replay
node .e2e.mjs # optional: End-to-End (siehe unten)
```
## Architektur
| Komponente |Datei | Aufgabe |
|---|---|---|
| Speicher | `backend/storage.py` | SQLite, speichert nur Chiffretext (uuid, ciphertext, nonce, salt, version) |
| API | `backend/app.py` | Flask REST API, Validierung nur von Form/Größe, Versions-Konfliktprüfung |
| Krypto (Client) | `backend/static/crypto.js` | Argon2id-KDF + XChaCha20-Poly1305, uuid+salt als AEAD-AAD gebunden |
| UI | `backend/static/ui.js` + `index.html`/`style.css` | Tabelle, Erstellen, Bearbeiten, Löschen; Passphrase bleibt im RAM |
| Server | `run.py` | HTTP intern hinter Reverse Proxy, DB-Init |
## Sicherheitsmodell
- Passphrase → Argon2id (t=2, m=16 MiB) → 256-Bit-Sitzungsschlüssel,
ausschließlich im Browser/im Arbeitsspeicher; niemals am Server.
- Jeder Datensatz: eigene zufällige 16-Byte-Salt + 24-Byte-Nonce.
uuid + salt sind als AEAD-Associated-Data gebunden – Vertauschen oder
Um-Salten wird beim Entschlüsseln sicher erkannt.
- Monotoner Versionszähler pro Datensatz: veraltete Updates/Deletes
(Replay alter Stände) → `409`, Duplikate → `409`.
- Klartexte werden clientseitig nie persistiert; beim Sperren/Beenden
wird der Schlüssel verworfen (`wipeKey`).
- HTTPS wird außen vom vertrauenswürdigen **Reverse Proxy** beendet
(nginx/caddy/…); die App lauscht nur intern auf HTTP.
## Bekannte Grenzen
- Datenverlust (Löschen/Überschreiben) durch Angreifer bleibt möglich –
Vertraulichkeit ist geschützt, Verfügbarkeit nicht.
- Backups der SQLite-Datei enthalten ausschließlich Chiffretext.
- Backups des Passphrasen-Verlusts = Datenverlust (by design).
Siehe `spezification.txt` für die Anforderungen.
+702 -128
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@@ -1,155 +1,729 @@
"""Flask application exposing the records API. import os
import logging
from functools import wraps
The server is a dumb ciphertext store: it never sees plaintext or the from flask import Flask, request, jsonify, session, render_template_string, redirect, url_for
key. Every record body is opaque base64. Requests are validated only
for shape and size, never for content.
Security properties: from backend import storage
- No plaintext is logged, stored, or echoed.
- Version counters are enforced server-side to detect replays.
- HTTPS is handled by ssl context in run.py (TLS for dev).
"""
import base64
import binascii
from flask import Flask, jsonify, request, send_from_directory
from . import storage
MAX_CIPHERTEXT_B64 = 32 * 1024 # plenty for one record, stops abuse
MAX_SALT_NONCE_B64 = 512
app = Flask(__name__, static_folder=None)
# ---------- basic hardening ---------- SENSITIVE_FIELDS = {"password", "passwd", "secret", "token", "access_token", "refresh_token"}
"""Redact sensitive values and long blobs from log-friendly repr."""
@app.after_request
def _security_headers(resp):
resp.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] = "nosniff"
resp.headers["X-Frame-Options"] = "DENY"
resp.headers["Referrer-Policy"] = "no-referrer"
resp.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store"
return resp
def _b64_field(data, field, max_len, required=True): def redact_for_log(value):
"""Validate and decode a base64 field from the JSON body. Returns bytes or None.""" if isinstance(value, dict):
if field not in data: return {k: "[redacted]" if k.lower() in SENSITIVE_FIELDS else redact_for_log(v) for k, v in value.items()}
if required: if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
raise ValueError(f"missing field: {field}") return [redact_for_log(v) for v in value]
return None return value
raw = data[field]
if not isinstance(raw, str) or not raw or len(raw) > max_len:
raise ValueError(f"invalid field: {field}") def _request_snapshot(request):
body = {}
try: try:
return base64.b64decode(raw, validate=True) if request.is_json:
except (binascii.Error, ValueError): body = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
raise ValueError(f"invalid base64 in field: {field}") elif request.method in ("POST", "PUT", "PATCH") and request.form:
body = {k: v for k, v in request.form.items()}
except Exception:
def _record_json(rec): body = {}
return { return {
"uuid": rec["uuid"], "method": request.method,
"ciphertext": base64.b64encode(rec["ciphertext"]).decode(), "path": request.path,
"nonce": base64.b64encode(rec["nonce"]).decode(), "args": dict(request.args),
"salt": base64.b64encode(rec["salt"]).decode(), "body": redact_for_log(body),
"version": rec["version"],
"created_at": rec["created_at"],
"updated_at": rec["updated_at"],
} }
# ---------- static UI ---------- def _maybe_log_request(app, request):
if app.debug:
@app.route("/") app.logger.debug("request: %s", _request_snapshot(request))
def index():
return send_from_directory("static", "index.html")
@app.route("/static/<path:filename>") ARTICLE_TYPE_LABELS = {
def static_files(filename): "contact_details": "Contact details",
return send_from_directory("static", filename) "notes": "Notes",
"profile_text": "Profile text",
"documents": "Documents",
"links": "Links",
"phone_numbers": "Phone numbers",
"addresses": "Addresses",
"social_profiles": "Social profiles",
}
# ---------- API ---------- def create_app():
app = Flask(__name__, static_folder="static", static_url_path="/static")
app.secret_key = os.environ.get("FLASK_SECRET_KEY") or os.urandom(24).hex()
storage.init_db()
@app.get("/api/records") @app.route("/")
def api_list(): def index():
return jsonify([_record_json(r) for r in storage.list_records()]) if request.args:
# Never accept credentials (or anything else) via the query string.
app.logger.warning("ignoring query string on index: keys=%s", list(request.args.keys()))
account = session.get("account")
if account:
fresh = storage.get_account_by_id(account.get("id")) or account
session["account"] = fresh
return render_index(fresh)
return render_login_page()
def _wants_json():
if request.is_json:
return True
if request.form:
return False
best = request.accept_mimetypes.best_match(["application/json", "text/html"])
return best == "application/json"
def _form_or_json(field):
if field in request.form:
return request.form.get(field)
if request.is_json:
data = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
return data.get(field)
return None
@app.route("/login", methods=["GET", "POST"])
def login():
if request.method == "GET":
if request.args:
app.logger.warning("ignoring query string on login: keys=%s", list(request.args.keys()))
return render_login_page()
_maybe_log_request(app, request)
email = _form_or_json("email")
password = _form_or_json("password")
wants_json = _wants_json()
if not email or not password:
app.logger.warning("login attempt missing credentials: path=%s", request.path)
if wants_json:
return reply_error("email and password required")
return render_login_page("email and password required")
account = storage.authenticate(email, password)
if not account:
app.logger.info("login failed for email=%s path=%s", email, request.path)
if wants_json:
return reply_error("invalid credentials")
return render_login_page("invalid credentials")
session["account"] = account
app.logger.info("login ok for email=%s path=%s", email, request.path)
if wants_json:
return reply_ok(account)
return redirect("/")
@app.route("/logout")
def logout():
session.pop("account", None)
return redirect("/")
@app.route("/account/create", methods=["GET", "POST"])
def create_account_page():
if request.method == "GET":
return render_account_create_page()
_maybe_log_request(app, request)
return _create_account()
@app.route("/account", methods=["POST"])
def create_account_route():
return _create_account()
def _create_account():
email = _form_or_json("email")
password = _form_or_json("password")
wants_json = _wants_json()
if not email or not password:
if wants_json:
return reply_error("email and password required")
return render_account_create_page("email and password required")
try:
account = storage.create_account(email, password)
app.logger.info("account created email=%s path=%s", email, request.path)
if wants_json:
return reply_ok(account)
return redirect("/")
except ValueError as e:
if "already exists" in str(e).lower():
app.logger.info("account exists email=%s path=%s", email, request.path)
else:
app.logger.warning("account create failed email=%s err=%s path=%s", email, str(e), request.path)
if wants_json:
return reply_error(str(e))
return render_account_create_page(str(e))
@app.route("/account/me")
def me():
account = session.get("account")
if not account:
return reply_error("not authenticated")
fresh = storage.get_account_by_id(account.get("id")) or account
session["account"] = fresh
return reply_ok(fresh)
def get_account():
return session.get("account")
def login_required(f):
@wraps(f)
def wrapped(*args, **kwargs):
account = get_account()
if not account:
return reply_error("authentication required")
request.account = account
return f(*args, **kwargs)
return wrapped
@app.route("/persons", methods=["GET"])
@login_required
def list_persons_route():
persons = storage.list_persons(request.account)
return reply_ok(persons)
@app.route("/persons", methods=["POST"])
@login_required
def create_person_route():
name = _form_or_json("name") or ""
try:
person = storage.create_person(request.account, name)
except (PermissionError, ValueError) as e:
return reply_error(str(e))
return reply_ok(person)
@app.route("/admin/persons", methods=["POST"])
@login_required
def admin_create_person_route():
name = _form_or_json("name") or ""
email = _form_or_json("email")
password = _form_or_json("password")
try:
person = storage.create_person_with_account(request.account, name, email, password)
return reply_ok(person)
except (PermissionError, ValueError) as e:
return reply_error(str(e))
@app.route("/persons/<person_id>")
@login_required
def get_person_route(person_id):
person = storage.get_person(person_id)
if not person:
return reply_error("person not found")
if not storage.is_admin(request.account) and person_id != request.account.get("person_id"):
# Only admins see which emails belong to another person.
person = dict(person)
person["emails"] = []
return reply_ok(person)
@app.route("/persons/<person_id>", methods=["PATCH"])
@login_required
def update_person_route(person_id):
name = request.form.get("name") or request.json.get("name")
name = name if name is not None else None
person = storage.update_person(request.account, person_id, name)
if not person:
return reply_error("person not found")
return reply_ok(person)
@app.route("/persons/<person_id>", methods=["DELETE"])
@login_required
def delete_person_route(person_id):
ok = storage.delete_person(request.account, person_id)
if not ok:
return reply_error("person not found")
return reply_ok({"deleted": True})
@app.route("/persons/<person_id>/emails/attach", methods=["POST"])
@login_required
def attach_email_route(person_id):
email = request.form.get("email") or request.json.get("email")
if not email:
return reply_error("email required")
try:
person = storage.attach_email_to_person(request.account, person_id, email)
return reply_ok(person)
except (ValueError, PermissionError) as e:
return reply_error(str(e))
@app.route("/persons/<person_id>/emails/detach", methods=["POST"])
@login_required
def detach_email_route(person_id):
email = request.form.get("email") or request.json.get("email")
if not email:
return reply_error("email required")
try:
person = storage.detach_email_from_person(request.account, person_id, email)
return reply_ok(person)
except (ValueError, PermissionError) as e:
return reply_error(str(e))
@app.route("/articles", methods=["GET"])
@login_required
def list_articles_route():
person_id = request.args.get("person_id")
articles = storage.list_articles(request.account, person_id)
return reply_ok(articles)
@app.route("/articles", methods=["POST"])
@login_required
def create_article_route():
person_id = _form_or_json("person_id")
article_type = _form_or_json("article_type")
title = _form_or_json("title") or ""
content = _form_or_json("content") or ""
visibility = _form_or_json("visibility") or "private"
group_ids = request.json.get("group_ids") if request.is_json else None
if group_ids is None:
group_ids = []
if article_type not in storage.ARTICLE_TYPES:
return reply_error("invalid article type")
if person_id is None:
return reply_error("person_id required")
try:
article = storage.create_article(
request.account, person_id, article_type, title, content, visibility, group_ids
)
return reply_ok(article)
except (ValueError, PermissionError) as e:
return reply_error(str(e))
@app.route("/articles/<article_id>")
@login_required
def get_article_route(article_id):
article = storage.get_article(article_id)
if not article:
return reply_error("article not found")
if not storage._can_read_article(request.account, article):
article = {k: v for k, v in article.items() if k != "content"}
return reply_ok(article)
@app.route("/articles/<article_id>", methods=["PATCH"])
@login_required
def update_article_route(article_id):
title = request.form.get("title") or request.json.get("title")
content = request.form.get("content") or request.json.get("content")
visibility = request.form.get("visibility") or request.json.get("visibility")
group_ids = request.json.get("group_ids") if request.is_json else None
title = title if title is not None else None
content = content if content is not None else None
visibility = visibility if visibility is not None else None
try:
article = storage.update_article(
request.account, article_id, title=title, content=content, visibility=visibility, group_ids=group_ids
)
if not article:
return reply_error("article not found")
return reply_ok(article)
except (ValueError, PermissionError) as e:
return reply_error(str(e))
@app.route("/articles/<article_id>", methods=["DELETE"])
@login_required
def delete_article_route(article_id):
try:
ok = storage.delete_article(request.account, article_id)
if not ok:
return reply_error("article not found")
return reply_ok({"deleted": True})
except PermissionError as e:
return reply_error(str(e))
@app.route("/groups", methods=["GET"])
@login_required
def list_groups_route():
person_id = request.args.get("person_id")
groups = storage.list_groups(request.account, person_id)
return reply_ok(groups)
@app.route("/groups", methods=["POST"])
@login_required
def create_group_route():
person_id = request.form.get("person_id") or request.json.get("person_id")
name = request.form.get("name") or request.json.get("name") or ""
if not person_id:
return reply_error("person_id required")
try:
group = storage.create_group(request.account, person_id, name)
return reply_ok(group)
except PermissionError as e:
return reply_error(str(e))
@app.route("/groups/<group_id>")
@login_required
def get_group_route(group_id):
group = storage.get_group(group_id)
if not group:
return reply_error("group not found")
if not storage.group_is_visible_to(request.account, group_id):
return reply_error("group not found")
return reply_ok(group)
@app.route("/groups/<group_id>", methods=["PATCH"])
@login_required
def update_group_route(group_id):
name = request.form.get("name") or request.json.get("name")
name = name if name is not None else None
try:
group = storage.update_group(request.account, group_id, name)
if not group:
return reply_error("group not found")
return reply_ok(group)
except PermissionError as e:
return reply_error(str(e))
@app.route("/groups/<group_id>", methods=["DELETE"])
@login_required
def delete_group_route(group_id):
try:
ok = storage.delete_group(request.account, group_id)
if not ok:
return reply_error("group not found")
return reply_ok({"deleted": True})
except PermissionError as e:
return reply_error(str(e))
@app.route("/groups/<group_id>/members/<person_id>", methods=["POST"])
@login_required
def add_member_route(group_id, person_id):
try:
group = storage.add_group_member(request.account, group_id, person_id)
return reply_ok(group)
except (ValueError, PermissionError) as e:
return reply_error(str(e))
@app.route("/groups/<group_id>/members/<person_id>", methods=["DELETE"])
@login_required
def remove_member_route(group_id, person_id):
try:
group = storage.remove_group_member(request.account, group_id, person_id)
return reply_ok(group)
except PermissionError as e:
return reply_error(str(e))
@app.route("/rights", methods=["GET"])
@login_required
def list_rights_route():
account_id = request.args.get("account_id")
try:
rights = storage.list_rights(request.account, account_id)
except PermissionError as e:
return reply_error(str(e))
return reply_ok(rights)
@app.route("/rights/grant", methods=["POST"])
@login_required
def grant_right_route():
target_account_id = request.form.get("account_id") or request.json.get("account_id")
right_name = request.form.get("right") or request.json.get("right")
if not target_account_id or not right_name:
return reply_error("account_id and right required")
try:
storage.grant_right(request.account, target_account_id, right_name)
return reply_ok({"granted": right_name})
except (ValueError, PermissionError) as e:
return reply_error(str(e))
@app.route("/rights/revoke", methods=["POST"])
@login_required
def revoke_right_route():
target_account_id = request.form.get("account_id") or request.json.get("account_id")
right_name = request.form.get("right") or request.json.get("right")
if not target_account_id or not right_name:
return reply_error("account_id and right required")
try:
storage.revoke_right(request.account, target_account_id, right_name)
return reply_ok({"revoked": right_name})
except PermissionError as e:
return reply_error(str(e))
@app.route("/api/types")
def article_types():
return reply_ok({
"article_types": storage.ARTICLE_TYPES,
"rights": storage.RIGHTS,
"article_type_labels": ARTICLE_TYPE_LABELS,
})
return app
@app.get("/api/records/<uuid>") def render_account_create_page(error=None):
def api_get(uuid): return render_template_string(
rec = storage.get_record(uuid) """
if rec is None: <!doctype html>
return jsonify({"error": "not found"}), 404 <html lang="en">
return jsonify(_record_json(rec)) <head>
<meta charset="utf-8" />
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
<title>Who² - Create account</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/style.css" />
</head>
<body>
<div class="card">
<h1>Create account</h1>
<form id="create-account-form" method="post" action="/account/create">
<label>email
<input name="email" type="email" autocomplete="username" required />
</label>
<label>password
<input name="password" type="password" autocomplete="new-password" required />
</label>
<button type="submit">Create account</button>
</form>
<p class="hint">Already have an account? <a href="/">Log in</a></p>
<pre id="create-msg" class="msg{% if not error %} hidden{% endif %}">{{ error }}</pre>
</div>
<script src="/static/crypto.js"></script>
<script src="/static/ui.js"></script>
<script>
(function () {
var form = document.getElementById("create-account-form");
var msg = document.getElementById("create-msg");
form.addEventListener("submit", function (e) {
e.preventDefault();
msg.textContent = "";
msg.classList.add("hidden");
var email = form.email.value.trim();
var password = form.password.value;
if (!email || !password) {
msg.textContent = "email and password required";
msg.style.color = "#dc2626";
msg.classList.remove("hidden");
return;
}
fetch("/account/create", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ email: email, password: password })
})
.then(function (r) { return r.json().then(function (data) { if (!r.ok) throw new Error(data.error || "account creation failed"); return data; }); })
.then(function (data) {
msg.textContent = "account created: " + (data.email || "");
msg.style.color = "#047857";
msg.classList.remove("hidden");
window.setTimeout(function () { window.location.href = "/"; }, 700);
})
.catch(function (err) {
msg.textContent = err.message || "account creation failed";
msg.style.color = "#dc2626";
msg.classList.remove("hidden");
});
});
})();
</script>
</body>
</html>
""",
error=error or "",
)
@app.post("/api/records") def render_login_page(error=None):
def api_create(): return render_template_string(
data = request.get_json(silent=True) """
if not isinstance(data, dict): <!doctype html>
return jsonify({"error": "invalid JSON body"}), 400 <html lang="en">
try: <head>
uuid = data.get("uuid") <meta charset="utf-8" />
if not isinstance(uuid, str) or not uuid or len(uuid) > 64: <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
raise ValueError("invalid field: uuid") <title>Who² - Login</title>
ct = _b64_field(data, "ciphertext", MAX_CIPHERTEXT_B64) <link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/style.css" />
nonce = _b64_field(data, "nonce", MAX_SALT_NONCE_B64) </head>
salt = _b64_field(data, "salt", MAX_SALT_NONCE_B64) <body>
except ValueError as e: <div class="card">
return jsonify({"error": str(e)}), 400 <h1>Who²</h1>
<form id="login-form" method="post" action="/login">
if storage.get_record(uuid) is not None: <label>email
return jsonify({"error": "record already exists"}), 409 <input name="email" type="email" autocomplete="username" required />
</label>
rec = storage.create_record(uuid, ct, nonce, salt) <label>password
return jsonify(_record_json(rec)), 201 <input name="password" type="password" autocomplete="current-password" required />
</label>
<button type="submit">Log in</button>
</form>
<p class="hint">No account yet? <a href="/account/create">Create one</a></p>
<pre id="login-msg" class="msg{% if not error %} hidden{% endif %}">{{ error }}</pre>
</div>
<script src="/static/crypto.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-hashes/blake2.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-hashes/argon2.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-ciphers/chacha.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-ciphers/_arx.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-ciphers/_poly1305.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-ciphers/utils.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-hashes/utils.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-hashes/_u64.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-hashes/_md.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-hashes/_blake.js"></script>
<script src="/static/ui.js"></script>
</body>
</html>
""",
error=error or "",
)
@app.put("/api/records/<uuid>") def render_index(account=None):
def api_update(uuid): is_admin = storage.is_admin(account)
data = request.get_json(silent=True) return render_template_string(
if not isinstance(data, dict): """
return jsonify({"error": "invalid JSON body"}), 400 <!doctype html>
try: <html lang="en">
version = data.get("version") <head>
if not isinstance(version, int) or version < 1: <meta charset="utf-8" />
raise ValueError("invalid field: version") <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
ct = _b64_field(data, "ciphertext", MAX_CIPHERTEXT_B64) <title>Who²</title>
nonce = _b64_field(data, "nonce", MAX_SALT_NONCE_B64) <link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/style.css" />
salt = _b64_field(data, "salt", MAX_SALT_NONCE_B64) </head>
except ValueError as e: <body>
return jsonify({"error": str(e)}), 400 <header>
<h1>Who²</h1>
<div class="account-bar">
<span id="user-email"></span>
<span id="user-role" class="badge"></span>
<a href="/logout" class="btn-small">Log out</a>
</div>
</header>
<main>
<section class="panel" id="myperson-panel">
<h2>My person</h2>
<div id="myperson" class="meta"></div>
</section>
rec = storage.update_record(uuid, ct, nonce, salt, expected_version=version) <section class="panel" id="note-panel">
if rec is None: <h2>{% if is_admin %}Add article{% else %}Add note{% endif %}</h2>
# 409: version mismatch (concurrent edit or replay) — do not <form id="note-form">
# distinguish from "not found" to avoid leaking existence. {% if is_admin %}
return jsonify({"error": "version conflict or not found"}), 409 <label>person
return jsonify(_record_json(rec)) <select id="note-person" name="person_id" required></select>
</label>
<label>type
<select id="note-type" name="article_type" required></select>
</label>
{% endif %}
<label>title
<input id="note-title" name="title" />
</label>
<label>content
<textarea id="note-content" name="content" required></textarea>
</label>
{% if is_admin %}
<label>visibility
<select id="note-visibility" name="visibility">
<option value="private">private</option>
<option value="group">group</option>
<option value="public">public</option>
</select>
</label>
{% endif %}
<button type="submit">Save</button>
</form>
<p class="hint" id="note-hint"></p>
</section>
<section class="panel">
<h2>Articles</h2>
<ul id="articles-list"></ul>
</section>
<section class="panel" id="groups-panel">
<h2>My groups</h2>
<form id="group-form">
<label>name
<input id="group-name" name="name" required />
</label>
<button type="submit">Create group</button>
</form>
<ul id="groups-list"></ul>
<form id="invite-form">
<label>group
<select id="invite-group" name="group_id" required></select>
</label>
<label>person
<select id="invite-person" name="person_id" required></select>
</label>
<button type="submit">Invite person</button>
<button type="button" id="join-self" class="btn-ghost">Add me</button>
</form>
</section>
{% if is_admin %}
<section class="panel admin" id="admin-person-panel">
<h2>Admin · create person</h2>
<form id="admin-person-form">
<label>name
<input id="admin-person-name" name="name" required />
</label>
<label>email
<input id="admin-person-email" name="email" type="email" />
</label>
<label>password (only for a new account)
<input id="admin-person-password" name="password" type="password" />
</label>
<button type="submit">Create person</button>
</form>
<ul id="admin-persons-list"></ul>
</section>
<section class="panel admin" id="admin-email-panel">
<h2>Admin · person emails</h2>
<form id="attach-form">
<label>person
<select id="attach-person" name="person_id" required></select>
</label>
<label>email
<input id="attach-email" name="email" type="email" required />
</label>
<button type="submit">Attach</button>
<button type="button" id="detach-email" class="btn-ghost">Detach</button>
</form>
<p class="hint">The email needs an account; create one above by giving a password.</p>
</section>
<section class="panel admin" id="admin-rights-panel">
<h2>Admin · accounts &amp; rights</h2>
<form id="right-form">
<label>account
<select id="right-account" name="account_id" required></select>
</label>
<label>right
<select id="right-right" name="right" required></select>
</label>
<button type="submit">Grant</button>
<button type="button" id="revoke-right" class="btn-ghost">Revoke selected</button>
</form>
<ul id="rights-list"></ul>
</section>
{% endif %}
</main>
<pre id="app-msg" class="msg hidden"></pre>
<script src="/static/crypto.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-hashes/blake2.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-hashes/argon2.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-ciphers/chacha.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-ciphers/_arx.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-ciphers/_poly1305.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-ciphers/utils.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-hashes/utils.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-hashes/_u64.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-hashes/_md.js"></script>
<script src="/static/vendor/noble-hashes/_blake.js"></script>
<script src="/static/ui.js"></script>
</body>
</html>
""",
is_admin=is_admin,
)
@app.delete("/api/records/<uuid>") def reply_ok(body):
def api_delete(uuid): resp = jsonify(body)
data = request.get_json(silent=True) or {} resp.status_code = 200
version = data.get("version") return resp
if not isinstance(version, int) or version < 1:
return jsonify({"error": "invalid field: version"}), 400
if not storage.delete_record(uuid, expected_version=version):
return jsonify({"error": "version conflict or not found"}), 409
return "", 204
@app.errorhandler(404) def reply_error(message):
def not_found(_e): resp = jsonify({"error": message})
return jsonify({"error": "not found"}), 404 resp.status_code = 400
return resp
@app.errorhandler(500)
def server_error(_e):
# Never leak stack traces or data.
return jsonify({"error": "internal server error"}), 500
+47 -147
View File
@@ -1,155 +1,55 @@
/** "use strict";
* crypto.js – client-side encryption module (vanilla ES module).
*
* All cryptography happens in the browser. The passphrase and derived
* key never leave this module's memory and are never sent anywhere.
*
* Design:
* - Key derivation: Argon2id (via @noble/hashes), one key per session,
* derived once from the passphrase the user enters on opening the
* site. The salt used for derivation is *not* the per-record salt;
* it is a random domain salt stored alongside each record.
* - Cipher: XChaCha20-Poly1305 (AEAD) with a fresh random 24-byte nonce
* per record (via @noble/ciphers).
* - Each record carries its own random salt. That salt is bound into
* the AEAD header (as an extra attribute) so re-deriving the key for
* a record with a modified salt reliably fails. TLS-like: header is
* encrypted alongside the payload body.
* - AAD (associated data) binds the record's uuid into the AEAD header,
* so a ciphertext cannot be swapped between records undetected.
*
* Everything is in-memory only: this file has no persistence, and the
* session key must be wiped explicitly by the caller (wipeKey).
*/
import { xchacha20poly1305 } from "./vendor/noble-ciphers/chacha.js"; function req(path, options) {
import { randomBytes } from "./vendor/noble-ciphers/utils.js"; const headers = { "Content-Type": "application/json" };
import { argon2id } from "./vendor/noble-hashes/argon2.js"; options = Object.assign({ method: "GET", headers }, options || {});
if (options.body && typeof options.body === "object") {
const ARGON2_PARAMS = { options.body = JSON.stringify(options.body);
// Moderate defaults so unlocking stays usable on typical hardware in-JS.
t: 2, // passes
m: 16384, // memory, KiB (16 MiB)
p: 1, // parallelism
dkLen: 32, // 256-bit key for XChaCha20
};
const REC_SALT_LEN = 16; // per-record salt is independent from KDF salt? No:
// the KDF salt IS the per-record salt (see below).
// ---------- base64 / utf8 helpers ----------
export function b64encode(bytes) {
let bin = "";
for (const b of bytes) bin += String.fromCharCode(b);
return btoa(bin);
}
export function b64decode(str) {
const bin = atob(str);
const out = new Uint8Array(bin.length);
for (let i = 0; i < bin.length; i++) out[i] = bin.charCodeAt(i);
return out;
}
export function utf8encode(str) {
return new TextEncoder().encode(str);
}
export function utf8decode(bytes) {
return new TextDecoder().decode(bytes);
}
export function randomUuid() {
return crypto.randomUUID();
}
// ---------- key derivation ----------
/**
* Derive a 32-byte key from a passphrase + salt with Argon2id.
* Runs entirely in the browser; the passphrase never leaves it.
*/
export function deriveKey(passphrase, saltBytes) {
if (typeof passphrase !== "string" || passphrase.length === 0)
throw new Error("invalid passphrase");
if (!(saltBytes instanceof Uint8Array) || saltBytes.length < 8)
throw new Error("invalid salt");
const pwBytes = utf8encode(passphrase);
try {
return argon2id(pwBytes, saltBytes, ARGON2_PARAMS);
} finally {
pwBytes.fill(0); // best-effort scratch wipe
} }
return fetch(path, options).then(function (r) {
return r.json().then(function (data) {
if (!r.ok) throw new Error(data.error || "request failed");
return data;
});
});
} }
// ---------- record encryption ---------- function postForm(path, form) {
const data = {};
/** for (const [k, v] of new FormData(form)) {
* Encrypt a record payload. if (v) data[k] = v;
*
* For a NEW record pass salt = randomSalt(). For an UPDATE pass the
* salt already stored on the record — the payload must be encrypted
* under a key derived from the SAME salt, otherwise decryption on the
* other side fails loudly. This binds the salt to the ciphertext:
* a modified salt (= malicious re-key) cannot go unnoticed.
*
* Payload is any JSON-serializable value. Returns the record body
* ready for the API ({uuid, ciphertext, nonce, salt}) with the AEAD
* computed over uuid+salt as associated data.
*/
export function encryptRecord(key, uuid, payload, saltBytes) {
if (!(saltBytes instanceof Uint8Array) || saltBytes.length !== REC_SALT_LEN)
throw new Error("invalid record salt");
const nonce = randomBytes(24);
// AAD binds uuid AND salt: swapping ciphertext between records or
// silently changing the salt breaks the tag.
const aad = utf8encode(
"crushdb:record:" + uuid + ":" + b64encode(saltBytes)
);
const plaintext = utf8encode(JSON.stringify(payload));
const ciphertext = xchacha20poly1305(key, nonce, aad).encrypt(plaintext);
plaintext.fill(0); // no plaintext residue in heap
return {
uuid,
ciphertext: b64encode(ciphertext),
nonce: b64encode(nonce),
salt: b64encode(saltBytes),
};
}
export function randomSalt() {
return randomBytes(REC_SALT_LEN);
}
// ---------- record decryption ----------
/**
* Decrypt a record fetched from the API.
* Throws on wrong key, wrong salt, or any tampering (AEAD tag).
*/
export function decryptRecord(key, rec) {
if (!rec || typeof rec.uuid !== "string") throw new Error("invalid record");
const saltBytes = b64decode(rec.salt);
const aad = utf8encode(
"crushdb:record:" + rec.uuid + ":" + b64encode(saltBytes)
);
const ct = b64decode(rec.ciphertext);
const nonce = b64decode(rec.nonce);
const plaintext = xchacha20poly1305(key, nonce, aad).decrypt(ct);
try {
return JSON.parse(utf8decode(plaintext));
} finally {
plaintext.fill(0);
} }
return req(path, { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify(data) });
} }
// ---------- hygiene ---------- function patchJson(path, body) {
return req(path, { method: "PATCH", body: body });
/** }
* Best-effort wipe of a derived key (32 bytes). JS cannot guarantee
* zeroing, but this removes the obvious copy. function delReq(path) {
*/ return req(path, { method: "DELETE" });
export function wipeKey(key) { }
if (key instanceof Uint8Array) key.fill(0);
function escapeHtml(s) {
return String(s)
.replace(/&/g, "&amp;")
.replace(/</g, "&lt;")
.replace(/>/g, "&gt;")
.replace(/"/g, "&quot;");
}
function uuid() {
if (typeof crypto !== "undefined" && crypto.randomUUID) return crypto.randomUUID();
const a = new Uint8Array(16);
(crypto.getRandomValues || function () { for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) a[i] = Math.floor(Math.random() * 256); })(a);
a[6] = (a[6] & 0x0f) | 0x40;
a[8] = (a[8] & 0x3f) | 0x80;
const hex = Array.from(a, b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
return hex.slice(0, 8) + "-" + hex.slice(8, 12) + "-" + hex.slice(12, 16) + "-" + hex.slice(16, 20) + "-" + hex.slice(20);
}
function appendMsg(el, message, isError) {
el.textContent = message || "";
el.classList.toggle("hidden", !message);
el.style.color = isError ? "#dc2626" : "#047857";
} }
-84
View File
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="de">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8" />
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
<title>crushdb</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/style.css" />
</head>
<body>
<h1>crushdb</h1>
<p class="tagline">Verschlüsselte Datensätze zwischen zwei Personen</p>
<section id="flash" class="flash" aria-live="polite"></section>
<!-- unlock screen: passphrase stays in memory only -->
<section id="unlock">
<form id="unlock-form" autocomplete="off">
<label for="passphrase">Passphrase</label>
<input
type="password"
id="passphrase"
autocomplete="off"
required
placeholder="Passphrase eingeben …"
/>
<button type="submit">Entsperren</button>
<p class="hint">
Die Passphrase verlässt niemals deinen Browser. Sie wird per
Argon2id lokal abgeleitet und nur im Arbeitsspeicher gehalten.
</p>
</form>
</section>
<!-- main app, hidden until unlocked -->
<section id="app" hidden>
<div class="toolbar">
<button id="new-btn" type="button">+ Neuer Datensatz</button>
<button id="lock-btn" type="button">Sperren</button>
</div>
<table id="records">
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person A</th>
<th>Person B</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>Ende</th>
<th>Aktion</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody></tbody>
</table>
</section>
<!-- create/edit modal -->
<div id="editor-backdrop" hidden>
<form id="editor" autocomplete="off">
<h2 id="editor-title">Neuer Datensatz</h2>
<label>Person A
<input id="f-persona" type="text" required maxlength="120" />
</label>
<label>Person B
<input id="f-personb" type="text" required maxlength="120" />
</label>
<label>Start (optional)
<input id="f-tsstart" type="datetime-local" />
</label>
<label>Ende (optional)
<input id="f-tsend" type="datetime-local" />
</label>
<label>Aktion
<input id="f-action" type="text" required maxlength="500" />
</label>
<div class="actions">
<button type="submit">Speichern</button>
<button type="button" id="editor-cancel">Abbrechen</button>
</div>
</form>
</div>
<script type="module" src="/static/ui.js"></script>
</body>
</html>
+82 -122
View File
@@ -1,129 +1,89 @@
/* crushdb – simple, clean dark UI */
:root {
--bg: #101418;
--panel: #1a2028;
--panel-2: #202830;
--border: #2c3642;
--text: #e6edf3;
--muted: #8b98a5;
--accent: #4da3ff;
--danger: #ff5d5d;
--ok: #47d68a;
}
* { box-sizing: border-box; } * { box-sizing: border-box; }
body { body {
margin: 0 auto; font-family: system-ui, -apple-system, sans-serif;
max-width: 960px; margin: 0;
padding: 2rem 1rem; background: #f6f7f9;
font-family: system-ui, -apple-system, "Segoe UI", sans-serif; color: #1f2330;
background: var(--bg);
color: var(--text);
line-height: 1.5;
} }
header {
h1 { margin: 0 0 0.25rem; font-size: 1.6rem; }
.tagline { margin: 0 0 1.5rem; color: var(--muted); }
#flash {
min-height: 1.4rem;
margin-bottom: 1rem;
color: var(--ok);
}
#flash.error { color: var(--danger); }
#unlock {
max-width: 420px;
margin: 3rem auto;
background: var(--panel);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: 10px;
padding: 1.5rem;
}
#unlock label { display: block; margin-bottom: 0.5rem; }
#unlock input {
width: 100%;
margin-bottom: 1rem;
}
.hint { color: var(--muted); font-size: 0.85rem; margin-top: 1rem; }
input, button {
font: inherit;
color: var(--text);
}
input {
background: var(--panel-2);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: 6px;
padding: 0.5rem 0.7rem;
}
input:focus { outline: 1px solid var(--accent); }
button {
background: var(--accent);
color: #0b1016;
border: none;
border-radius: 6px;
padding: 0.5rem 1rem;
cursor: pointer;
font-weight: 600;
}
button:hover { filter: brightness(1.1); }
#app .toolbar {
display: flex;
gap: 0.75rem;
margin-bottom: 1rem;
}
#lock-btn { background: var(--panel-2); color: var(--text); border: 1px solid var(--border); }
table {
width: 100%;
border-collapse: collapse;
background: var(--panel);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: 10px;
overflow: hidden;
}
th, td {
padding: 0.6rem 0.75rem;
text-align: left;
border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border);
}
thead th { background: var(--panel-2); color: var(--muted); font-weight: 600; }
tbody tr:last-child td { border-bottom: none; }
tbody tr:hover { background: var(--panel-2); }
.row-error td { color: var(--danger); font-size: 0.9rem; }
td:last-child, td button { white-space: nowrap; }
td button + button { margin-left: 0.4rem; }
/* modal */
#editor-backdrop {
position: fixed;
inset: 0;
background: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.6);
display: flex; display: flex;
align-items: center; align-items: center;
justify-content: center; justify-content: space-between;
padding: 12px 16px;
background: #ffffff;
border-bottom: 1px solid #e4e7ee;
} }
.account-bar { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 12px; }
#editor { main {
background: var(--panel); max-width: 1100px;
border: 1px solid var(--border); margin: 16px auto;
border-radius: 10px; padding: 0 16px;
padding: 1.5rem; display: grid;
width: min(440px, 92vw); grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fit, minmax(320px, 1fr));
gap: 16px;
} }
.panel {
#editor h2 { margin-top: 0; font-size: 1.15rem; } background: #ffffff;
#editor label { display: block; margin-bottom: 0.75rem; color: var(--muted); } border: 1px solid #e4e7ee;
#editor input { width: 100%; margin-top: 0.25rem; } border-radius: 8px;
#editor .actions { display: flex; gap: 0.75rem; margin-top: 1rem; } padding: 14px;
#editor-cancel { background: var(--panel-2); color: var(--text); border: 1px solid var(--border); } }
.panel h2 { margin-top: 0; font-size: 14px; text-transform: uppercase; letter-spacing: 0.04em; color: #6b7280; }
.panel label {
display: block;
font-size: 12px;
color: #6b7280;
margin: 8px 0 2px;
}
input, select, textarea {
width: 100%;
padding: 6px 8px;
border: 1px solid #d1d5db;
border-radius: 4px;
font-size: 14px;
font-family: inherit;
}
textarea { min-height: 60px; resize: vertical; }
button, .btn-small {
background: #2563eb;
color: #fff;
border: none;
padding: 6px 12px;
border-radius: 4px;
cursor: pointer;
font-size: 14px;
}
button[type="button"] { background: #e5e7eb; color: #1f2330; }
.btn-small { padding: 4px 8px; font-size: 12px; }
.btn-ghost { background: transparent; color: #dc2626; border: 1px solid #dc2626; }
.card { max-width: 420px; margin: 60px auto; padding: 24px; }
.card h1 { margin: 0 0 16px; }
.hint { font-size: 12px; color: #6b7280; margin-top: 12px; }
.msg { color: #dc2626; font-size: 12px; margin-top: 8px; word-break: break-word; }
.hidden { display: none; }
ul { list-style: none; padding: 0; margin: 8px 0 0; }
li {
padding: 8px 10px;
border: 1px solid #e4e7ee;
border-radius: 4px;
margin: 4px 0;
font-size: 13px;
background: #fafbfc;
}
li .meta { color: #6b7280; font-size: 11px; display: block; margin-top: 4px; }
.account-bar .dot { width: 8px; height: 8px; border-radius: 50%; background: #10b981; display: inline-block; }
.badge {
font-size: 11px;
text-transform: uppercase;
letter-spacing: 0.05em;
padding: 2px 8px;
border-radius: 999px;
background: #e5e7eb;
color: #374151;
}
.panel.admin {
border-color: #c7d2fe;
background: #f8faff;
}
.panel.admin h2 { color: #4338ca; }
#myperson .meta { margin-top: 4px; }
+487 -258
View File
@@ -1,275 +1,504 @@
/** "use strict";
* ui.js – browser UI logic for crushdb.
*
* Flow:
* 1. User enters a passphrase → Argon2id derives the session key in
* memory (never sent anywhere, never persisted).
* 2. Fetch ciphertext records from /api/records, decrypt each in
* memory; decrypt failures are surfaced as "wrong passphrase or
* tampered record" without leaking details.
* 3. Create/edit records: form values are encrypted client-side
* before POST/PUT; the server only ever sees ciphertext.
* 4. Delete requires the record's current version (optimistic lock).
* 5. "Lock" wipes the passphrase field and releases decrypted rows so
* nothing sensitive lingers in the DOM.
*/
import { (function () {
deriveKey, const msgEl = document.getElementById("app-msg") || document.getElementById("login-msg");
encryptRecord, const isLoginPage = !!document.getElementById("login-form");
decryptRecord,
randomSalt,
randomUuid,
wipeKey,
} from "./crypto.js";
// ---------- tiny DOM helpers ---------- let currentAccount = null;
const $ = (sel) => document.querySelector(sel); function showMessage(text, isError) {
if (!msgEl) return;
function el(tag, attrs = {}, children = []) { appendMsg(msgEl, text, isError);
const node = document.createElement(tag);
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(attrs)) {
if (k === "class") node.className = v;
else if (k === "text") node.textContent = v;
else node.setAttribute(k, v);
}
for (const child of children) node.appendChild(child);
return node;
}
function flash(msg, isError = false) {
const box = $("#flash");
box.textContent = msg;
box.className = isError ? "flash error" : "flash";
setTimeout(() => { box.textContent = ""; }, 4000);
}
// ---------- session state (memory only) ----------
let sessionKey = null; // Uint8Array(32) or null
function resetSession() {
wipeKey(sessionKey);
sessionKey = null;
$("#records").replaceChildren();
$("#app").hidden = true;
$("#unlock").hidden = false;
$("#passphrase").value = "";
$("#passphrase").focus();
}
// ---------- API helpers ----------
async function api(path, opts = {}) {
const res = await fetch(path, {
headers: opts.body ? { "Content-Type": "application/json" } : {},
...opts,
});
if (!res.ok) {
let detail = "";
try { detail = (await res.json()).error ?? ""; } catch { /* noop */ }
throw new Error(`HTTP ${res.status}${detail ? ": " + detail : ""}`);
}
if (res.status === 204) return null;
return res.json();
}
// ---------- rendering ----------
function iso(ts) {
if (ts === null || ts === "") return "–";
const d = new Date(ts);
return isNaN(d) ? String(ts) : d.toLocaleString();
}
function renderRow(record, payload) {
const tr = el("tr");
const cells = [
payload.personA,
payload.personB,
iso(payload.tsStart),
iso(payload.tsEnd),
payload.action,
];
for (const text of cells) {
const td = el("td");
td.textContent = text ?? ""; // textContent = no HTML injection
tr.appendChild(td);
} }
const ops = el("td"); function clearMessage() {
ops.appendChild( showMessage("", false);
el("button", {
text: "Bearbeiten",
type: "button",
onclick: () => openEditor(record, payload),
})
);
ops.appendChild(
el("button", {
text: "Löschen",
type: "button",
onclick: () => removeRecord(record),
})
);
tr.appendChild(ops);
return tr;
}
async function reload() {
const tbody = $("#records tbody");
tbody.replaceChildren();
const raw = await api("/api/records");
let failures = 0;
for (const record of raw) {
try {
const payload = decryptRecord(sessionKey, record);
payload.__version = record.version; // used for optimistic locking
tbody.appendChild(renderRow(record, payload));
} catch {
failures++;
tbody.appendChild(
el("tr", { class: "row-error" }, [
el("td", { colspan: "6", text: "Datensatz nicht entschlüsselbar (falsche Passphrase oder manipuliert)." }),
])
);
}
}
if (failures > 0) flash(`${failures} Datensatz/Datensätze konnten nicht entschlüsselt werden.`, true);
}
function openEditor(record, payload) {
const form = $("#editor");
form.dataset.uuid = record.uuid;
form.dataset.version = payload.__version;
form.dataset.salt = record.salt;
$("#editor-title").textContent = "Datensatz bearbeiten";
$("#f-persona").value = payload.personA ?? "";
$("#f-personb").value = payload.personB ?? "";
$("#f-tsstart").value = payload.tsStart ? new Date(payload.tsStart).toISOString().slice(0, 16) : "";
$("#f-tsend").value = payload.tsEnd ? new Date(payload.tsEnd).toISOString().slice(0, 16) : "";
$("#f-action").value = payload.action ?? "";
$("#editor-backdrop").hidden = false;
}
function newRecord() {
const form = $("#editor");
form.reset();
form.dataset.uuid = randomUuid();
form.dataset.version = "";
form.dataset.salt = "";
$("#editor-title").textContent = "Neuer Datensatz";
$("#editor-backdrop").hidden = false;
}
function closeEditor() {
$("#editor-backdrop").hidden = true;
$("#editor").reset();
}
function tsOrNull(inputValue) {
if (!inputValue) return null;
const d = new Date(inputValue);
return isNaN(d) ? null : d.toISOString();
}
// ---------- record operations ----------
async function saveRecord(ev) {
ev.preventDefault();
if (!sessionKey) { flash("Bitte zuerst entsperren.", true); return; }
const form = $("#editor");
const payload = {
personA: $("#f-persona").value.trim(),
personB: $("#f-personb").value.trim(),
tsStart: tsOrNull($("#f-tsstart").value),
tsEnd: tsOrNull($("#f-tsend").value),
action: $("#f-action").value.trim(),
};
if (!payload.personA || !payload.personB || !payload.action) {
flash("Person A, Person B und Aktion sind erforderlich.", true);
return;
} }
const isEdit = form.dataset.version !== ""; function byId(id) {
const salt = isEdit ? new Uint8Array(atob(form.dataset.salt).split("").map((c) => c.charCodeAt(0))) : randomSalt(); return document.getElementById(id);
const enc = encryptRecord(sessionKey, form.dataset.uuid, payload, salt);
try {
if (isEdit) {
enc.version = Number(form.dataset.version);
await api(`/api/records/${encodeURIComponent(enc.uuid)}`, { method: "PUT", body: JSON.stringify(enc) });
} else {
await api("/api/records", { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify(enc) });
}
closeEditor();
await reload();
flash(isEdit ? "Datensatz aktualisiert." : "Datensatz erstellt.");
} catch (e) {
closeEditor();
if (String(e).includes("409")) {
flash("Konflikt: Der Datensatz wurde zwischenzeitlich geändert. Liste wird neu geladen.", true);
} else {
flash("Speichern fehlgeschlagen: " + e.message, true);
}
await reload();
} }
}
async function removeRecord(record) { function setOptions(sel, items, valueOf, labelOf, keepSelection) {
if (!sessionKey) { flash("Bitte zuerst entsperren.", true); return; } if (!sel) return;
if (!confirm("Diesen Datensatz wirklich löschen?")) return; const current = keepSelection ? sel.value : "";
try { sel.innerHTML = "";
const current = await api(`/api/records/${encodeURIComponent(record.uuid)}`); items.forEach(function (item) {
await api(`/api/records/${encodeURIComponent(record.uuid)}`, { const o = document.createElement("option");
method: "DELETE", o.value = valueOf(item);
body: JSON.stringify({ version: current.version }), o.textContent = labelOf(item);
sel.appendChild(o);
}); });
await reload(); if (current) {
flash("Datensatz gelöscht."); for (const o of sel.options) {
} catch (e) { if (o.value === current) o.selected = true;
if (String(e).includes("409")) flash("Konflikt beim Löschen (Version geändert). Bitte erneut versuchen.", true); }
else flash("Löschen fehlgeschlagen: " + e.message, true); }
await reload();
} }
}
// ---------- unlock / lock ---------- /* ----------------------------- login page ----------------------------- */
async function unlock(ev) { function initLoginPage() {
ev.preventDefault(); const form = byId("login-form");
const passphrase = $("#passphrase").value; if (!form) return;
if (!passphrase) { flash("Bitte Passphrase eingeben.", true); return; } form.addEventListener("submit", function (e) {
// Salt for key derivation: per-record salts are used for the AEAD; e.preventDefault();
// for the session key we use a fixed domain-salt so all records can clearMessage();
// be opened with one passphrase. It contains no secret. const email = form.email.value.trim();
const domainSalt = new TextEncoder().encode("crushdb://session-key-v1"); const password = form.password.value;
try { if (!email || !password) {
sessionKey = deriveKey(passphrase, domainSalt); showMessage("email and password required", true);
$("#passphrase").value = ""; return;
$("#unlock").hidden = true; }
$("#app").hidden = false; fetch("/login", {
await reload(); method: "POST",
} catch (e) { headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
flash("Entsperren fehlgeschlagen: " + e.message, true); body: JSON.stringify({ email: email, password: password }),
})
.then(function (r) {
return r.json().then(function (data) {
if (!r.ok) throw new Error(data.error || "login failed");
return data;
});
})
.then(function () {
window.location.href = "/";
})
.catch(function (err) {
showMessage(err.message || "login failed", true);
});
});
} }
}
function lock() { /* ------------------------------ main app ------------------------------ */
if (!confirm("Sperren? Alle entschlüsselten Daten werden verworfen.")) return;
resetSession();
}
// ---------- wire-up ---------- function initMainApp() {
req("/account/me")
.then(function (account) {
currentAccount = account;
startMainApp(account);
})
.catch(function () {
window.location.href = "/login";
});
}
document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", () => { function startMainApp(account) {
$("#unlock-form").addEventListener("submit", unlock); const emailEl = byId("user-email");
$("#lock-btn").addEventListener("click", lock); if (emailEl) emailEl.textContent = account.email;
$("#new-btn").addEventListener("click", newRecord); const roleEl = byId("user-role");
$("#editor").addEventListener("submit", saveRecord); if (roleEl) roleEl.textContent = account.is_admin ? "admin" : "user";
$("#editor-cancel").addEventListener("click", closeEditor);
window.addEventListener("beforeunload", () => wipeKey(sessionKey)); renderMyPerson(account);
$("#passphrase").focus();
}); bindNoteForm();
bindGroupForm();
bindInviteForm();
if (account.is_admin) {
bindAdminPersonForm();
bindAttachForm();
bindRightForm();
loadArticleTypes();
populateRightsDropdown();
refreshRights();
}
refreshPersons();
refreshArticles();
refreshGroups();
}
function renderMyPerson(account) {
const box = byId("myperson");
const form = byId("note-form");
const hint = byId("note-hint");
if (!account.person_id) {
if (box) box.innerHTML = "Your account is not linked to a person yet. Ask an admin to link it.";
if (form) {
Array.prototype.forEach.call(form.querySelectorAll("input, textarea, button"), function (el) {
el.disabled = true;
});
}
if (hint) hint.textContent = "You can add notes, groups and invites once an admin links you to a person.";
return;
}
req("/persons/" + encodeURIComponent(account.person_id))
.then(function (p) {
if (!box) return;
box.innerHTML =
"<strong>" + escapeHtml(p.name || "(unnamed)") + "</strong>" +
'<span class="meta">' +
(p.emails && p.emails.length ? "emails: " + escapeHtml(p.emails.join(", ")) : "no email shown") +
"</span>";
})
.catch(function () {
if (box) box.textContent = "Person not found.";
});
}
function loadArticleTypes() {
req("/api/types")
.then(function (data) {
setOptions(
byId("note-type"),
data.article_types || [],
function (t) { return t; },
function (t) { return (data.article_type_labels && data.article_type_labels[t]) || t; }
);
})
.catch(function () {});
}
function populateRightsDropdown() {
req("/api/types")
.then(function (data) {
const rights = data.rights || {};
setOptions(
byId("right-right"),
Object.keys(rights),
function (k) { return k; },
function (k) { return k + " - " + rights[k]; }
);
})
.catch(function () {});
}
function bindNoteForm() {
const form = byId("note-form");
if (!form) return;
form.addEventListener("submit", function (e) {
e.preventDefault();
clearMessage();
const isAdmin = currentAccount && currentAccount.is_admin;
const personSel = byId("note-person");
const personId = isAdmin && personSel ? personSel.value : currentAccount && currentAccount.person_id;
if (!personId) {
showMessage("no person linked to your account", true);
return;
}
const typeSel = byId("note-type");
const visSel = byId("note-visibility");
req("/articles", {
method: "POST",
body: {
person_id: personId,
article_type: isAdmin && typeSel ? typeSel.value : "notes",
title: form.title.value,
content: form.content.value,
visibility: isAdmin && visSel ? visSel.value : "private",
group_ids: [],
},
})
.then(function () {
form.reset();
refreshArticles();
})
.catch(function (err) {
showMessage(err.message || "failed to save", true);
});
});
}
function refreshArticles() {
req("/articles")
.then(function (data) {
const list = byId("articles-list");
if (!list) return;
list.innerHTML = "";
if (!data.length) {
list.innerHTML = '<li class="meta">Nothing here yet.</li>';
return;
}
data.forEach(function (a) {
const li = document.createElement("li");
li.innerHTML =
"<strong>" + escapeHtml(a.title || "(untitled)") + "</strong> " +
'<span class="meta">' +
escapeHtml(a.article_type) +
" · " + escapeHtml(a.visibility) +
"</span>" +
(a.content
? "<pre style='margin:4px 0;white-space:pre-wrap;font:inherit;background:#fff;border:1px solid #e4e7ee;padding:4px;border-radius:4px;'>" +
escapeHtml(a.content) + "</pre>"
: "") +
(a.visibility === "group" && a.allowed_groups && a.allowed_groups.length
? '<span class="meta">groups: ' + escapeHtml(a.allowed_groups.join(", ")) + "</span>"
: "");
list.appendChild(li);
});
})
.catch(function (err) {
showMessage(err.message || "failed to load articles", true);
});
}
function refreshPersons() {
req("/persons")
.then(function (data) {
const label = function (p) { return p.name || "(unnamed)"; };
setOptions(byId("invite-person"), data, function (p) { return p.id; }, label, true);
const noteSel = byId("note-person");
setOptions(noteSel, data, function (p) { return p.id; }, label, true);
if (noteSel && !noteSel.value && currentAccount && currentAccount.person_id) {
noteSel.value = currentAccount.person_id;
}
setOptions(byId("attach-person"), data, function (p) { return p.id; }, label, true);
const list = byId("admin-persons-list");
if (!list) return;
list.innerHTML = "";
if (!data.length) {
list.innerHTML = '<li class="meta">No persons yet.</li>';
return;
}
data.forEach(function (p) {
const li = document.createElement("li");
li.innerHTML =
"<strong>" + escapeHtml(p.name || "(unnamed)") + "</strong>" +
'<span class="meta">' +
(p.emails && p.emails.length ? "emails: " + escapeHtml(p.emails.join(", ")) : "no emails") +
"</span>";
list.appendChild(li);
});
})
.catch(function (err) {
showMessage(err.message || "failed to load persons", true);
});
}
function bindAdminPersonForm() {
const form = byId("admin-person-form");
if (!form) return;
form.addEventListener("submit", function (e) {
e.preventDefault();
clearMessage();
req("/admin/persons", {
method: "POST",
body: {
name: form.name.value,
email: form.email.value,
password: form.password.value,
},
})
.then(function (person) {
form.reset();
showMessage("created person: " + (person.name || person.id), false);
refreshPersons();
})
.catch(function (err) {
showMessage(err.message || "failed to create person", true);
});
});
}
function bindAttachForm() {
const form = byId("attach-form");
if (!form) return;
const send = function (action, okText) {
const personId = byId("attach-person").value;
const email = byId("attach-email").value.trim();
if (!personId || !email) {
showMessage("select a person and enter an email", true);
return;
}
req("/persons/" + encodeURIComponent(personId) + "/emails/" + action, {
method: "POST",
body: { email: email },
})
.then(function () {
showMessage(okText + " " + email, false);
refreshPersons();
})
.catch(function (err) {
showMessage(err.message || "failed to change email", true);
});
};
form.addEventListener("submit", function (e) {
e.preventDefault();
clearMessage();
send("attach", "attached");
});
const detach = byId("detach-email");
if (detach) {
detach.addEventListener("click", function () {
clearMessage();
send("detach", "detached");
});
}
}
function bindGroupForm() {
const form = byId("group-form");
if (!form) return;
form.addEventListener("submit", function (e) {
e.preventDefault();
clearMessage();
if (!currentAccount || !currentAccount.person_id) {
showMessage("no person linked to your account", true);
return;
}
req("/groups", {
method: "POST",
body: { person_id: currentAccount.person_id, name: form.name.value },
})
.then(function () {
form.reset();
refreshGroups();
})
.catch(function (err) {
showMessage(err.message || "failed to create group", true);
});
});
}
function refreshGroups() {
req("/groups")
.then(function (data) {
setOptions(
byId("invite-group"),
data,
function (g) { return g.id; },
function (g) { return g.name || "(unnamed)"; },
true
);
const list = byId("groups-list");
if (!list) return;
list.innerHTML = "";
if (!data.length) {
list.innerHTML = '<li class="meta">No groups yet. Create one above.</li>';
return;
}
data.forEach(function (g) {
const li = document.createElement("li");
li.innerHTML =
"<strong>" + escapeHtml(g.name || "(unnamed)") + "</strong> " +
'<span class="meta">members: ' +
(g.members && g.members.length
? escapeHtml(g.members.map(function (m) { return m.name || "(unnamed)"; }).join(", "))
: "none") +
"</span>";
list.appendChild(li);
});
})
.catch(function (err) {
showMessage(err.message || "failed to load groups", true);
});
}
function bindInviteForm() {
const form = byId("invite-form");
if (!form) return;
const addMember = function (groupId, personId) {
if (!groupId || !personId) {
showMessage("select a group and a person", true);
return;
}
req("/groups/" + encodeURIComponent(groupId) + "/members/" + encodeURIComponent(personId), {
method: "POST",
body: {},
})
.then(function () {
clearMessage();
refreshGroups();
})
.catch(function (err) {
showMessage(err.message || "failed to add member", true);
});
};
form.addEventListener("submit", function (e) {
e.preventDefault();
clearMessage();
addMember(byId("invite-group").value, byId("invite-person").value);
});
const join = byId("join-self");
if (join) {
join.addEventListener("click", function () {
clearMessage();
if (!currentAccount || !currentAccount.person_id) {
showMessage("no person linked to your account", true);
return;
}
addMember(byId("invite-group").value, currentAccount.person_id);
});
}
}
function refreshRights() {
req("/rights")
.then(function (data) {
const accountSel = byId("right-account");
setOptions(
accountSel,
data,
function (a) { return a.id; },
function (a) { return a.email + (a.rights && a.rights.length ? " (" + a.rights.join(", ") + ")" : ""); },
true
);
const list = byId("rights-list");
if (!list) return;
list.innerHTML = "";
data.forEach(function (a) {
const li = document.createElement("li");
li.innerHTML =
"<strong>" + escapeHtml(a.email) + "</strong> " +
'<span class="meta">' +
(a.rights && a.rights.length ? escapeHtml(a.rights.join(", ")) : "no rights") +
"</span>";
list.appendChild(li);
});
})
.catch(function (err) {
showMessage(err.message || "failed to load rights", true);
});
}
function bindRightForm() {
const form = byId("right-form");
if (!form) return;
form.addEventListener("submit", function (e) {
e.preventDefault();
clearMessage();
if (!form.account_id.value || !form.right.value) {
showMessage("select account and right", true);
return;
}
req("/rights/grant", {
method: "POST",
body: { account_id: form.account_id.value, right: form.right.value },
})
.then(refreshRights)
.catch(function (err) {
showMessage(err.message || "failed to grant right", true);
});
});
const revokeBtn = byId("revoke-right");
if (revokeBtn) {
revokeBtn.addEventListener("click", function () {
clearMessage();
const accountSel = byId("right-account");
const rightSel = byId("right-right");
if (!accountSel.value || !rightSel.value) {
showMessage("select account and right to revoke", true);
return;
}
req("/rights/revoke", {
method: "POST",
body: { account_id: accountSel.value, right: rightSel.value },
})
.then(refreshRights)
.catch(function (err) {
showMessage(err.message || "failed to revoke right", true);
});
});
}
}
if (isLoginPage) {
initLoginPage();
} else if (byId("app-msg")) {
initMainApp();
}
})();
+3 -378
View File
@@ -1,379 +1,4 @@
/** // Stub placeholder for noble-ciphers internal _arx module
* Basic utils for ARX (add-rotate-xor) salsa and chacha ciphers. export function arx() {
throw new Error("noble _arx stub: not implemented");
RFC8439 requires multi-step cipher stream, where
authKey starts with counter: 0, actual msg with counter: 1.
For this, we need a way to re-use nonce / counter:
const counter = new Uint8Array(4);
chacha(..., counter, ...); // counter is now 1
chacha(..., counter, ...); // counter is now 2
This is complicated:
- 32-bit counters are enough, no need for 64-bit: max ArrayBuffer size in JS is 4GB
- Original papers don't allow mutating counters
- Counter overflow is undefined [^1]
- Idea A: allow providing (nonce | counter) instead of just nonce, re-use it
- Caveat: Cannot be re-used through all cases:
- * chacha has (counter | nonce)
- * xchacha has (nonce16 | counter | nonce16)
- Idea B: separate nonce / counter and provide separate API for counter re-use
- Caveat: there are different counter sizes depending on an algorithm.
- salsa & chacha also differ in structures of key & sigma:
salsa20: s[0] | k(4) | s[1] | nonce(2) | cnt(2) | s[2] | k(4) | s[3]
chacha: s(4) | k(8) | cnt(1) | nonce(3)
chacha20orig: s(4) | k(8) | cnt(2) | nonce(2)
- Idea C: helper method such as `setSalsaState(key, nonce, sigma, data)`
- Caveat: we can't re-use counter array
xchacha uses the subkey and remaining 8 byte nonce with ChaCha20 as normal
(prefixed by 4 NUL bytes, since RFC8439 specifies a 12-byte nonce).
Counter overflow is undefined; see {@link https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/gsOnTJzcbgG6OqD8Sc0GO5aR_tU/ | the CFRG thread}.
Current noble policy is strict non-wrap for the shared 32-bit counter path:
exported ARX ciphers reject initial `0xffffffff` and stop before any implicit
wrap back to zero.
See {@link https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha#appendix-A.2 | the XChaCha appendix} for the extended-nonce construction.
* @module
*/
import { abool, abytes, anumber, checkOpts, clean, complexOverlapBytes, copyBytes, getOutput, isAligned32, isLE, randomBytes, swap32IfBE, u32, } from "./utils.js";
// Replaces `TextEncoder` for ASCII literals, which is enough for sigma constants.
// Non-ASCII input would not match UTF-8 `TextEncoder` output.
const encodeStr = (str) => Uint8Array.from(str.split(''), (c) => c.charCodeAt(0));
// Raw `createCipher(...)` exports consume these native-endian `u32(...)` views directly.
// Public `wrapCipher(...)` APIs reject non-little-endian platforms before reaching this path.
// RFC 8439 §2.3 / RFC 7539 §2.3 only define the 256-bit-key constants; this 16-byte sigma is
// kept for legacy allowShortKeys Salsa/ChaCha variants.
const sigma16_32 = /* @__PURE__ */ (() => swap32IfBE(u32(encodeStr('expand 16-byte k'))))();
// RFC 8439 §2.3 / RFC 7539 §2.3 define words 0-3 as
// `0x61707865 0x3320646e 0x79622d32 0x6b206574`, i.e. `expand 32-byte k`.
const sigma32_32 = /* @__PURE__ */ (() => swap32IfBE(u32(encodeStr('expand 32-byte k'))))();
/**
* Rotates a 32-bit word left.
* @param a - Input word.
* @param b - Rotation count in bits.
* @returns Rotated 32-bit word.
* @example
* Moves the top byte of `0x12345678` into the low byte position.
* ```ts
* rotl(0x12345678, 8);
* ```
*/
export function rotl(a, b) {
return (a << b) | (a >>> (32 - b));
} }
// Salsa and Chacha block length is always 512-bit
const BLOCK_LEN = 64;
// RFC 8439 §2.2 / RFC 7539 §2.2: the ChaCha state has 16 32-bit words.
const BLOCK_LEN32 = 16;
// Counter policy for the shared public `counter` argument:
// - RFC/IETF ChaCha20 uses a 32-bit counter.
// - OpenSSL/Node `chacha20` instead treat the full 16-byte IV as a 128-bit
// counter state and carry into the next word.
// - Raw `chacha20orig`, `salsa20`, `xsalsa20`, and `xchacha20` use 64-bit counters in libsodium
// and libtomcrypt, while some libs (for example libtomcrypt's RFC/IETF path) reject the max
// boundary instead of carrying.
// - AEAD wrappers diverge too: libsodium `xchacha20poly1305` uses the IETF payload counter from
// block 1, while `secretstream_xchacha20poly1305` is a different protocol with rekey/reset.
// Noble intentionally throws instead of silently picking one wrap model for users. In the default
// path, even a 32-bit boundary would take 2^32 blocks * 64 bytes = 256 GiB, which is practically
// unreachable for normal JS callers; advanced users who pass `counter` explicitly can implement
// whatever wider carry / wrap policy they need on top.
const MAX_COUNTER = /* @__PURE__ */ (() => 2 ** 32 - 1)();
const U32_EMPTY = /* @__PURE__ */ Uint32Array.of();
function runCipher(core, sigma, key, nonce, data, output, counter, rounds) {
const len = data.length;
const block = new Uint8Array(BLOCK_LEN);
const b32 = u32(block);
// Make sure that buffers aligned to 4 bytes
const isAligned = isLE && isAligned32(data) && isAligned32(output);
const d32 = isAligned ? u32(data) : U32_EMPTY;
const o32 = isAligned ? u32(output) : U32_EMPTY;
// RFC 8439 §2.4.1 / RFC 7539 §2.4.1 allow XORing one keystream block at a time and
// truncating the final partial block instead of materializing the whole keystream.
if (!isLE) {
for (let pos = 0; pos < len; counter++) {
core(sigma, key, nonce, b32, counter, rounds);
// RFC 8439 §2.4 / RFC 7539 §2.4 serialize keystream words in little-endian order.
swap32IfBE(b32);
if (counter >= MAX_COUNTER)
throw new Error('arx: counter overflow');
const take = Math.min(BLOCK_LEN, len - pos);
for (let j = 0, posj; j < take; j++) {
posj = pos + j;
output[posj] = data[posj] ^ block[j];
}
pos += take;
}
return;
}
for (let pos = 0; pos < len; counter++) {
core(sigma, key, nonce, b32, counter, rounds);
// See MAX_COUNTER policy note above: never silently wrap the shared public counter.
if (counter >= MAX_COUNTER)
throw new Error('arx: counter overflow');
const take = Math.min(BLOCK_LEN, len - pos);
// aligned to 4 bytes
if (isAligned && take === BLOCK_LEN) {
const pos32 = pos / 4;
if (pos % 4 !== 0)
throw new Error('arx: invalid block position');
for (let j = 0, posj; j < BLOCK_LEN32; j++) {
posj = pos32 + j;
o32[posj] = d32[posj] ^ b32[j];
}
pos += BLOCK_LEN;
continue;
}
for (let j = 0, posj; j < take; j++) {
posj = pos + j;
output[posj] = data[posj] ^ block[j];
}
pos += take;
}
}
/**
* Creates an ARX stream cipher from a 32-bit core permutation.
* Used internally to build the exported Salsa and ChaCha stream ciphers.
* @param core - Core function that fills one keystream block.
* @param opts - Cipher layout and nonce-extension options. See {@link CipherOpts}.
* @returns Stream cipher function over byte arrays.
* @throws If the core callback, key size, counter, or output sizing is invalid. {@link Error}
*/
export function createCipher(core, opts) {
const { allowShortKeys, extendNonceFn, counterLength, counterRight, rounds } = checkOpts({ allowShortKeys: false, counterLength: 8, counterRight: false, rounds: 20 }, opts);
if (typeof core !== 'function')
throw new Error('core must be a function');
anumber(counterLength);
anumber(rounds);
abool(counterRight);
abool(allowShortKeys);
return (key, nonce, data, output, counter = 0) => {
abytes(key, undefined, 'key');
abytes(nonce, undefined, 'nonce');
abytes(data, undefined, 'data');
const len = data.length;
// Raw XorStream APIs return ciphertext/plaintext bytes directly, so caller-provided outputs
// must match the logical result length exactly instead of returning an oversized workspace.
const hasOutput = output !== undefined;
output = getOutput(len, output, false);
if (hasOutput)
complexOverlapBytes(data, output);
anumber(counter);
// See MAX_COUNTER policy note above: reject advanced explicit-counter requests before any wrap.
if (counter < 0 || counter >= MAX_COUNTER)
throw new Error('arx: counter overflow');
const toClean = [];
// Key & sigma
// key=16 -> sigma16, k=key|key
// key=32 -> sigma32, k=key
let l = key.length;
let k;
let sigma;
if (l === 32) {
// Copy caller keys too: big-endian normalization, extended-nonce subkey derivation, and
// final clean(...) all mutate or wipe the temporary buffer in place.
toClean.push((k = copyBytes(key)));
sigma = sigma32_32;
}
else if (l === 16 && allowShortKeys) {
k = new Uint8Array(32);
k.set(key);
k.set(key, 16);
sigma = sigma16_32;
toClean.push(k);
}
else {
abytes(key, 32, 'arx key');
throw new Error('invalid key size');
// throw new Error(`"arx key" expected Uint8Array of length 32, got length=${l}`);
}
// Nonce
// salsa20: 8 (8-byte counter)
// chacha20orig: 8 (8-byte counter)
// chacha20: 12 (4-byte counter)
// xsalsa20: 24 (16 -> hsalsa, 8 -> old nonce)
// xchacha20: 24 (16 -> hchacha, 8 -> old nonce)
// Copy before taking u32(...) views on misaligned inputs, and on big-endian so later
// swap32IfBE(...) never mutates caller nonce bytes in place.
if (!isLE || !isAligned32(nonce))
toClean.push((nonce = copyBytes(nonce)));
let k32 = u32(k);
// hsalsa & hchacha: handle extended nonce
if (extendNonceFn) {
if (nonce.length !== 24)
throw new Error('arx: extended nonce must be 24 bytes');
const n16 = nonce.subarray(0, 16);
if (isLE)
extendNonceFn(sigma, k32, u32(n16), k32);
else {
const sigmaRaw = swap32IfBE(Uint32Array.from(sigma));
extendNonceFn(sigmaRaw, k32, u32(n16), k32);
clean(sigmaRaw);
swap32IfBE(k32);
}
nonce = nonce.subarray(16);
}
else if (!isLE)
swap32IfBE(k32);
// Handle nonce counter
const nonceNcLen = 16 - counterLength;
if (nonceNcLen !== nonce.length)
throw new Error(`arx: nonce must be ${nonceNcLen} or 16 bytes`);
// Normalize 64-bit-nonce layouts to the 12-byte core input: ChaCha/XChaCha prefix 4 zero
// counter bytes, while Salsa/XSalsa append them after the nonce words.
if (nonceNcLen !== 12) {
const nc = new Uint8Array(12);
nc.set(nonce, counterRight ? 0 : 12 - nonce.length);
nonce = nc;
toClean.push(nonce);
}
const n32 = swap32IfBE(u32(nonce));
// Ensure temporary key/nonce copies are wiped even if the remaining
// runtime guard in runCipher(...) throws on counter overflow.
try {
runCipher(core, sigma, k32, n32, data, output, counter, rounds);
return output;
}
finally {
clean(...toClean);
}
};
}
/** Internal class which wraps chacha20 or chacha8 to create CSPRNG. */
export class _XorStreamPRG {
blockLen;
keyLen;
nonceLen;
state;
buf;
key;
nonce;
pos;
ctr;
cipher;
destroyed = false;
constructor(cipher, blockLen, keyLen, nonceLen, seed) {
this.cipher = cipher;
this.blockLen = blockLen;
this.keyLen = keyLen;
this.nonceLen = nonceLen;
this.state = new Uint8Array(this.keyLen + this.nonceLen);
this.reseed(seed);
this.ctr = 0;
this.pos = this.blockLen;
this.buf = new Uint8Array(this.blockLen);
// Keep a single key||nonce backing buffer so reseed/addEntropy/clean update the live cipher
// inputs in place through these subarray views.
this.key = this.state.subarray(0, this.keyLen);
this.nonce = this.state.subarray(this.keyLen);
}
reseed(seed) {
abytes(seed, undefined, 'seed');
if (!seed || seed.length === 0)
throw new Error('entropy required');
// Mix variable-length entropy cyclically across the whole key||nonce state, then restart the
// keystream so buffered leftovers from the previous state are never reused.
for (let i = 0; i < seed.length; i++)
this.state[i % this.state.length] ^= seed[i];
this.ctr = 0;
this.pos = this.blockLen;
}
addEntropy(seed) {
if (this.destroyed)
throw new Error('cannot use destroyed PRG');
// Reject empty entropy before re-keying, otherwise a throwing call would still advance state.
abytes(seed, undefined, 'seed');
if (seed.length === 0)
throw new Error('entropy required');
// Re-key from the current stream first, then mix external entropy into the fresh key||nonce
// state through reseed() so stale buffered bytes are discarded.
this.state.set(this.randomBytes(this.state.length));
this.reseed(seed);
}
randomBytes(len) {
if (this.destroyed)
throw new Error('cannot use destroyed PRG');
anumber(len);
if (len === 0)
return new Uint8Array(0);
const avail = this.pos < this.blockLen ? this.blockLen - this.pos : 0;
const blocks = Math.ceil(Math.max(0, len - avail) / this.blockLen);
// Preflight overflow so failed reads don't partially consume keystream
// and leave the PRG repeating blocks.
if (blocks > 0 && this.ctr > MAX_COUNTER - blocks)
throw new Error('arx: counter overflow');
const out = new Uint8Array(len);
let outPos = 0;
// `out` starts zero-filled, and `buf.fill(0)` below does the same for leftovers: XOR-stream
// ciphers then emit raw keystream bytes directly into those buffers.
// Serve buffered leftovers first so split reads stay identical to one larger read.
if (this.pos < this.blockLen) {
const take = Math.min(len, this.blockLen - this.pos);
out.set(this.buf.subarray(this.pos, this.pos + take), 0);
this.pos += take;
outPos += take;
if (outPos === len)
return out; // fast path
}
// Full blocks directly to out
const full = Math.floor((len - outPos) / this.blockLen);
if (full > 0) {
const blockBytes = full * this.blockLen;
const b = out.subarray(outPos, outPos + blockBytes);
this.cipher(this.key, this.nonce, b, b, this.ctr);
this.ctr += full;
outPos += blockBytes;
}
// Save leftovers
const left = len - outPos;
if (left > 0) {
this.buf.fill(0);
// NOTE: cipher will handle overflow
this.cipher(this.key, this.nonce, this.buf, this.buf, this.ctr++);
out.set(this.buf.subarray(0, left), outPos);
this.pos = left;
}
return out;
}
// Clone seeds the new instance from this stream, so the source PRG advances too.
clone() {
if (this.destroyed)
throw new Error('cannot use destroyed PRG');
return new _XorStreamPRG(this.cipher, this.blockLen, this.keyLen, this.nonceLen, this.randomBytes(this.state.length));
}
// Zeroes the current state, leftover buffer, and marks the instance destroyed.
// The instance fails closed: any later randomBytes()/addEntropy()/clone() throws instead
// of silently continuing from zero key||nonce state (which would yield predictable output).
clean() {
this.pos = 0;
this.ctr = 0;
this.buf.fill(0);
this.state.fill(0);
this.destroyed = true;
}
}
/**
* Creates a PRG constructor from a stream cipher.
* @param cipher - Stream cipher used to fill output blocks.
* @param blockLen - Keystream block length in bytes.
* @param keyLen - Internal key length in bytes.
* @param nonceLen - Internal nonce length in bytes.
* @returns PRG factory for seeded concrete `_XorStreamPRG` instances.
* @example
* Builds a PRG from XChaCha20 and reads bytes from a randomly seeded instance.
* ```ts
* import { xchacha20 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js';
* import { createPRG } from '@noble/ciphers/_arx.js';
* import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js';
* const seed = randomBytes(32);
* const init = createPRG(xchacha20, 64, 32, 24);
* const prg = init(seed);
* prg.randomBytes(8);
* ```
*/
export const createPRG = (cipher, blockLen, keyLen, nonceLen) => {
return ((seed = randomBytes(32)) => new _XorStreamPRG(cipher, blockLen, keyLen, nonceLen, seed));
};
+3 -317
View File
@@ -1,318 +1,4 @@
/** // Stub placeholder for noble-ciphers internal _poly1305 module
* Poly1305 ({@link https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf | PDF}, export function poly1305() {
* {@link https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poly1305 | wiki}) throw new Error("noble _poly1305 stub: not implemented");
* is a fast and parallel secret-key message-authentication code suitable for
* a wide variety of applications. It was standardized in
* {@link https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8439 | RFC 8439} and is now used in TLS 1.3.
*
* Polynomial MACs are not perfect for every situation:
* they lack Random Key Robustness: the MAC can be forged, and can't be used in PAKE schemes.
* See {@link https://keymaterial.net/2020/09/07/invisible-salamanders-in-aes-gcm-siv/ | the invisible salamanders attack writeup}.
* To combat invisible salamanders, `hash(key)` can be included in ciphertext,
* however, this would violate ciphertext indistinguishability:
* an attacker would know which key was used - so `HKDF(key, i)`
* could be used instead.
*
* Check out the {@link https://cr.yp.to/mac.html | original website}.
* Based on public-domain {@link https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna | poly1305-donna}.
* @module
*/
// prettier-ignore
import { abytes, aexists, aoutput, clean, copyBytes, wrapMacConstructor } from "./utils.js";
// A simple-loop reference version (`poly1305_small`) lives in
// `test/misc/micro-ciphers.ts`, provided for auditability.
// Little-endian 2-byte load used by the Poly1305 limb decomposition.
function u8to16(a, i) {
return (a[i++] & 0xff) | ((a[i++] & 0xff) << 8);
} }
/**
* Incremental Poly1305 MAC state.
* Prefer `poly1305()` for one-shot use.
* @param key - 32-byte Poly1305 one-time key.
* @example
* Feeds one chunk into an incremental Poly1305 state with a fresh one-time key.
*
* ```ts
* import { Poly1305 } from '@noble/ciphers/_poly1305.js';
* import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js';
* const key = randomBytes(32);
* const mac = new Poly1305(key);
* mac.update(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
* mac.digest();
* ```
*/
export class Poly1305 {
blockLen = 16;
outputLen = 16;
buffer = new Uint8Array(16);
r = new Uint16Array(10); // Allocating 1 array with .subarray() here is slower than 3
h = new Uint16Array(10);
pad = new Uint16Array(8);
pos = 0;
finished = false;
destroyed = false;
// Can be speed-up using BigUint64Array, at the cost of complexity
constructor(key) {
key = copyBytes(abytes(key, 32, 'key'));
const t0 = u8to16(key, 0);
const t1 = u8to16(key, 2);
const t2 = u8to16(key, 4);
const t3 = u8to16(key, 6);
const t4 = u8to16(key, 8);
const t5 = u8to16(key, 10);
const t6 = u8to16(key, 12);
const t7 = u8to16(key, 14);
// RFC 8439 §2.5.1 / RFC 7539 §2.5.1 clamp r before multiplication.
// These masks unpack that clamped value into 13-bit limbs, while pad
// keeps the raw s half for finalize().
// {@link https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna/blob/e6ad6e091d30d7f4ec2d4f978be1fcfcbce72781/poly1305-donna-16.h#L47 | poly1305-donna reference}
this.r[0] = t0 & 0x1fff;
this.r[1] = ((t0 >>> 13) | (t1 << 3)) & 0x1fff;
this.r[2] = ((t1 >>> 10) | (t2 << 6)) & 0x1f03;
this.r[3] = ((t2 >>> 7) | (t3 << 9)) & 0x1fff;
this.r[4] = ((t3 >>> 4) | (t4 << 12)) & 0x00ff;
this.r[5] = (t4 >>> 1) & 0x1ffe;
this.r[6] = ((t4 >>> 14) | (t5 << 2)) & 0x1fff;
this.r[7] = ((t5 >>> 11) | (t6 << 5)) & 0x1f81;
this.r[8] = ((t6 >>> 8) | (t7 << 8)) & 0x1fff;
this.r[9] = (t7 >>> 5) & 0x007f;
for (let i = 0; i < 8; i++)
this.pad[i] = u8to16(key, 16 + 2 * i);
}
process(data, offset, isLast = false) {
// RFC 8439 §2.5 / §2.5.1 and RFC 7539 §2.5 / §2.5.1 add an extra high
// bit to every full 16-byte block. The final partial block gets its
// explicit `1` byte during digestInto(), so `hibit` stays zero there.
const hibit = isLast ? 0 : 1 << 11;
const { h, r } = this;
const r0 = r[0];
const r1 = r[1];
const r2 = r[2];
const r3 = r[3];
const r4 = r[4];
const r5 = r[5];
const r6 = r[6];
const r7 = r[7];
const r8 = r[8];
const r9 = r[9];
const t0 = u8to16(data, offset + 0);
const t1 = u8to16(data, offset + 2);
const t2 = u8to16(data, offset + 4);
const t3 = u8to16(data, offset + 6);
const t4 = u8to16(data, offset + 8);
const t5 = u8to16(data, offset + 10);
const t6 = u8to16(data, offset + 12);
const t7 = u8to16(data, offset + 14);
let h0 = h[0] + (t0 & 0x1fff);
let h1 = h[1] + (((t0 >>> 13) | (t1 << 3)) & 0x1fff);
let h2 = h[2] + (((t1 >>> 10) | (t2 << 6)) & 0x1fff);
let h3 = h[3] + (((t2 >>> 7) | (t3 << 9)) & 0x1fff);
let h4 = h[4] + (((t3 >>> 4) | (t4 << 12)) & 0x1fff);
let h5 = h[5] + ((t4 >>> 1) & 0x1fff);
let h6 = h[6] + (((t4 >>> 14) | (t5 << 2)) & 0x1fff);
let h7 = h[7] + (((t5 >>> 11) | (t6 << 5)) & 0x1fff);
let h8 = h[8] + (((t6 >>> 8) | (t7 << 8)) & 0x1fff);
let h9 = h[9] + ((t7 >>> 5) | hibit);
let c = 0;
let d0 = c + h0 * r0 + h1 * (5 * r9) + h2 * (5 * r8) + h3 * (5 * r7) + h4 * (5 * r6);
c = d0 >>> 13;
d0 &= 0x1fff;
d0 += h5 * (5 * r5) + h6 * (5 * r4) + h7 * (5 * r3) + h8 * (5 * r2) + h9 * (5 * r1);
c += d0 >>> 13;
d0 &= 0x1fff;
let d1 = c + h0 * r1 + h1 * r0 + h2 * (5 * r9) + h3 * (5 * r8) + h4 * (5 * r7);
c = d1 >>> 13;
d1 &= 0x1fff;
d1 += h5 * (5 * r6) + h6 * (5 * r5) + h7 * (5 * r4) + h8 * (5 * r3) + h9 * (5 * r2);
c += d1 >>> 13;
d1 &= 0x1fff;
let d2 = c + h0 * r2 + h1 * r1 + h2 * r0 + h3 * (5 * r9) + h4 * (5 * r8);
c = d2 >>> 13;
d2 &= 0x1fff;
d2 += h5 * (5 * r7) + h6 * (5 * r6) + h7 * (5 * r5) + h8 * (5 * r4) + h9 * (5 * r3);
c += d2 >>> 13;
d2 &= 0x1fff;
let d3 = c + h0 * r3 + h1 * r2 + h2 * r1 + h3 * r0 + h4 * (5 * r9);
c = d3 >>> 13;
d3 &= 0x1fff;
d3 += h5 * (5 * r8) + h6 * (5 * r7) + h7 * (5 * r6) + h8 * (5 * r5) + h9 * (5 * r4);
c += d3 >>> 13;
d3 &= 0x1fff;
let d4 = c + h0 * r4 + h1 * r3 + h2 * r2 + h3 * r1 + h4 * r0;
c = d4 >>> 13;
d4 &= 0x1fff;
d4 += h5 * (5 * r9) + h6 * (5 * r8) + h7 * (5 * r7) + h8 * (5 * r6) + h9 * (5 * r5);
c += d4 >>> 13;
d4 &= 0x1fff;
let d5 = c + h0 * r5 + h1 * r4 + h2 * r3 + h3 * r2 + h4 * r1;
c = d5 >>> 13;
d5 &= 0x1fff;
d5 += h5 * r0 + h6 * (5 * r9) + h7 * (5 * r8) + h8 * (5 * r7) + h9 * (5 * r6);
c += d5 >>> 13;
d5 &= 0x1fff;
let d6 = c + h0 * r6 + h1 * r5 + h2 * r4 + h3 * r3 + h4 * r2;
c = d6 >>> 13;
d6 &= 0x1fff;
d6 += h5 * r1 + h6 * r0 + h7 * (5 * r9) + h8 * (5 * r8) + h9 * (5 * r7);
c += d6 >>> 13;
d6 &= 0x1fff;
let d7 = c + h0 * r7 + h1 * r6 + h2 * r5 + h3 * r4 + h4 * r3;
c = d7 >>> 13;
d7 &= 0x1fff;
d7 += h5 * r2 + h6 * r1 + h7 * r0 + h8 * (5 * r9) + h9 * (5 * r8);
c += d7 >>> 13;
d7 &= 0x1fff;
let d8 = c + h0 * r8 + h1 * r7 + h2 * r6 + h3 * r5 + h4 * r4;
c = d8 >>> 13;
d8 &= 0x1fff;
d8 += h5 * r3 + h6 * r2 + h7 * r1 + h8 * r0 + h9 * (5 * r9);
c += d8 >>> 13;
d8 &= 0x1fff;
let d9 = c + h0 * r9 + h1 * r8 + h2 * r7 + h3 * r6 + h4 * r5;
c = d9 >>> 13;
d9 &= 0x1fff;
d9 += h5 * r4 + h6 * r3 + h7 * r2 + h8 * r1 + h9 * r0;
c += d9 >>> 13;
d9 &= 0x1fff;
c = ((c << 2) + c) | 0;
c = (c + d0) | 0;
d0 = c & 0x1fff;
c = c >>> 13;
d1 += c;
h[0] = d0;
h[1] = d1;
h[2] = d2;
h[3] = d3;
h[4] = d4;
h[5] = d5;
h[6] = d6;
h[7] = d7;
h[8] = d8;
h[9] = d9;
}
finalize() {
const { h, pad } = this;
const g = new Uint16Array(10);
let c = h[1] >>> 13;
h[1] &= 0x1fff;
for (let i = 2; i < 10; i++) {
h[i] += c;
c = h[i] >>> 13;
h[i] &= 0x1fff;
}
h[0] += c * 5;
c = h[0] >>> 13;
h[0] &= 0x1fff;
h[1] += c;
c = h[1] >>> 13;
h[1] &= 0x1fff;
h[2] += c;
// RFC 8439 §2.5 / RFC 7539 §2.5 reduce modulo 2^130-5 before repacking
// to 16-bit words and adding the raw s half.
g[0] = h[0] + 5;
c = g[0] >>> 13;
g[0] &= 0x1fff;
for (let i = 1; i < 10; i++) {
g[i] = h[i] + c;
c = g[i] >>> 13;
g[i] &= 0x1fff;
}
g[9] -= 1 << 13;
let mask = (c ^ 1) - 1;
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++)
g[i] &= mask;
mask = ~mask;
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++)
h[i] = (h[i] & mask) | g[i];
h[0] = (h[0] | (h[1] << 13)) & 0xffff;
h[1] = ((h[1] >>> 3) | (h[2] << 10)) & 0xffff;
h[2] = ((h[2] >>> 6) | (h[3] << 7)) & 0xffff;
h[3] = ((h[3] >>> 9) | (h[4] << 4)) & 0xffff;
h[4] = ((h[4] >>> 12) | (h[5] << 1) | (h[6] << 14)) & 0xffff;
h[5] = ((h[6] >>> 2) | (h[7] << 11)) & 0xffff;
h[6] = ((h[7] >>> 5) | (h[8] << 8)) & 0xffff;
h[7] = ((h[8] >>> 8) | (h[9] << 5)) & 0xffff;
let f = h[0] + pad[0];
h[0] = f & 0xffff;
for (let i = 1; i < 8; i++) {
f = (((h[i] + pad[i]) | 0) + (f >>> 16)) | 0;
h[i] = f & 0xffff;
}
clean(g);
}
update(data) {
aexists(this);
abytes(data);
data = copyBytes(data);
const { buffer, blockLen } = this;
const len = data.length;
for (let pos = 0; pos < len;) {
const take = Math.min(blockLen - this.pos, len - pos);
// Fast path: we have at least one block in input
if (take === blockLen) {
for (; blockLen <= len - pos; pos += blockLen)
this.process(data, pos);
continue;
}
buffer.set(data.subarray(pos, pos + take), this.pos);
this.pos += take;
pos += take;
if (this.pos === blockLen) {
this.process(buffer, 0, false);
this.pos = 0;
}
}
return this;
}
destroy() {
// `aexists(this)` guards update/digest paths, so destroy must mark the instance unusable too.
this.destroyed = true;
clean(this.h, this.r, this.buffer, this.pad);
}
digestInto(out) {
aexists(this);
aoutput(out, this);
this.finished = true;
const { buffer, h } = this;
let { pos } = this;
if (pos) {
// RFC 8439 §2.5 / RFC 7539 §2.5: the final short block appends a
// single `0x01` byte and zero-fills the remaining bytes before the
// last multiplication step.
buffer[pos++] = 1;
for (; pos < 16; pos++)
buffer[pos] = 0;
this.process(buffer, 0, true);
}
this.finalize();
let opos = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
out[opos++] = h[i] >>> 0;
out[opos++] = h[i] >>> 8;
}
}
digest() {
const { buffer, outputLen } = this;
this.digestInto(buffer);
// Copy out before destroy() zeroes the internal buffer.
const res = buffer.slice(0, outputLen);
this.destroy();
return res;
}
}
/**
* Poly1305 MAC from RFC 8439.
* @param msg - Message bytes to authenticate.
* @param key - 32-byte Poly1305 one-time key.
* @returns 16-byte authentication tag.
* @example
* Authenticates one message with a one-shot Poly1305 call and a fresh key.
*
* ```ts
* import { poly1305 } from '@noble/ciphers/_poly1305.js';
* import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js';
* const key = randomBytes(32);
* poly1305(new Uint8Array(), key);
* ```
*/
export const poly1305 = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapMacConstructor(32, (key) => new Poly1305(key));
+3 -459
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@@ -1,460 +1,4 @@
/** // Stub placeholder for noble-ciphers chacha module
* ChaCha stream cipher, released export function chacha20(poly1305) {
* in 2008. Developed after Salsa20, ChaCha aims to increase diffusion per round. throw new Error("noble chacha stub: not implemented");
* It was standardized in
* {@link https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8439 | RFC 8439} and
* is now used in TLS 1.3.
*
* {@link https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha | XChaCha20}
* extended-nonce variant is also provided. Similar to XSalsa, it's safe to use with
* randomly-generated nonces.
*
* Check out
* {@link http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf | PDF},
* {@link https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salsa20 | wiki}, and
* {@link https://cr.yp.to/chacha.html | website}.
*
* @module
*/
import { createCipher, createPRG, rotl } from "./_arx.js";
import { poly1305 } from "./_poly1305.js";
import { abytes, clean, equalBytes, getOutput, isLE, swap32IfBE, u64Lengths, wrapCipher, } from "./utils.js";
/**
* ChaCha core function. Uses an unrolled loop (chachaCore, hchacha) - 4x
* faster than a simple loop, but larger & harder to read. A simple-loop
* reference version lives in `test/misc/micro-ciphers.ts`;
* `test/arx.test.ts` keeps the two aligned.
* The specific implementation is selected in `createCipher` below.
*/
/** RFC 8439 §2.3 block core for `state = constants | key | counter | nonce`. */
// prettier-ignore
function chachaCore(s, k, n, out, cnt, rounds = 20) {
let y00 = s[0], y01 = s[1], y02 = s[2], y03 = s[3], // "expa" "nd 3" "2-by" "te k"
y04 = k[0], y05 = k[1], y06 = k[2], y07 = k[3], // Key Key Key Key
y08 = k[4], y09 = k[5], y10 = k[6], y11 = k[7], // Key Key Key Key
y12 = cnt, y13 = n[0], y14 = n[1], y15 = n[2]; // Counter Nonce Nonce Nonce
// Save state to temporary variables
let x00 = y00, x01 = y01, x02 = y02, x03 = y03, x04 = y04, x05 = y05, x06 = y06, x07 = y07, x08 = y08, x09 = y09, x10 = y10, x11 = y11, x12 = y12, x13 = y13, x14 = y14, x15 = y15;
for (let r = 0; r < rounds; r += 2) {
x00 = (x00 + x04) | 0;
x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x00, 16);
x08 = (x08 + x12) | 0;
x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x08, 12);
x00 = (x00 + x04) | 0;
x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x00, 8);
x08 = (x08 + x12) | 0;
x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x08, 7);
x01 = (x01 + x05) | 0;
x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x01, 16);
x09 = (x09 + x13) | 0;
x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x09, 12);
x01 = (x01 + x05) | 0;
x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x01, 8);
x09 = (x09 + x13) | 0;
x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x09, 7);
x02 = (x02 + x06) | 0;
x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x02, 16);
x10 = (x10 + x14) | 0;
x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x10, 12);
x02 = (x02 + x06) | 0;
x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x02, 8);
x10 = (x10 + x14) | 0;
x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x10, 7);
x03 = (x03 + x07) | 0;
x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x03, 16);
x11 = (x11 + x15) | 0;
x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x11, 12);
x03 = (x03 + x07) | 0;
x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x03, 8);
x11 = (x11 + x15) | 0;
x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x11, 7);
x00 = (x00 + x05) | 0;
x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x00, 16);
x10 = (x10 + x15) | 0;
x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x10, 12);
x00 = (x00 + x05) | 0;
x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x00, 8);
x10 = (x10 + x15) | 0;
x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x10, 7);
x01 = (x01 + x06) | 0;
x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x01, 16);
x11 = (x11 + x12) | 0;
x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x11, 12);
x01 = (x01 + x06) | 0;
x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x01, 8);
x11 = (x11 + x12) | 0;
x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x11, 7);
x02 = (x02 + x07) | 0;
x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x02, 16);
x08 = (x08 + x13) | 0;
x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x08, 12);
x02 = (x02 + x07) | 0;
x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x02, 8);
x08 = (x08 + x13) | 0;
x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x08, 7);
x03 = (x03 + x04) | 0;
x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x03, 16);
x09 = (x09 + x14) | 0;
x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x09, 12);
x03 = (x03 + x04) | 0;
x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x03, 8);
x09 = (x09 + x14) | 0;
x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x09, 7);
}
// RFC 8439 §2.3 / §2.3.1: add the original state words back in state order.
let oi = 0;
out[oi++] = (y00 + x00) | 0;
out[oi++] = (y01 + x01) | 0;
out[oi++] = (y02 + x02) | 0;
out[oi++] = (y03 + x03) | 0;
out[oi++] = (y04 + x04) | 0;
out[oi++] = (y05 + x05) | 0;
out[oi++] = (y06 + x06) | 0;
out[oi++] = (y07 + x07) | 0;
out[oi++] = (y08 + x08) | 0;
out[oi++] = (y09 + x09) | 0;
out[oi++] = (y10 + x10) | 0;
out[oi++] = (y11 + x11) | 0;
out[oi++] = (y12 + x12) | 0;
out[oi++] = (y13 + x13) | 0;
out[oi++] = (y14 + x14) | 0;
out[oi++] = (y15 + x15) | 0;
} }
/**
* hchacha hashes key and nonce into key' and nonce' for xchacha20.
* Algorithmically identical to `hchacha_small` from `test/misc/micro-ciphers.ts`,
* but this exported path normalizes word order on big-endian hosts.
* Reuses `chachaCore` and subtracts its feed-forward, keeping the hot per-block
* path untouched.
* @param s - Sigma constants as 32-bit words.
* @param k - Key words.
* @param i - Nonce-prefix words.
* @param out - Output buffer for the derived subkey.
* @example
* Derives the XChaCha subkey from sigma, key, and nonce-prefix words.
*
* ```ts
* const sigma = new Uint32Array(4);
* const key = new Uint32Array(8);
* const nonce = new Uint32Array(4);
* const out = new Uint32Array(8);
* hchacha(sigma, key, nonce, out);
* ```
*/
// prettier-ignore
export function hchacha(s, k, i, out) {
// Runs the shared chachaCore permutation, then subtracts the RFC 8439 feed-forward
// it applies, recovering the raw permutation words hchacha needs.
// LE hosts read the caller arrays in place (no copies); BE hosts get
// byte-swapped scratch copies, wiped before returning.
const s2 = isLE ? s : swap32IfBE(s.slice(0, 4));
const k2 = isLE ? k : swap32IfBE(k.slice(0, 8));
const i2 = isLE ? i : swap32IfBE(i.slice(0, 4));
const t = new Uint32Array(16);
chachaCore(s2, k2, i2.subarray(1), t, i2[0]);
let oi = 0;
out[oi++] = (t[0] - s2[0]) | 0;
out[oi++] = (t[1] - s2[1]) | 0;
out[oi++] = (t[2] - s2[2]) | 0;
out[oi++] = (t[3] - s2[3]) | 0;
out[oi++] = (t[12] - i2[0]) | 0;
out[oi++] = (t[13] - i2[1]) | 0;
out[oi++] = (t[14] - i2[2]) | 0;
out[oi++] = (t[15] - i2[3]) | 0;
swap32IfBE(out);
if (!isLE)
clean(s2, k2, i2);
clean(t);
}
/**
* Original, non-RFC chacha20 from DJB. 8-byte nonce, 8-byte counter.
* The nonce/counter layout still reserves 8 counter bytes internally, but the shared public
* `counter` argument follows noble's strict non-wrapping 32-bit policy. See `src/_arx.ts`
* near `MAX_COUNTER` for the full counter-policy rationale.
* @param key - 16-byte or 32-byte key.
* @param nonce - 8-byte nonce.
* @param data - Input bytes to xor with the keystream.
* @param output - Optional destination buffer.
* @param counter - Initial block counter.
* @returns Encrypted or decrypted bytes.
* @example
* Encrypts bytes with the original 8-byte-nonce ChaCha variant and a fresh key/nonce.
*
* ```ts
* import { chacha20orig } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js';
* import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js';
* const key = randomBytes(32);
* const nonce = randomBytes(8);
* chacha20orig(key, nonce, new Uint8Array(4));
* ```
*/
export const chacha20orig = /* @__PURE__ */ createCipher(chachaCore, {
counterRight: false,
counterLength: 8,
allowShortKeys: true,
});
/**
* ChaCha stream cipher. Conforms to RFC 8439 (IETF, TLS). 12-byte nonce, 4-byte counter.
* With smaller nonce, it's not safe to make it random (CSPRNG), due to collision chance.
* @param key - 32-byte key.
* @param nonce - 12-byte nonce.
* @param data - Input bytes to xor with the keystream.
* @param output - Optional destination buffer.
* @param counter - Initial block counter.
* @returns Encrypted or decrypted bytes.
* @example
* Encrypts bytes with the RFC 8439 ChaCha20 stream cipher and a fresh key/nonce.
*
* ```ts
* import { chacha20 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js';
* import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js';
* const key = randomBytes(32);
* const nonce = randomBytes(12);
* chacha20(key, nonce, new Uint8Array(4));
* ```
*/
export const chacha20 = /* @__PURE__ */ createCipher(chachaCore, {
counterRight: false,
counterLength: 4,
allowShortKeys: false,
});
/**
* XChaCha eXtended-nonce ChaCha. With 24-byte nonce, it's safe to make it random (CSPRNG).
* See {@link https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha | the IRTF draft}.
* The nonce/counter layout still reserves 8 counter bytes internally, but the shared public
* `counter` argument follows noble's strict non-wrapping 32-bit policy. See `src/_arx.ts`
* near `MAX_COUNTER` for the full counter-policy rationale.
* @param key - 32-byte key.
* @param nonce - 24-byte extended nonce.
* @param data - Input bytes to xor with the keystream.
* @param output - Optional destination buffer.
* @param counter - Initial block counter.
* @returns Encrypted or decrypted bytes.
* @example
* Encrypts bytes with XChaCha20 using a fresh key and random 24-byte nonce.
*
* ```ts
* import { xchacha20 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js';
* import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js';
* const key = randomBytes(32);
* const nonce = randomBytes(24);
* xchacha20(key, nonce, new Uint8Array(4));
* ```
*/
export const xchacha20 = /* @__PURE__ */ createCipher(chachaCore, {
counterRight: false,
counterLength: 8,
extendNonceFn: hchacha,
allowShortKeys: false,
});
/**
* Reduced 8-round chacha, described in original paper.
* @param key - 32-byte key.
* @param nonce - 12-byte nonce.
* @param data - Input bytes to xor with the keystream.
* @param output - Optional destination buffer.
* @param counter - Initial block counter.
* @returns Encrypted or decrypted bytes.
* @example
* Uses the reduced 8-round variant for non-critical workloads with a fresh key/nonce.
*
* ```ts
* import { chacha8 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js';
* import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js';
* const key = randomBytes(32);
* const nonce = randomBytes(12);
* chacha8(key, nonce, new Uint8Array(4));
* ```
*/
export const chacha8 = /* @__PURE__ */ createCipher(chachaCore, {
counterRight: false,
counterLength: 4,
rounds: 8,
});
/**
* Reduced 12-round chacha, described in original paper.
* @param key - 32-byte key.
* @param nonce - 12-byte nonce.
* @param data - Input bytes to xor with the keystream.
* @param output - Optional destination buffer.
* @param counter - Initial block counter.
* @returns Encrypted or decrypted bytes.
* @example
* Uses the reduced 12-round variant for non-critical workloads with a fresh key/nonce.
*
* ```ts
* import { chacha12 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js';
* import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js';
* const key = randomBytes(32);
* const nonce = randomBytes(12);
* chacha12(key, nonce, new Uint8Array(4));
* ```
*/
export const chacha12 = /* @__PURE__ */ createCipher(chachaCore, {
counterRight: false,
counterLength: 4,
rounds: 12,
});
// Test-only hook: exposes the unrolled production core so tests can compare it
// with the simple/reference core from `test/misc/micro-ciphers.ts`.
export const __TESTS = /* @__PURE__ */ Object.freeze({ chachaCore });
// RFC 8439 §2.8.1 pad16(x): shared zero block for AAD/ciphertext padding.
const ZEROS16 = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(16);
// RFC 8439 §2.8 / §2.8.1: aligned inputs add nothing, otherwise append 16-(len%16) zero bytes.
const updatePadded = (h, msg) => {
h.update(msg);
const leftover = msg.length % 16;
if (leftover)
h.update(ZEROS16.subarray(leftover));
};
// RFC 8439 §2.6.1 poly1305_key_gen returns `block[0..31]`, so AEAD key
// generation only needs 32 zero bytes.
const ZEROS32 = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(32);
function computeTag(fn, key, nonce, ciphertext, AAD) {
if (AAD !== undefined)
abytes(AAD, undefined, 'AAD');
// RFC 8439 §2.6 / §2.8: derive the Poly1305 one-time key from counter 0,
// then MAC AAD || pad16(AAD) || ciphertext || pad16(ciphertext) || len(AAD) || len(ciphertext).
const authKey = fn(key, nonce, ZEROS32);
const lengths = u64Lengths(ciphertext.length, AAD ? AAD.length : 0, true);
// Methods below can be replaced with
// `return poly1305_computeTag_small(authKey, lengths, ciphertext, AAD)`
// from `test/misc/micro-ciphers.ts`.
const h = poly1305.create(authKey);
if (AAD)
updatePadded(h, AAD);
updatePadded(h, ciphertext);
h.update(lengths);
const res = h.digest();
clean(authKey, lengths);
return res;
}
/**
* AEAD algorithm from RFC 8439.
* Salsa20 and chacha (RFC 8439) use poly1305 differently.
* We could have composed them, but it's hard because of authKey:
* In salsa20, authKey changes position in salsa stream.
* In chacha, authKey can't be computed inside computeTag, it modifies the counter.
*/
export const _poly1305_aead = (xorStream) => (key, nonce, AAD) => {
// This borrows caller key/nonce/AAD buffers by reference; mutating them after construction
// changes future encrypt/decrypt results.
const tagLength = 16;
return {
encrypt(plaintext, output) {
const plength = plaintext.length;
output = getOutput(plength + tagLength, output, false);
output.set(plaintext);
const oPlain = output.subarray(0, -tagLength);
// RFC 8439 §2.8: payload encryption starts at counter 1 because counter 0 produced the OTK.
xorStream(key, nonce, oPlain, oPlain, 1);
const tag = computeTag(xorStream, key, nonce, oPlain, AAD);
output.set(tag, plength); // append tag
clean(tag);
return output;
},
decrypt(ciphertext, output) {
output = getOutput(ciphertext.length - tagLength, output, false);
const data = ciphertext.subarray(0, -tagLength);
const passedTag = ciphertext.subarray(-tagLength);
const tag = computeTag(xorStream, key, nonce, data, AAD);
// RFC 8439 §2.8 / §4: authenticate ciphertext before decrypting it, and compare tags with
// the constant-time equalBytes() helper rather than decrypting speculative plaintext first.
if (!equalBytes(passedTag, tag)) {
clean(tag);
throw new Error('invalid tag');
}
output.set(ciphertext.subarray(0, -tagLength));
// Actual decryption
xorStream(key, nonce, output, output, 1); // start stream with i=1
clean(tag);
return output;
},
};
};
/**
* ChaCha20-Poly1305 from RFC 8439.
*
* Unsafe to use random nonces under the same key, due to collision chance.
* Prefer XChaCha instead.
* @param key - 32-byte key.
* @param nonce - 12-byte nonce.
* @param AAD - Additional authenticated data.
* @returns AEAD cipher instance.
* @example
* Encrypts and authenticates plaintext with a fresh key and nonce.
*
* ```ts
* import { chacha20poly1305 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js';
* import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js';
* const key = randomBytes(32);
* const nonce = randomBytes(12);
* const aad = new TextEncoder().encode('session metadata');
* const cipher = chacha20poly1305(key, nonce, aad);
* cipher.encrypt(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
* ```
*/
export const chacha20poly1305 = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher({ blockSize: 64, nonceLength: 12, tagLength: 16, withAAD: true },
/* @__PURE__ */ _poly1305_aead(chacha20));
/**
* XChaCha20-Poly1305 extended-nonce chacha.
*
* Can be safely used with random nonces (CSPRNG).
* See {@link https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha | the IRTF draft}.
* @param key - 32-byte key.
* @param nonce - 24-byte nonce.
* @param AAD - Additional authenticated data.
* @returns AEAD cipher instance.
* @example
* Encrypts and authenticates plaintext with a fresh key and random 24-byte nonce.
*
* ```ts
* import { xchacha20poly1305 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js';
* import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js';
* const key = randomBytes(32);
* const nonce = randomBytes(24);
* const aad = new TextEncoder().encode('session metadata');
* const cipher = xchacha20poly1305(key, nonce, aad);
* cipher.encrypt(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
* ```
*/
export const xchacha20poly1305 = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher({ blockSize: 64, nonceLength: 24, tagLength: 16, withAAD: true },
/* @__PURE__ */ _poly1305_aead(xchacha20));
/**
* Chacha20 CSPRNG (cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator).
* It's best to limit usage to non-production, non-critical cases: for example, test-only.
* Compatible with libtomcrypt. It does not have a specification, so unclear how secure it is.
* @param seed - Optional seed bytes mixed into the internal `key || nonce` state. When omitted,
* only 32 random bytes are mixed into the 40-byte state.
* @returns Seeded concrete `_XorStreamPRG` instance, including `clone()`.
* @example
* Seeds the test-only ChaCha20 DRBG from fresh entropy.
*
* ```ts
* import { rngChacha20 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js';
* import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js';
* const seed = randomBytes(32);
* const prg = rngChacha20(seed);
* prg.randomBytes(8);
* ```
*/
export const rngChacha20 = /* @__PURE__ */ createPRG(chacha20orig, 64, 32, 8);
/**
* Chacha20/8 CSPRNG (cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator).
* It's best to limit usage to non-production, non-critical cases: for example, test-only.
* Faster than `rngChacha20`.
* @param seed - Optional seed bytes mixed into the internal `key || nonce` state. When omitted,
* only 32 random bytes are mixed into the 44-byte state.
* @returns Seeded concrete `_XorStreamPRG` instance, including `clone()`.
* @example
* Seeds the faster test-only ChaCha8 DRBG from fresh entropy.
*
* ```ts
* import { rngChacha8 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js';
* import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js';
* const seed = randomBytes(32);
* const prg = rngChacha8(seed);
* prg.randomBytes(8);
* ```
*/
export const rngChacha8 = /* @__PURE__ */ createPRG(chacha8, 64, 32, 12);
+5 -892
View File
@@ -1,896 +1,9 @@
/** // Stub placeholder for noble-ciphers utils module
* Utilities for hex, bytes, CSPRNG.
* @module
*/
/*! noble-ciphers - MIT License (c) 2023 Paul Miller (paulmillr.com) */
export function aarray(item, title, inner = () => { }) {
if (!Array.isArray(item))
throw new TypeError(`"${title}" expected array, got type=${typeof item}`);
for (let i = 0; i < item.length; i++)
inner(item[i], `${title}[${i}]`);
return item;
}
/**
* Checks if something is Uint8Array. Be careful: nodejs Buffer will return true.
* @param a - Value to inspect.
* @returns `true` when the value is a Uint8Array view, including Node's `Buffer`.
* @example
* Guards a value before treating it as raw key material.
*
* ```ts
* isBytes(new Uint8Array());
* ```
*/
export function isBytes(a) {
// Plain `instanceof Uint8Array` is too strict for some Buffer / proxy /
// cross-realm cases. The fallback still requires a real ArrayBuffer view
// so plain JSON-deserialized `{ constructor: ... }`
// spoofing is rejected, and `BYTES_PER_ELEMENT === 1` keeps the fallback on byte-oriented views.
return (a instanceof Uint8Array ||
(ArrayBuffer.isView(a) &&
a.constructor.name === 'Uint8Array' &&
'BYTES_PER_ELEMENT' in a &&
a.BYTES_PER_ELEMENT === 1));
}
// Shared error-message prefix builder. Only called on throw paths, so assert
// success paths never pay for the string concatenation.
const atitle = (title) => (title ? `"${title}" ` : '');
/**
* Asserts something is boolean.
* @param value - Value to validate.
* @returns The validated boolean.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @example
* Validates a boolean option before branching on it.
*
* ```ts
* abool(true);
* ```
*/
export function abool(value, title = '') {
if (typeof value !== 'boolean')
throw new TypeError(atitle(title) + 'expected boolean, got type=' + typeof value);
return value;
}
/**
* Asserts something is a non-negative safe integer.
* @param n - Value to validate.
* @returns The validated number.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @throws On wrong argument ranges or values. {@link RangeError}
* @example
* Validates a non-negative length or counter.
*
* ```ts
* anumber(1);
* ```
*/
export function anumber(n, title = '') {
if (typeof n !== 'number')
throw new TypeError(atitle(title) + 'expected number, got ' + typeof n);
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(n) || n < 0)
throw new RangeError(atitle(title) + 'expected integer >= 0, got ' + n);
return n;
}
/**
* Asserts something is Uint8Array.
* @param value - Value to validate.
* @param length - Expected byte length.
* @param title - Optional label used in error messages.
* @returns The validated byte array.
* On Node, `Buffer` is accepted too because it is a Uint8Array view.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @throws On wrong argument lengths. {@link RangeError}
* @example
* Validates a fixed-length nonce or key buffer.
*
* ```ts
* abytes(new Uint8Array([1, 2]), 2);
* ```
*/
export function abytes(value, length, title = '') {
// Success path first: this runs at the start of every update() / digestInto(), and the
// common `abytes(data)` form must not pay for length handling it does not use.
if (isBytes(value) && (length === undefined || value.length === length))
return value;
// Error path: recompute freely to build the exact message.
if (length !== undefined)
anumber(length, 'length');
const bytes = isBytes(value);
const ofLen = length !== undefined ? ` of length ${length}` : '';
const got = bytes ? `length=${value.length}` : `type=${typeof value}`;
const message = atitle(title) + 'expected Uint8Array' + ofLen + ', got ' + got;
if (!bytes)
throw new TypeError(message);
throw new RangeError(message);
}
const aobject = (value, label) => {
if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object' || Array.isArray(value))
throw new TypeError(label === 'object'
? 'expected valid options object'
: `"${label}" expected object, got type=${typeof value}`);
};
/**
* Asserts a hash- or MAC-like instance has not been destroyed or finished.
* @param instance - Stateful instance to validate.
* @param checkFinished - Whether to reject finished instances.
* When `false`, only `destroyed` is checked.
* @throws If the hash instance has already been destroyed or finalized. {@link Error}
* @example
* Guards against calling `update()` or `digest()` on a finished hash.
*
* ```ts
* aexists({ destroyed: false, finished: false });
* ```
*/
export function aexists(instance, checkFinished = true) {
// Runs on every update()/digestInto(); the flags are library-owned booleans, so only their
// truthiness is checked - re-validating their type per call was pure hot-path overhead.
if (instance.destroyed)
throw new Error('hash was destroyed');
if (checkFinished && instance.finished)
throw new Error('digest() was already called');
}
/**
* Asserts output is a sufficiently-sized byte array.
* @param out - Output buffer to validate.
* @param instance - Hash-like instance providing `outputLen`.
* This is the relaxed `digestInto()`-style contract: output must be at least `outputLen`,
* unlike one-shot cipher helpers elsewhere in the repo that often require exact lengths.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @throws On wrong output buffer lengths. {@link RangeError}
* @example
* Verifies that a caller-provided output buffer is large enough.
*
* ```ts
* aoutput(new Uint8Array(16), { outputLen: 16 });
* ```
*/
export function aoutput(out, instance) {
abytes(out, undefined, 'output');
// `outputLen` is a library-owned readonly number; the negated comparison keeps failing fast
// when it is missing/NaN (comparisons with undefined/NaN are false) without an anumber() call.
const min = instance.outputLen;
if (!(out.length >= min)) {
throw new RangeError('"output" expected length >= ' + min);
}
}
/**
* Asserts output is a sufficiently-sized, 4-byte-aligned byte array.
* {@link aoutput} plus an {@link isAligned32} check, for `digestInto()` paths
* that write through zero-allocation `u32` word views.
* @param out - Output buffer to validate.
* @param instance - Hash-like instance providing `outputLen`.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @throws On wrong output buffer lengths. {@link RangeError}
* @throws On wrong output buffer alignment. {@link Error}
* @example
* Verifies that a caller-provided output buffer is large enough and aligned.
*
* ```ts
* aoutput32(new Uint8Array(16), { outputLen: 16 });
* ```
*/
export function aoutput32(out, instance) {
aoutput(out, instance);
if (!isAligned32(out))
throw new Error('invalid output, must be aligned');
}
/**
* Casts a typed-array view to Uint8Array.
* @param arr - Typed-array view to reinterpret.
* @returns Uint8Array view over the same bytes.
* @example
* Views 32-bit words as raw bytes without copying.
*
* ```ts
* u8(new Uint32Array([1]));
* ```
*/
export function u8(arr) {
return new Uint8Array(arr.buffer, arr.byteOffset, arr.byteLength);
}
/**
* Casts a typed-array view to Uint32Array.
* @param arr - Typed-array view to reinterpret.
* @returns Uint32Array view over the same bytes. Callers are expected to provide a
* 4-byte-aligned offset; trailing `1..3` bytes are silently dropped.
* @example
* Views a byte buffer as 32-bit words for block processing.
*
* ```ts
* u32(new Uint8Array(4));
* ```
*/
export function u32(arr) {
return new Uint32Array(arr.buffer, arr.byteOffset, Math.floor(arr.byteLength / 4));
}
/**
* Zeroizes typed arrays in place.
* Warning: JS provides no guarantees.
* @param arrays - Arrays to wipe.
* @example
* Wipes a temporary key buffer after use.
*
* ```ts
* const bytes = new Uint8Array([1]);
* clean(bytes);
* ```
*/
export function clean(...arrays) {
for (let i = 0; i < arrays.length; i++) {
arrays[i].fill(0);
}
}
/**
* Creates a DataView for byte-level manipulation.
* @param arr - Typed-array view to wrap.
* @returns DataView over the same bytes.
* @example
* Creates an endian-aware view for length encoding.
*
* ```ts
* createView(new Uint8Array(4));
* ```
*/
export function createView(arr) {
return new DataView(arr.buffer, arr.byteOffset, arr.byteLength);
}
/**
* Whether the current platform is little-endian.
* Most are; some IBM systems are not.
*/
export const isLE = /* @__PURE__ */ (() => new Uint8Array(new Uint32Array([0x11223344]).buffer)[0] === 0x44)();
/**
* Reverses byte order of one 32-bit word.
* @param word - Unsigned 32-bit word to swap.
* @returns The same word with bytes reversed.
* @example
* Swaps a big-endian word into little-endian byte order.
*
* ```ts
* byteSwap(0x11223344);
* ```
*/
export function byteSwap(word) {
return (((word << 24) & 0xff000000) |
((word << 8) & 0xff0000) |
((word >>> 8) & 0xff00) |
((word >>> 24) & 0xff));
}
/**
* Normalizes one 32-bit word to the little-endian representation expected by cipher cores.
* @param n - Unsigned 32-bit word to normalize.
* @returns Little-endian normalized word on big-endian hosts, else the input word unchanged.
* @example
* Normalizes a host-endian word before passing it into an ARX/AES core.
*
* ```ts
* swap8IfBE(0x11223344);
* ```
*/
export const swap8IfBE = isLE
? (n) => n
: (n) => byteSwap(n) >>> 0;
/**
* Byte-swaps every word of a Uint32Array in place.
* @param arr - Uint32Array whose words should be swapped.
* @returns The same array after in-place byte swapping.
* @example
* Swaps every 32-bit word in a word-view buffer.
*
* ```ts
* byteSwap32(new Uint32Array([0x11223344]));
* ```
*/
export function byteSwap32(arr) {
for (let i = 0; i < arr.length; i++) {
arr[i] = byteSwap(arr[i]);
}
return arr;
}
/**
* Normalizes a Uint32Array view to the little-endian representation expected by cipher cores.
* @param u - Word view to normalize in place.
* @returns Little-endian normalized word view.
* @example
* Normalizes a word-view buffer before block processing.
*
* ```ts
* swap32IfBE(new Uint32Array([0x11223344]));
* ```
*/
export const swap32IfBE = isLE
? (u) => u
: byteSwap32;
// Built-in hex conversion:
// {@link https://caniuse.com/mdn-javascript_builtins_uint8array_fromhex | caniuse entry}
const hasHexBuiltin = /* @__PURE__ */ (() =>
// @ts-ignore
typeof Uint8Array.from([]).toHex === 'function' && typeof Uint8Array.fromHex === 'function')();
// Array where index 0xf0 (240) is mapped to string 'f0'
const hexes = /* @__PURE__ */ Array.from({ length: 256 }, (_, i) => i.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'));
/**
* Convert byte array to hex string. Uses built-in function, when available.
* @param bytes - Bytes to encode.
* @returns Lowercase hexadecimal string.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @example
* Formats ciphertext bytes for logs or test vectors.
*
* ```ts
* bytesToHex(Uint8Array.from([0xca, 0xfe, 0x01, 0x23])); // 'cafe0123'
* ```
*/
export function bytesToHex(bytes) { export function bytesToHex(bytes) {
abytes(bytes); return Array.from(bytes).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
// @ts-ignore
if (hasHexBuiltin)
return bytes.toHex();
// pre-caching improves the speed 6x
let hex = '';
for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) {
hex += hexes[bytes[i]];
}
return hex;
} }
// Strict ASCII nibble parser: non-ASCII hex lookalikes are rejected as undefined.
// ASCII codes: '0'..'9' = 48..57, 'A'..'F' = 65..70, 'a'..'f' = 97..102.
// prettier-ignore
function asciiToBase16(ch) {
return ch >= 48 && ch <= 57 ? ch - 48 // '2' => 50-48
: ch >= 65 && ch <= 70 ? ch - (65 - 10) // 'B' => 66-(65-10)
: ch >= 97 && ch <= 102 ? ch - (97 - 10) // 'b' => 98-(97-10)
: undefined;
}
/**
* Convert hex string to byte array. Uses built-in function, when available.
* @param hex - hexadecimal string to decode
* @returns Decoded bytes.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @throws On wrong argument ranges or values. {@link RangeError}
* @example
* Decode lowercase hexadecimal into bytes.
* ```ts
* hexToBytes('cafe0123'); // Uint8Array.from([0xca, 0xfe, 0x01, 0x23])
* ```
*/
export function hexToBytes(hex) { export function hexToBytes(hex) {
if (typeof hex !== 'string') const bytes = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);
throw new TypeError('hex string expected, got ' + typeof hex); for (let i = 0; i < hex.length; i += 2) bytes[i / 2] = parseInt(hex.slice(i, i + 2), 16);
if (hasHexBuiltin) { return bytes;
try {
return Uint8Array.fromHex(hex);
}
catch (error) {
if (error instanceof SyntaxError)
throw new RangeError(error.message);
throw error;
}
}
const hl = hex.length;
const al = hl / 2;
if (hl % 2)
throw new RangeError('hex string expected, got unpadded hex of length ' + hl);
const array = new Uint8Array(al);
for (let ai = 0, hi = 0; ai < al; ai++, hi += 2) {
const n1 = asciiToBase16(hex.charCodeAt(hi)); // parse first char, multiply it by 16
const n2 = asciiToBase16(hex.charCodeAt(hi + 1)); // parse second char
if (n1 === undefined || n2 === undefined) {
const char = hex[hi] + hex[hi + 1];
throw new RangeError('hex string expected, got non-hex character "' + char + '" at index ' + hi);
}
array[ai] = n1 * 16 + n2; // example: 'A9' => 10*16 + 9
}
return array;
}
const _0n = /* @__PURE__ */ BigInt(0);
// Used in ff1, via bytesToNumberBE
/**
* Converts a big-endian hex string into bigint.
* @param hex - Hexadecimal string without `0x`.
* @returns Parsed bigint value. The empty string is treated as `0n`.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @example
* Parses a big-endian field element or counter from hex.
*
* ```ts
* hexToNumber('ff');
* ```
*/
export function hexToNumber(hex) {
if (typeof hex !== 'string')
throw new TypeError('hex string expected, got ' + typeof hex);
// Numeric parser, not byte-hex decoder: odd-length forms like 'f' are valid,
// and malformed syntax follows BigInt's native error behavior.
return hex === '' ? _0n : BigInt('0x' + hex); // Big Endian
}
// Used in ff1
// BE: Big Endian, LE: Little Endian
/**
* Converts big-endian bytes into bigint.
* @param bytes - Big-endian bytes.
* @returns Parsed bigint value. Empty input is treated as `0n`.
* @throws On invalid byte input passed to the internal hex conversion. {@link TypeError}
* @example
* Reads a big-endian integer from serialized bytes.
*
* ```ts
* bytesToNumberBE(new Uint8Array([1, 0]));
* ```
*/
export function bytesToNumberBE(bytes) {
return hexToNumber(bytesToHex(bytes));
}
/**
* Validates that a value is a non-negative bigint or safe integer.
* @param n - Value to validate.
* @returns The same validated value.
* @throws On wrong argument ranges or values. {@link RangeError}
*/
function abignumber(n) {
if (typeof n === 'bigint') {
if (!(_0n <= n))
throw new RangeError('positive bigint expected, got ' + n);
}
else
anumber(n);
return n;
}
// Used in ff1
/**
* Converts a number into big-endian bytes of fixed length.
* @param n - Number to encode.
* @param len - Output length in bytes. Must be greater than zero.
* @returns Big-endian bytes padded to `len`.
* Negative values, `len = 0`, and values that do not fit are rejected before
* downstream hex parsing.
* @throws On wrong argument ranges or values. {@link RangeError}
* @throws If a documented runtime validation or state check fails. {@link Error}
* @example
* Encodes a counter as fixed-width big-endian bytes.
*
* ```ts
* numberToBytesBE(1, 2);
* ```
*/
export function numberToBytesBE(n, len) {
anumber(len);
if (len === 0)
throw new Error('zero output length is invalid');
n = abignumber(n);
const expectedLen = len * 2;
const hex = n.toString(16);
// Detect overflow before hex parsing so oversized values don't leak the shared odd-hex error.
if (hex.length > expectedLen)
throw new RangeError('number is too large');
return hexToBytes(hex.padStart(expectedLen, '0'));
}
/**
* Converts string to bytes using UTF8 encoding.
* @param str - String to encode.
* @returns UTF-8 bytes in a detached fresh Uint8Array copy.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @example
* Encodes application text before encryption or MACing.
*
* ```ts
* utf8ToBytes('abc'); // new Uint8Array([97, 98, 99])
* ```
*/
export function utf8ToBytes(str) {
if (typeof str !== 'string')
throw new TypeError('string expected');
return new Uint8Array(new TextEncoder().encode(str)); // {@link https://bugzil.la/1681809 | Firefox bug 1681809}
}
/**
* Converts bytes to string using UTF8 encoding.
* @param bytes - UTF-8 bytes.
* @returns Decoded string. Input validation is delegated to `TextDecoder`, and malformed
* UTF-8 is replacement-decoded instead of rejected.
* @example
* Decodes UTF-8 plaintext back into a string.
*
* ```ts
* bytesToUtf8(new Uint8Array([97, 98, 99])); // 'abc'
* ```
*/
export function bytesToUtf8(bytes) {
return new TextDecoder().decode(bytes);
}
/**
* Checks if two U8A use same underlying buffer and overlaps.
* This is invalid and can corrupt data.
* @param a - First byte view.
* @param b - Second byte view.
* @returns `true` when the views overlap in memory.
* @example
* Detects whether two slices alias the same backing buffer.
*
* ```ts
* overlapBytes(new Uint8Array(4), new Uint8Array(4));
* ```
*/
export function overlapBytes(a, b) {
// Zero-length views cannot overwrite anything, even if their offset sits inside another range.
if (!a.byteLength || !b.byteLength)
return false;
return (a.buffer === b.buffer && // best we can do, may fail with an obscure Proxy
a.byteOffset < b.byteOffset + b.byteLength && // a starts before b end
b.byteOffset < a.byteOffset + a.byteLength // b starts before a end
);
}
/**
* If input and output overlap and input starts before output, we will overwrite end of input before
* we start processing it, so this is not supported by forward-processing ciphers.
* @param input - Input bytes.
* @param output - Output bytes.
* @throws If the output view would overwrite unread input bytes. {@link Error}
* @example
* Rejects an in-place layout that would overwrite unread input bytes.
*
* ```ts
* const buffer = new Uint8Array(8);
* complexOverlapBytes(buffer.subarray(0, 4), buffer.subarray(2, 6));
* ```
*/
export function complexOverlapBytes(input, output) {
// This is very cursed. It works somehow, but I'm completely unsure,
// reasoning about overlapping aligned windows is very hard.
if (overlapBytes(input, output) && input.byteOffset < output.byteOffset)
throw new Error('complex overlap of input and output is not supported');
}
/**
* Copies several Uint8Arrays into one.
* @param arrays - Byte arrays to concatenate.
* @returns Combined byte array.
* @throws On wrong argument types inside the byte-array list. {@link TypeError}
* @example
* Builds a `nonce || ciphertext` style buffer.
*
* ```ts
* concatBytes(new Uint8Array([1]), new Uint8Array([2]));
* ```
*/
export function concatBytes(...arrays) {
let sum = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < arrays.length; i++) {
const a = arrays[i];
abytes(a);
sum += a.length;
}
const res = new Uint8Array(sum);
for (let i = 0, pad = 0; i < arrays.length; i++) {
const a = arrays[i];
res.set(a, pad);
pad += a.length;
}
return res;
}
/**
* Merges user options into defaults.
* @param defaults - Default option values.
* @param opts - User-provided overrides.
* @returns Combined options object.
* `defaults` is a library-owned mutable object; user-provided `opts` only need to be
* object-shaped, since "plain object" checks reject valid proxy/cross-realm containers.
* The merge mutates `defaults` in place and returns the same object, so direct callers
* should pass a fresh defaults object unless they intentionally want shared state updated.
* @throws If options are missing or not an object. {@link Error}
* @example
* Applies user overrides to the default cipher options.
*
* ```ts
* checkOpts({ rounds: 20 }, { rounds: 8 });
* ```
*/
export function checkOpts(defaults, opts) {
aobject(defaults, 'defaults');
aobject(opts, 'opts');
// Mutates defaults by design. __proto__ follows Object.assign semantics here and can only
// affect this local option object; callers already control this low-level options surface.
const merged = Object.assign(defaults, opts);
return merged;
}
/**
* Compares two byte arrays in kinda constant time once lengths already match.
* @param a - First byte array.
* @param b - Second byte array.
* @returns `true` when the arrays contain the same bytes. Different lengths still return early.
* @example
* Compares an expected authentication tag with the received one.
*
* ```ts
* equalBytes(new Uint8Array([1]), new Uint8Array([1]));
* ```
*/
export function equalBytes(a, b) {
a = abytes(a);
b = abytes(b);
if (a.length !== b.length)
return false;
let diff = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++)
diff |= a[i] ^ b[i];
return diff === 0;
}
/**
* Wraps a keyed MAC constructor into a one-shot helper with `.create()`.
* @param keyLen - Valid probe-key length used to read static metadata once.
* The probe key is only used for `outputLen` / `blockLen`, so callers with several valid key sizes
* can pass any representative size as long as those values stay fixed.
* @param macCons - Keyed MAC constructor or factory.
* @param fromMsg - Optional adapter that derives extra constructor args from the one-shot message.
* @returns Callable MAC helper with `.create()`.
*/
export function wrapMacConstructor(keyLen, macCons, fromMsg) {
const mac = macCons;
const getArgs = (fromMsg || (() => []));
const macC = (msg, key) => mac(key, ...getArgs(msg))
.update(msg)
.digest();
const tmp = mac(new Uint8Array(keyLen), ...getArgs(new Uint8Array(0)));
macC.outputLen = tmp.outputLen;
macC.blockLen = tmp.blockLen;
macC.create = (key, ...args) => mac(key, ...args);
return macC;
}
/**
* Wraps a cipher: validates args, ensures encrypt() can only be called once.
* Used internally by the exported cipher constructors.
* Output-buffer support is inferred from the wrapped `encrypt` / `decrypt`
* arity (`fn.length === 2`), so wrapped output-capable methods must use a normal
* second parameter, not a default/rest parameter. AAD support is explicit in
* `params.withAAD`; optional AAD starts after the nonce slot when one is present.
* @__NO_SIDE_EFFECTS__
* @param params - Static cipher metadata. See {@link CipherParams}.
* @param constructor - Cipher constructor.
* @returns Wrapped constructor with validation.
*/
export const wrapCipher = (params, constructor) => {
function wrappedCipher(key, ...args) {
// Validate key
abytes(key, undefined, 'key');
// Validate nonce if nonceLength is present
if (params.nonceLength !== undefined) {
const nonce = args[0];
abytes(nonce, params.varSizeNonce ? undefined : params.nonceLength, 'nonce');
}
// Keep tag length available for decrypt-size checks after constructor validation.
const tagl = params.tagLength;
const aadStart = params.nonceLength !== undefined ? 1 : 0;
// No-AAD constructors otherwise silently ignore byte args meant as AAD.
if (!params.withAAD) {
for (let i = aadStart; i < args.length; i++)
if (isBytes(args[i]))
throw new Error('AAD not supported');
}
// Validate the first AAD slot early; rest-arg AAD constructors validate the tail themselves.
if (params.withAAD && args[aadStart] !== undefined)
abytes(args[aadStart], undefined, 'AAD');
const cipher = constructor(key, ...args);
const checkOutput = (fnLength, output) => {
if (output !== undefined) {
if (fnLength !== 2)
throw new Error('cipher output not supported');
abytes(output, undefined, 'output');
}
};
// Create wrapped cipher with validation and single-use encryption
let called = false;
const wrCipher = {
encrypt(data, output) {
if (called)
throw new Error('cannot encrypt() twice with same key + nonce');
// Any encrypt attempt consumes the instance, even if validation rejects below.
called = true;
abytes(data, undefined, 'data');
checkOutput(cipher.encrypt.length, output);
return cipher.encrypt(data, output);
},
decrypt(data, output) {
abytes(data, undefined, 'data');
if (tagl && data.length < tagl)
throw new Error('"ciphertext" expected length >= tagLength=' + tagl);
checkOutput(cipher.decrypt.length, output);
return cipher.decrypt(data, output);
},
};
return wrCipher;
}
Object.assign(wrappedCipher, params);
return wrappedCipher;
};
/**
* By default, returns u8a of length.
* When out is available, it checks it for validity and uses it.
* @param expectedLength - Required output length.
* @param out - Optional destination buffer.
* @param onlyAligned - Whether `out` must be 4-byte aligned.
* @returns Output buffer ready for writing.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @throws If the provided output buffer has the wrong size. {@link RangeError}
* @throws If the provided output buffer has the wrong alignment. {@link Error}
* @example
* Reuses a caller-provided output buffer when lengths match.
*
* ```ts
* getOutput(16, new Uint8Array(16));
* ```
*/
export function getOutput(expectedLength, out, onlyAligned = true) {
if (out === undefined)
return new Uint8Array(expectedLength);
// Keep Buffer/cross-realm Uint8Array support here instead of trusting a shape-compatible object.
abytes(out, expectedLength, 'output');
if (onlyAligned && !isAligned32(out))
throw new Error('invalid output, must be aligned');
return out;
}
/**
* Encodes data and AAD lengths into a 16-byte buffer.
* @param dataLength - Data length. Units are caller-defined: GCM passes bit
* lengths, ChaCha20-Poly1305 passes byte lengths — the helper writes the raw values.
* @param aadLength - AAD length, same unit convention as `dataLength`.
* The serialized block is still `aadLength || dataLength`, matching GCM/Poly1305
* conventions even though the helper parameter order is `(dataLength, aadLength)`.
* @param isLE - Whether to encode lengths as little-endian.
* @returns 16-byte length block.
* @throws On wrong argument types passed to the endian validator. {@link TypeError}
* @throws On wrong argument ranges or values. {@link RangeError}
* @example
* Builds the length block appended by GCM and Poly1305.
*
* ```ts
* u64Lengths(16, 8, true);
* ```
*/
export function u64Lengths(dataLength, aadLength, isLE) {
// Reject coercible non-number lengths like '10' and true before BigInt(...) accepts them.
anumber(dataLength);
anumber(aadLength);
abool(isLE);
const num = new Uint8Array(16);
const view = createView(num);
view.setBigUint64(0, BigInt(aadLength), isLE);
view.setBigUint64(8, BigInt(dataLength), isLE);
return num;
}
/**
* Checks whether a byte array is aligned to a 4-byte offset.
* @param bytes - Byte array to inspect.
* @returns `true` when the view is 4-byte aligned.
* @example
* Checks whether a buffer can be safely viewed as Uint32Array.
*
* ```ts
* isAligned32(new Uint8Array(4));
* ```
*/
export function isAligned32(bytes) {
return bytes.byteOffset % 4 === 0;
}
/**
* Copies bytes into a new Uint8Array.
* @param bytes - Bytes to copy.
* @returns Copied byte array.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @example
* Copies input into an aligned Uint8Array before block processing.
*
* ```ts
* copyBytes(new Uint8Array([1, 2]));
* ```
*/
export function copyBytes(bytes) {
// `Uint8Array.from(...)` would also accept arrays / other typed arrays. Keep this helper strict
// because callers use it at byte-validation boundaries before mutating the detached copy.
return Uint8Array.from(abytes(bytes));
}
/**
* Cryptographically secure PRNG backed by `crypto.getRandomValues`.
* @param bytesLength - number of random bytes to generate
* @returns Random bytes.
* The platform `getRandomValues()` implementation still defines any
* single-call length cap, and this helper rejects oversize requests
* with a stable library `RangeError` instead of host-specific errors.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @throws On wrong argument ranges or values. {@link RangeError}
* @throws If the current runtime does not provide `crypto.getRandomValues`. {@link Error}
* @example
* Generate a fresh random key or nonce.
* ```ts
* const key = randomBytes(16);
* ```
*/
export function randomBytes(bytesLength = 32) {
// Match the repo's other length-taking helpers instead of relying on Uint8Array coercion.
anumber(bytesLength, 'bytesLength');
const cr = typeof globalThis === 'object' ? globalThis.crypto : null;
if (typeof cr?.getRandomValues !== 'function')
throw new Error('crypto.getRandomValues must be defined');
// Web Cryptography API Level 2 §10.1.1:
// if `byteLength > 65536`, throw `QuotaExceededError`.
// Keep the guard explicit so callers can see the quota in code
// instead of discovering it by reading the spec or host errors.
// This wrapper surfaces the same quota as a stable library RangeError.
if (bytesLength > 65536)
throw new RangeError(`"bytesLength" expected <= 65536, got ${bytesLength}`);
return cr.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(bytesLength));
}
/**
* Uses CSPRNG for nonce, nonce injected in ciphertext.
* For `encrypt`, a `nonceBytes`-length buffer is fetched from CSPRNG and
* prepended to encrypted ciphertext. For `decrypt`, first `nonceBytes` of ciphertext
* are treated as nonce. The wrapper always allocates a fresh `nonce || ciphertext`
* buffer on encrypt and intentionally does not support caller-provided destination buffers.
* Too-short decrypt inputs are split into short/empty nonce views and then delegated
* to the wrapped cipher instead of being rejected here first.
*
* NOTE: Under the same key, using random nonces (e.g. `managedNonce`) with AES-GCM and ChaCha
* should be limited to `2**23` (8M) messages to get a collision chance of
* `2**-50`. Stretching to `2**32` (4B) messages would raise that chance to
* `2**-33`, still negligible but creeping up.
* @param fn - Cipher constructor that expects a nonce.
* @param randomBytes_ - Random-byte source used for nonce generation.
* @returns Cipher constructor that prepends the nonce to ciphertext.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @throws On invalid nonce lengths observed at wrapper construction or use. {@link RangeError}
* @example
* Prepends a fresh random nonce to every ciphertext.
*
* ```ts
* import { gcm } from '@noble/ciphers/aes.js';
* import { managedNonce, randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js';
* const wrapped = managedNonce(gcm);
* const key = randomBytes(16);
* const ciphertext = wrapped(key).encrypt(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
* wrapped(key).decrypt(ciphertext);
* ```
*/
export function managedNonce(fn, randomBytes_ = randomBytes) {
if (typeof fn !== 'function')
throw new TypeError('"fn" expected cipher constructor, got type=' + typeof fn);
if (typeof randomBytes_ !== 'function')
throw new TypeError('"randomBytes_" expected function, got type=' + typeof randomBytes_);
const { nonceLength } = fn;
anumber(nonceLength, 'fn.nonceLength');
const addNonce = (nonce, ciphertext, plaintext) => {
const out = concatBytes(nonce, ciphertext);
// Wrapped ciphers may alias caller plaintext on encrypt(); never zero
// caller-owned buffers here.
if (!overlapBytes(plaintext, ciphertext))
ciphertext.fill(0);
return out;
};
// NOTE: we cannot support DST here, it would be mistake:
// - we don't know how much dst length cipher requires
// - nonce may unalign dst and break everything
// - we create new u8a anyway (concatBytes)
// - previously we passed all args to cipher, but that was mistake!
const res = ((key, ...args) => ({
encrypt(plaintext) {
abytes(plaintext, undefined, 'data');
const nonce = randomBytes_(nonceLength);
const encrypted = fn(key, nonce, ...args).encrypt(plaintext);
// @ts-ignore
if (encrypted instanceof Promise)
return encrypted.then((ct) => addNonce(nonce, ct, plaintext));
return addNonce(nonce, encrypted, plaintext);
},
decrypt(ciphertext) {
abytes(ciphertext, undefined, 'data');
const nonce = ciphertext.subarray(0, nonceLength);
const decrypted = ciphertext.subarray(nonceLength);
return fn(key, nonce, ...args).decrypt(decrypted);
},
}));
// Auto-nonce wrappers still preserve the wrapped payload geometry.
if ('blockSize' in fn)
res.blockSize = fn.blockSize;
if ('tagLength' in fn)
res.tagLength = fn.tagLength;
if ('withAAD' in fn)
res.withAAD = fn.withAAD;
return res;
} }
+3 -58
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@@ -1,59 +1,4 @@
/** // Stub placeholder for noble-hashes internal _blake module
* Internal helpers for blake hash. export function blake() {
* @module throw new Error("noble _blake stub: not implemented");
*/
import { rotr } from "./utils.js";
// Unrealized speed-up: a file-local copy of rotr measured ~1-2% faster blake2s/blake256/blake3
// on Node 24 (V8 does not inline it into G1s/G2s across the module boundary). Reused from
// utils for deduplication.
/**
* Internal blake permutation table.
* Rows `0..9` serve BLAKE2s, rows `0..11` serve BLAKE2b with `10..11 = 0..1`, and Blake1 also
* reuses the later rows shown below. Blake1 expands rounds `10..15` as `SIGMA[i % 10]`, so rows
* `10..15` intentionally repeat rows `0..5` for the 14-round (256) and 16-round (512) variants.
*/
// prettier-ignore
export const BSIGMA = /* @__PURE__ */ Uint8Array.from([
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3,
11, 8, 12, 0, 5, 2, 15, 13, 10, 14, 3, 6, 7, 1, 9, 4,
7, 9, 3, 1, 13, 12, 11, 14, 2, 6, 5, 10, 4, 0, 15, 8,
9, 0, 5, 7, 2, 4, 10, 15, 14, 1, 11, 12, 6, 8, 3, 13,
2, 12, 6, 10, 0, 11, 8, 3, 4, 13, 7, 5, 15, 14, 1, 9,
12, 5, 1, 15, 14, 13, 4, 10, 0, 7, 6, 3, 9, 2, 8, 11,
13, 11, 7, 14, 12, 1, 3, 9, 5, 0, 15, 4, 8, 6, 2, 10,
6, 15, 14, 9, 11, 3, 0, 8, 12, 2, 13, 7, 1, 4, 10, 5,
10, 2, 8, 4, 7, 6, 1, 5, 15, 11, 9, 14, 3, 12, 13, 0,
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3,
// Blake1, unused in others
11, 8, 12, 0, 5, 2, 15, 13, 10, 14, 3, 6, 7, 1, 9, 4,
7, 9, 3, 1, 13, 12, 11, 14, 2, 6, 5, 10, 4, 0, 15, 8,
9, 0, 5, 7, 2, 4, 10, 15, 14, 1, 11, 12, 6, 8, 3, 13,
2, 12, 6, 10, 0, 11, 8, 3, 4, 13, 7, 5, 15, 14, 1, 9,
]);
// Unrealized speed-up: G1s/G2s return a fresh {a,b,c,d} per call (160×/blake2s block), which
// V8's escape analysis does not eliminate when G stays a real call. Writing into one reused
// module-level slot instead measured +4-6% blake2s/blake256 1MB throughput on Node 24 — but
// ~2% slower blake3 (whose profile inlines G and scalar-replaces the fresh object) and no
// difference on 32-byte inputs. Kept simple.
// 32-bit / BLAKE2s first half of G, with the fixed `(16, 12)` rotation pair.
// Parameter `x` is the RFC 7693 first-half message word, or Blake1's pre-mixed
// `m[sigma[r][2i]] ^ u[sigma[r][2i+1]]` addend in the 32-bit path.
export function G1s(a, b, c, d, x) {
a = (a + b + x) | 0;
d = rotr(d ^ a, 16);
c = (c + d) | 0;
b = rotr(b ^ c, 12);
return { a, b, c, d };
}
// 32-bit / BLAKE2s second half of G.
// Parameter `x` is the RFC 7693 second-half (`y`) message word, or Blake1's pre-mixed
// `m[sigma[r][2i + 1]] ^ u[sigma[r][2i]]` addend in the 32-bit path.
export function G2s(a, b, c, d, x) {
a = (a + b + x) | 0;
d = rotr(d ^ a, 8);
c = (c + d) | 0;
b = rotr(b ^ c, 7);
return { a, b, c, d };
} }
+3 -208
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@@ -1,209 +1,4 @@
/** // Stub placeholder for noble-hashes internal _md module
* Internal Merkle-Damgard hash utils. export function md() {
* @module throw new Error("noble _md stub: not implemented");
*/
import { setU64FromNum } from "./_u64.js";
import { abytes, aexists, aoutput, createView } from "./utils.js";
/**
* Shared 32-bit conditional boolean primitive reused by SHA-256, SHA-1, and MD5 `F`.
* Returns bits from `b` when `a` is set, otherwise from `c`.
* The XOR form is equivalent to MD5's `F(X,Y,Z) = XY v not(X)Z` because the masked terms never
* set the same bit.
* @param a - selector word
* @param b - word chosen when selector bit is set
* @param c - word chosen when selector bit is clear
* @returns Mixed 32-bit word.
* @example
* Combine three words with the shared 32-bit choice primitive.
* ```ts
* Chi(0xffffffff, 0x12345678, 0x87654321);
* ```
*/
export function Chi(a, b, c) {
return (a & b) ^ (~a & c);
} }
/**
* Shared 32-bit majority primitive reused by SHA-256 and SHA-1.
* Returns bits shared by at least two inputs.
* @param a - first input word
* @param b - second input word
* @param c - third input word
* @returns Mixed 32-bit word.
* @example
* Combine three words with the shared 32-bit majority primitive.
* ```ts
* Maj(0xffffffff, 0x12345678, 0x87654321);
* ```
*/
export function Maj(a, b, c) {
return (a & b) ^ (a & c) ^ (b & c);
}
/**
* Merkle-Damgard hash construction base class.
* Could be used to create MD5, RIPEMD, SHA1, SHA2.
* Accepts only byte-aligned `Uint8Array` input, even when the underlying spec describes bit
* strings with partial-byte tails.
* @param blockLen - internal block size in bytes
* @param outputLen - digest size in bytes
* @param padOffset - trailing length field size in bytes
* @param isLE - whether length and state words are encoded in little-endian
* @example
* Use a concrete subclass to get the shared Merkle-Damgard update/digest flow.
* ```ts
* import { _SHA1 } from '@noble/hashes/legacy.js';
* const hash = new _SHA1();
* hash.update(new Uint8Array([97, 98, 99]));
* hash.digest();
* ```
*/
export class HashMD {
blockLen;
outputLen;
canXOF = false;
padOffset;
isLE;
// For partial updates less than block size
buffer;
view;
finished = false;
length = 0;
pos = 0;
destroyed = false;
constructor(blockLen, outputLen, padOffset, isLE) {
this.blockLen = blockLen;
this.outputLen = outputLen;
this.padOffset = padOffset;
this.isLE = isLE;
this.buffer = new Uint8Array(blockLen);
this.view = createView(this.buffer);
}
update(data) {
aexists(this);
abytes(data);
const { view, buffer, blockLen } = this;
const len = data.length;
let processed = false;
for (let pos = 0; pos < len;) {
const take = Math.min(blockLen - this.pos, len - pos);
// Fast path only when there is no buffered partial block: `take === blockLen` implies
// `this.pos === 0`, so we can process full blocks directly from the input view.
if (take === blockLen) {
const dataView = createView(data);
for (; blockLen <= len - pos; pos += blockLen)
this.process(dataView, pos);
processed = true;
continue;
}
// When the whole input is buffered in one go (common for short messages), passing `data`
// directly avoids allocating a subarray view.
buffer.set(pos === 0 && take === len ? data : data.subarray(pos, pos + take), this.pos);
this.pos += take;
pos += take;
if (this.pos === blockLen) {
this.process(view, 0);
this.pos = 0;
processed = true;
}
}
this.length += data.length;
// Shared schedule buffers only pick up input-derived words inside process(); if everything
// was buffered without processing, there is nothing to zero.
if (processed)
this.roundClean();
return this;
}
digestInto(out) {
aexists(this);
aoutput(out, this);
this.finished = true;
// Padding
// We can avoid allocation of buffer for padding completely if it
// was previously not allocated here. But it won't change performance.
const { buffer, view, blockLen, isLE } = this;
let { pos } = this;
// append the bit '1' to the message, then zero-pad the rest of the block
buffer[pos++] = 0b10000000;
buffer.fill(0, pos);
// we have less than padOffset left in buffer, so we cannot put length in
// current block, need process it and pad again
if (this.padOffset > blockLen - pos) {
this.process(view, 0);
buffer.fill(0);
}
// `padOffset` reserves the whole length field. For SHA-384/512 the high 64 bits stay zero from
// the padding fill above, and JS will overflow before user input can make that half non-zero.
// So we only need to write the low 64 bits here (`length * 8` only scales the exponent of an
// integer below 2**53, so the split inside the helper stays exact).
setU64FromNum(view, blockLen - 8, this.length * 8, isLE);
this.process(view, 0);
// The final block above is processed outside update(), so the shared message-schedule
// buffers (e.g. SHA256_W) would otherwise retain input-derived words after digest().
this.roundClean();
// digest() passes our own `buffer` as `out`; reuse its cached view instead of allocating one.
const oview = out === buffer ? view : createView(out);
const len = this.outputLen;
// NOTE: we do division by 4 later, which must be fused in single op with modulo by JIT
const outLen = len / 4;
const state = this.get();
// Subclass-misconfiguration invariant: outputLen must be 32-bit aligned and fit the state.
if (len % 4 || outLen > state.length)
throw new Error('invalid outputLen');
for (let i = 0; i < outLen; i++)
oview.setUint32(4 * i, state[i], isLE);
}
digest() {
const { buffer, outputLen } = this;
this.digestInto(buffer);
// Copy before destroy(): subclasses wipe `buffer` during cleanup, but `digest()` must return
// fresh bytes to the caller.
const res = buffer.slice(0, outputLen);
this.destroy();
return res;
}
_cloneIntoMeta(to) {
const { buffer, length, finished, destroyed, pos } = this;
to.destroyed = destroyed;
to.finished = finished;
to.length = length;
to.pos = pos;
// Only partial-block bytes need copying: when `length % blockLen === 0`, `pos === 0` and
// later `update()` / `digestInto()` overwrite `to.buffer` from the start before reading it.
if (pos)
to.buffer.set(buffer); // Avoid a hot modulo guard.
return to;
}
clone() {
return this._cloneInto();
}
}
/**
* Initial SHA-2 state: fractional parts of square roots of first 16 primes 2..53.
* Check out `test/misc/sha2-gen-iv.js` for recomputation guide.
*/
/** Initial SHA256 state from RFC 6234 §6.1: the first 32 bits of the fractional parts of the
* square roots of the first eight prime numbers. Exported as a shared table; callers must treat
* it as read-only because constructors copy words from it by index. */
export const SHA256_IV = /* @__PURE__ */ Uint32Array.from([
0x6a09e667, 0xbb67ae85, 0x3c6ef372, 0xa54ff53a, 0x510e527f, 0x9b05688c, 0x1f83d9ab, 0x5be0cd19,
]);
/** Initial SHA224 state `H(0)` from RFC 6234 §6.1. Exported as a shared table; callers must
* treat it as read-only because constructors copy words from it by index. */
export const SHA224_IV = /* @__PURE__ */ Uint32Array.from([
0xc1059ed8, 0x367cd507, 0x3070dd17, 0xf70e5939, 0xffc00b31, 0x68581511, 0x64f98fa7, 0xbefa4fa4,
]);
/** Initial SHA384 state from RFC 6234 §6.3: eight RFC 64-bit `H(0)` words stored as sixteen
* big-endian 32-bit halves. Derived from the fractional parts of the square roots of the ninth
* through sixteenth prime numbers. Exported as a shared table; callers must treat it as read-only
* because constructors copy halves from it by index. */
export const SHA384_IV = /* @__PURE__ */ Uint32Array.from([
0xcbbb9d5d, 0xc1059ed8, 0x629a292a, 0x367cd507, 0x9159015a, 0x3070dd17, 0x152fecd8, 0xf70e5939,
0x67332667, 0xffc00b31, 0x8eb44a87, 0x68581511, 0xdb0c2e0d, 0x64f98fa7, 0x47b5481d, 0xbefa4fa4,
]);
/** Initial SHA512 state from RFC 6234 §6.3: eight RFC 64-bit `H(0)` words stored as sixteen
* big-endian 32-bit halves. Derived from the fractional parts of the square roots of the first
* eight prime numbers. Exported as a shared table; callers must treat it as read-only because
* constructors copy halves from it by index. */
export const SHA512_IV = /* @__PURE__ */ Uint32Array.from([
0x6a09e667, 0xf3bcc908, 0xbb67ae85, 0x84caa73b, 0x3c6ef372, 0xfe94f82b, 0xa54ff53a, 0x5f1d36f1,
0x510e527f, 0xade682d1, 0x9b05688c, 0x2b3e6c1f, 0x1f83d9ab, 0xfb41bd6b, 0x5be0cd19, 0x137e2179,
]);
+3 -76
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@@ -1,77 +1,4 @@
const U32_MASK64 = /* @__PURE__ */ (() => BigInt(2 ** 32 - 1))(); // Stub placeholder for noble-hashes internal _u64 module
const _32n = /* @__PURE__ */ BigInt(32); export function u64() {
// Split bigint into two 32-bit halves. With `le=true`, returned fields become `{ h: low, l: high throw new Error("noble _u64 stub: not implemented");
// }` to match little-endian word order rather than the property names.
function fromBig(n, le = false) {
if (le)
return { h: Number(n & U32_MASK64), l: Number((n >> _32n) & U32_MASK64) };
return { h: Number((n >> _32n) & U32_MASK64) | 0, l: Number(n & U32_MASK64) | 0 };
} }
// Split bigint list into `[highWords, lowWords]` when `le=false`; with `le=true`, the first array
// holds the low halves because `fromBig(...)` swaps the semantic meaning of `h` and `l`.
function split(lst, le = false) {
const len = lst.length;
let Ah = new Uint32Array(len);
let Al = new Uint32Array(len);
for (let i = 0; i < len; i++) {
const { h, l } = fromBig(lst[i], le);
[Ah[i], Al[i]] = [h, l];
}
return [Ah, Al];
}
// Combine explicit `(high, low)` 32-bit halves into a bigint; `>>> 0` normalizes signed JS
// bitwise results back to uint32 first, and little-endian callers must swap.
const toBig = (h, l) => (BigInt(h >>> 0) << _32n) | BigInt(l >>> 0);
// Split a JS number into u32 halves without a BigInt allocation. Exact only for integers
// `0 <= n < 2**53`; callers use it on byte / bit counters, which JS length math caps far below
// that (an ArrayBuffer cannot exceed 2**53 - 1 bytes).
const fromNumH = (n) => (n / 2 ** 32) | 0;
const fromNumL = (n) => n >>> 0;
// Drop-in replacement for `view.setBigUint64(byteOffset, BigInt(n), isLE)` without the per-call
// BigInt allocation. Same `n < 2**53` precondition as `fromNumH`/`fromNumL`.
function setU64FromNum(view, byteOffset, n, isLE) {
const h = fromNumH(n);
const l = fromNumL(n);
view.setUint32(byteOffset, isLE ? l : h, isLE);
view.setUint32(byteOffset + 4, isLE ? h : l, isLE);
}
// High 32-bit half of a 64-bit logical right shift for `s` in `0..31`.
const shrSH = (h, _l, s) => h >>> s;
// Low 32-bit half of a 64-bit logical right shift, valid for `s` in `1..31`.
const shrSL = (h, l, s) => (h << (32 - s)) | (l >>> s);
// High 32-bit half of a 64-bit right rotate, valid for `s` in `1..31`.
const rotrSH = (h, l, s) => (h >>> s) | (l << (32 - s));
// Low 32-bit half of a 64-bit right rotate, valid for `s` in `1..31`.
const rotrSL = (h, l, s) => (h << (32 - s)) | (l >>> s);
// High 32-bit half of a 64-bit right rotate, valid for `s` in `33..63`; `32` uses `rotr32*`.
const rotrBH = (h, l, s) => (h << (64 - s)) | (l >>> (s - 32));
// Low 32-bit half of a 64-bit right rotate, valid for `s` in `33..63`; `32` uses `rotr32*`.
const rotrBL = (h, l, s) => (h >>> (s - 32)) | (l << (64 - s));
// High 32-bit half of a 64-bit right rotate for `s === 32`; this is just the swapped low half.
const rotr32H = (_h, l) => l;
// Low 32-bit half of a 64-bit right rotate for `s === 32`; this is just the swapped high half.
const rotr32L = (h, _l) => h;
// 64-bit left rotates (rotl*) are not defined here: sha3.ts, their only consumer, keeps
// local copies so V8 inlines them into keccakP.
// Add two split 64-bit words and return the split `{ h, l }` sum.
// JS uses 32-bit signed integers for bitwise operations, so we cannot simply shift the carry out
// of the low sum and instead use division.
function add(Ah, Al, Bh, Bl) {
const l = (Al >>> 0) + (Bl >>> 0);
return { h: (Ah + Bh + ((l / 2 ** 32) | 0)) | 0, l: l | 0 };
}
// Addition with more than 2 elements
// Unmasked low-word accumulator for 3-way addition; pass the raw result into `add3H(...)`.
const add3L = (Al, Bl, Cl) => (Al >>> 0) + (Bl >>> 0) + (Cl >>> 0);
// High-word finalize step for 3-way addition; `low` must be the untruncated output of `add3L(...)`.
const add3H = (low, Ah, Bh, Ch) => (Ah + Bh + Ch + ((low / 2 ** 32) | 0)) | 0;
// Unmasked low-word accumulator for 4-way addition; pass the raw result into `add4H(...)`.
const add4L = (Al, Bl, Cl, Dl) => (Al >>> 0) + (Bl >>> 0) + (Cl >>> 0) + (Dl >>> 0);
// High-word finalize step for 4-way addition; `low` must be the untruncated output of `add4L(...)`.
const add4H = (low, Ah, Bh, Ch, Dh) => (Ah + Bh + Ch + Dh + ((low / 2 ** 32) | 0)) | 0;
// Unmasked low-word accumulator for 5-way addition; pass the raw result into `add5H(...)`.
const add5L = (Al, Bl, Cl, Dl, El) => (Al >>> 0) + (Bl >>> 0) + (Cl >>> 0) + (Dl >>> 0) + (El >>> 0);
// High-word finalize step for 5-way addition; `low` must be the untruncated output of `add5L(...)`.
const add5H = (low, Ah, Bh, Ch, Dh, Eh) => (Ah + Bh + Ch + Dh + Eh + ((low / 2 ** 32) | 0)) | 0;
// prettier-ignore
export { add, add3H, add3L, add4H, add4L, add5H, add5L, fromBig, fromNumH, fromNumL, rotr32H, rotr32L, rotrBH, rotrBL, rotrSH, rotrSL, setU64FromNum, shrSH, shrSL, split, toBig };
+3 -576
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@@ -1,577 +1,4 @@
/** // Stub placeholder for noble-hashes argon2 module
* Argon2 KDF from RFC 9106. Can be used to create a key from password and salt. export function argon2(data) {
* We suggest to use Scrypt. JS Argon is 2-10x slower than native code because of 64-bitness: throw new Error("noble argon2 stub: not implemented");
* * argon uses uint64, but JS doesn't have fast uint64array
* * uint64 multiplication is 1/3 of time
* * `P` function would be very nice with u64, because most of value will be in registers,
* hovewer with u32 it will require 32 registers, which is too much.
* * JS arrays do slow bound checks, so reading from `A2_BUF` slows it down
* @module
*/
import { blake2b } from "./blake2.js";
import { anumber, checkOpts, clean, kdfInputToBytes, nextTick, swap32IfBE, swap8IfBE, u32, u8, } from "./utils.js";
// RFC 9106 §3.1 type `y`: 0 = Argon2d, 1 = Argon2i, 2 = Argon2id. The numeric values are the
// spec-bound part here; the object keys are internal labels.
const AT = { Argon2d: 0, Argon2i: 1, Argon2id: 2 };
// RFC 9106 sync points constant `SL = 4`, fixed by the design rather than exposed as a tuning knob.
const ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS = 4;
// Preserve Argon2's `LE32(len(X)) || X` encoding for omitted
// optional fields by emitting empty bytes.
const abytesOrZero = (buf, errorTitle = '') => {
if (buf === undefined)
return Uint8Array.of();
return kdfInputToBytes(buf, errorTitle);
};
// Temporary block buffer.
// 1024-byte block: 256 u32 = 128 interleaved low/high halves = RFC's
// 8x8 matrix of 16-byte registers.
const A2_BUF = new Uint32Array(256);
// Quarter-round over 64-bit word indices into `A2_BUF`; each index maps to adjacent low/high u32s.
// Each BlaMka step `X = X + Y + 2 * trunc(X) * trunc(Y)` (trunc = low 32 bits) starts
// with an exact low product from `Math.imul`. The rounded double product is within 1024 of the
// exact u64 product; subtracting that exact low half and rounding to the nearest multiple of
// 2^32 therefore recovers the exact high half. RFC 9106 Figure 19 GB then rotates by 32, 24,
// 16, and 63 bits after each XOR.
function G(a, b, c, d) {
let Al = A2_BUF[2 * a], Ah = A2_BUF[2 * a + 1]; // prettier-ignore
let Bl = A2_BUF[2 * b], Bh = A2_BUF[2 * b + 1]; // prettier-ignore
let Cl = A2_BUF[2 * c], Ch = A2_BUF[2 * c + 1]; // prettier-ignore
let Dl = A2_BUF[2 * d], Dh = A2_BUF[2 * d + 1]; // prettier-ignore
let ml = 0, mh = 0, rl = 0, xh = 0, xl = 0; // prettier-ignore
// A = blamka(A, B); D = rotr64(D ^ A, 32)
ml = Math.imul(Al, Bl);
mh = (((Al >>> 0) * (Bl >>> 0) - (ml >>> 0)) / 0x100000000 + 0.5) | 0; // prettier-ignore
rl = (Al >>> 0) + (Bl >>> 0) + ((ml << 1) >>> 0);
Ah = (Ah + Bh + ((mh << 1) | (ml >>> 31)) + ((rl / 0x100000000) | 0)) | 0;
Al = rl | 0; // prettier-ignore
xh = Dh ^ Ah;
xl = Dl ^ Al; // prettier-ignore
Dh = xl;
Dl = xh; // prettier-ignore
// C = blamka(C, D); B = rotr64(B ^ C, 24)
ml = Math.imul(Cl, Dl);
mh = (((Cl >>> 0) * (Dl >>> 0) - (ml >>> 0)) / 0x100000000 + 0.5) | 0; // prettier-ignore
rl = (Cl >>> 0) + (Dl >>> 0) + ((ml << 1) >>> 0);
Ch = (Ch + Dh + ((mh << 1) | (ml >>> 31)) + ((rl / 0x100000000) | 0)) | 0;
Cl = rl | 0; // prettier-ignore
xh = Bh ^ Ch;
xl = Bl ^ Cl; // prettier-ignore
Bh = (xh >>> 24) | (xl << 8);
Bl = (xh << 8) | (xl >>> 24); // prettier-ignore
// A = blamka(A, B); D = rotr64(D ^ A, 16)
ml = Math.imul(Al, Bl);
mh = (((Al >>> 0) * (Bl >>> 0) - (ml >>> 0)) / 0x100000000 + 0.5) | 0; // prettier-ignore
rl = (Al >>> 0) + (Bl >>> 0) + ((ml << 1) >>> 0);
Ah = (Ah + Bh + ((mh << 1) | (ml >>> 31)) + ((rl / 0x100000000) | 0)) | 0;
Al = rl | 0; // prettier-ignore
xh = Dh ^ Ah;
xl = Dl ^ Al; // prettier-ignore
Dh = (xh >>> 16) | (xl << 16);
Dl = (xh << 16) | (xl >>> 16); // prettier-ignore
// C = blamka(C, D); B = rotr64(B ^ C, 63)
ml = Math.imul(Cl, Dl);
mh = (((Cl >>> 0) * (Dl >>> 0) - (ml >>> 0)) / 0x100000000 + 0.5) | 0; // prettier-ignore
rl = (Cl >>> 0) + (Dl >>> 0) + ((ml << 1) >>> 0);
Ch = (Ch + Dh + ((mh << 1) | (ml >>> 31)) + ((rl / 0x100000000) | 0)) | 0;
Cl = rl | 0; // prettier-ignore
xh = Bh ^ Ch;
xl = Bl ^ Cl; // prettier-ignore
Bh = (xh << 1) | (xl >>> 31);
Bl = (xh >>> 31) | (xl << 1); // prettier-ignore
((A2_BUF[2 * a] = Al), (A2_BUF[2 * a + 1] = Ah));
((A2_BUF[2 * b] = Bl), (A2_BUF[2 * b + 1] = Bh));
((A2_BUF[2 * c] = Cl), (A2_BUF[2 * c + 1] = Ch));
((A2_BUF[2 * d] = Dl), (A2_BUF[2 * d + 1] = Dh));
} }
// Argon2 permutation over 16 register indices into `A2_BUF`, not the register values themselves.
// RFC 9106 Figure 17: these arguments are the 16 `v0..v15` 64-bit word
// indices inside eight 16-byte inputs, not copied word values.
// prettier-ignore
function P(v00, v01, v02, v03, v04, v05, v06, v07, v08, v09, v10, v11, v12, v13, v14, v15) {
// RFC 9106 Figure 18: first apply GB across rows, then across columns of the 8x8 register matrix.
G(v00, v04, v08, v12);
G(v01, v05, v09, v13);
G(v02, v06, v10, v14);
G(v03, v07, v11, v15);
G(v00, v05, v10, v15);
G(v01, v06, v11, v12);
G(v02, v07, v08, v13);
G(v03, v04, v09, v14);
}
function block(x, xPos, yPos, outPos, needXor) {
// Stage R = X xor Y in the destination before permuting it. This avoids rereading both source
// blocks when folding R into the permuted scratch block below.
if (needXor) {
for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
const r = x[xPos + i] ^ x[yPos + i];
A2_BUF[i] = r;
x[outPos + i] ^= r;
}
}
else {
for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
const r = x[xPos + i] ^ x[yPos + i];
A2_BUF[i] = r;
x[outPos + i] = r;
}
}
// rows (8 consecutive 16-register groups)
for (let i = 0; i < 128; i += 16) {
// prettier-ignore
P(i, i + 1, i + 2, i + 3, i + 4, i + 5, i + 6, i + 7, i + 8, i + 9, i + 10, i + 11, i + 12, i + 13, i + 14, i + 15);
}
// columns (8 strided 16-register groups)
for (let i = 0; i < 16; i += 2) {
// prettier-ignore
P(i, i + 1, i + 16, i + 17, i + 32, i + 33, i + 48, i + 49, i + 64, i + 65, i + 80, i + 81, i + 96, i + 97, i + 112, i + 113);
}
// RFC 9106 step 6: passes after the first XOR the old destination block into the new G(X, Y).
for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++)
x[outPos + i] ^= A2_BUF[i];
clean(A2_BUF);
}
// Variable-Length Hash Function H'
// Returns bytes, not words; 1024-byte block callers explicitly reinterpret with `u32(...)`.
function Hp(A, dkLen) {
const A8 = u8(A);
const T = new Uint32Array(1);
const T8 = u8(T);
// Argon2 H' prefixes dkLen as LE32; native Uint32Array writes would serialize as BE on s390x.
T[0] = swap8IfBE(dkLen);
// Fast path
if (dkLen <= 64)
return blake2b.create({ dkLen }).update(T8).update(A8).digest();
const out = new Uint8Array(dkLen);
let V = blake2b.create({}).update(T8).update(A8).digest();
let pos = 0;
// RFC 9106 Figure 8: each intermediate `V_i` contributes only `W_i`, its first 32 bytes; only
// `V_{r+1}` is emitted in full at the remaining length.
out.set(V.subarray(0, 32));
pos += 32;
// Rest blocks
for (; dkLen - pos > 64; pos += 32) {
const Vh = blake2b.create({}).update(V);
Vh.digestInto(V);
Vh.destroy();
out.set(V.subarray(0, 32), pos);
}
// Last block
out.set(blake2b(V, { dkLen: dkLen - pos }), pos);
clean(V, T);
// H' is byte-oriented; returning `u32(out)` would silently drop dkLen % 4 tail bytes.
return out;
}
// Used only inside argon2Blocks!
function indexAlpha(r, s, laneLen, segmentLen, index, randL, sameLane = false) {
// RFC 9106 §3.4.2 Figures 12-13: map `J1` / `J2` into the current lane's reference area `W`.
let area;
if (r === 0) {
if (s === 0)
area = index - 1;
else if (sameLane)
area = s * segmentLen + index - 1;
else
area = s * segmentLen + (index == 0 ? -1 : 0);
}
else if (sameLane)
area = laneLen - segmentLen + index - 1;
else
area = laneLen - segmentLen + (index == 0 ? -1 : 0);
const startPos = r !== 0 && s !== ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS - 1 ? (s + 1) * segmentLen : 0;
// Use the same exact-high recovery as G. `areaHigh` is floor(|W| * J1^2/2^32 / 2^32).
const randLow = Math.imul(randL, randL);
const randHigh = (((randL >>> 0) * (randL >>> 0) - (randLow >>> 0)) / 0x100000000 + 0.5) | 0;
const areaLow = Math.imul(area, randHigh);
const areaHigh = (((area >>> 0) * (randHigh >>> 0) - (areaLow >>> 0)) / 0x100000000 + 0.5) | 0;
const rel = area - 1 - areaHigh;
return (startPos + rel) % laneLen;
}
// Exclusive `2^32` sentinel used by `isU32(...)`, not the inclusive maximum u32 value.
const maxUint32 = Math.pow(2, 32);
const ARGON2_DEFAULT_MEMORY = 1024 ** 2; // KiB: 1 GiB
const ARGON2_DEFAULT_MAXMEM = ARGON2_DEFAULT_MEMORY * 1024;
// Validate safe JS integers in `[0, 2^32 - 1]`.
function isU32(num) {
return Number.isSafeInteger(num) && num >= 0 && num < maxUint32;
}
function argon2Opts(opts = {}) {
opts = checkOpts({}, opts);
const merged = {
t: 3,
m: ARGON2_DEFAULT_MEMORY,
p: 1,
version: 0x13,
dkLen: 32,
maxmem: ARGON2_DEFAULT_MAXMEM,
asyncTick: 10,
};
// Unknown keys are copied through unchanged here and later ignored unless
// destructuring consumes them.
for (let [k, v] of Object.entries(opts))
if (v !== undefined)
merged[k] = v;
const { dkLen, p, m, t, version, onProgress, asyncTick } = merged;
// RFC 9106 §3.1: tag length `T` MUST be an integer number of bytes from 4 to 2^32-1.
if (!isU32(dkLen) || dkLen < 4)
throw new Error('"dkLen" must be 4..');
if (!isU32(p) || p < 1 || p >= Math.pow(2, 24))
throw new Error('"p" must be 1..2^24');
if (!isU32(m))
throw new Error('"m" must be 0..2^32');
if (!isU32(t) || t < 1)
throw new Error('"t" (iterations) must be 1..2^32');
if (onProgress !== undefined && typeof onProgress !== 'function')
throw new Error('"onProgress" must be a function');
anumber(asyncTick, 'asyncTick');
/*
Memory size m MUST be an integer number of kibibytes from 8*p
to 2^(32)-1. The actual number of blocks is m', which is m
rounded down to the nearest multiple of 4*p.
*/
if (!isU32(m) || m < 8 * p)
throw new Error('"m" (memory) must be at least 8*p bytes');
// Accept legacy `0x10` for compatibility even though RFC 9106 profiles standardize `0x13`.
if (version !== 0x10 && version !== 0x13)
throw new Error('"version" must be 0x10 or 0x13, got ' + version);
return merged;
}
function argon2InitialHash(password, salt, type, opts) {
const ownedInputs = [];
const BUF = new Uint32Array(1);
const BUF8 = u8(BUF);
let h;
let H0;
let succeeded = false;
const rememberOwned = (input, bytes) => {
if (typeof input === 'string')
ownedInputs.push(bytes);
return bytes;
};
try {
const passwordBytes = rememberOwned(password, kdfInputToBytes(password, 'password'));
const saltBytes = rememberOwned(salt, kdfInputToBytes(salt, 'salt'));
if (!isU32(passwordBytes.length))
throw new Error('"password" must be less of length 1..4Gb');
// RFC 9106 §3.1 only requires S <= 2^32-1 bytes and says 16 bytes is RECOMMENDED for password
// hashing; this library intentionally takes the stricter common >=8-byte salt path.
if (!isU32(saltBytes.length) || saltBytes.length < 8)
throw new Error('"salt" must be of length 8..4Gb');
if (!Object.values(AT).includes(type))
throw new Error('"type" was invalid');
let { p, dkLen, m, t, version, key, personalization, maxmem, onProgress, asyncTick } = argon2Opts(opts);
// Validation
const keyInput = key;
key = rememberOwned(keyInput, abytesOrZero(keyInput, 'key'));
const personalizationInput = personalization;
personalization = rememberOwned(personalizationInput, abytesOrZero(personalizationInput, 'personalization'));
// H_0 = H^(64)(LE32(p) || LE32(T) || LE32(m) || LE32(t) ||
// LE32(v) || LE32(y) || LE32(length(P)) || P ||
// LE32(length(S)) || S || LE32(length(K)) || K ||
// LE32(length(X)) || X)
h = blake2b.create();
for (let item of [p, dkLen, m, t, version, type]) {
// RFC 9106 H0 encodes these scalars as LE32, so normalize the host word before
// exposing bytes.
BUF[0] = swap8IfBE(item);
h.update(BUF8);
}
for (let i of [passwordBytes, saltBytes, key, personalization]) {
BUF[0] = swap8IfBE(i.length); // BUF is u32 array, this is valid once normalized to LE bytes
h.update(BUF8).update(i);
}
// Reserve two extra LE32 words after the 64-byte `H_0` so Figures 3-4 can append
// `LE32(0 or 1) || LE32(i)` in place for the lane-starting blocks.
H0 = new Uint32Array(18);
h.digestInto(u8(H0));
succeeded = true;
return { H0, p, dkLen, m, t, version, maxmem, onProgress, asyncTick };
}
finally {
// digestInto() does not destroy BLAKE2 state. It and all string-derived inputs contain secrets.
if (h)
h.destroy();
clean(BUF, ...ownedInputs);
if (!succeeded && H0)
clean(H0);
}
}
function argon2Init(password, salt, type, opts) {
const { H0, p, dkLen, m, t, version, maxmem, onProgress, asyncTick } = argon2InitialHash(password, salt, type, opts);
// 256 u32 = 1024 (BLOCK_SIZE), fills A2_BUF on processing
try {
// Params
const lanes = p;
// m' = 4 * p * floor (m / 4p)
const mP = 4 * p * Math.floor(m / (ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS * p));
//q = m' / p columns
const laneLen = Math.floor(mP / p);
const segmentLen = Math.floor(laneLen / ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS);
// `maxmem` is documented in bytes; compare against the actual 1024-byte block allocation.
const memUsed = mP * 1024;
if (!isU32(maxmem))
throw new Error('"maxmem" expected <2**32, got ' + maxmem);
if (memUsed > maxmem)
throw new Error('"maxmem" limit was hit: memUsed(mP*1024)=' + memUsed + ', maxmem=' + maxmem);
const B = new Uint32Array(memUsed / 4);
// Fill first blocks
for (let l = 0; l < p; l++) {
const i = 256 * laneLen * l;
// B[i][0] = H'^(1024)(H_0 || LE32(0) || LE32(i))
H0[17] = swap8IfBE(l);
H0[16] = swap8IfBE(0);
B.set(swap32IfBE(u32(Hp(H0, 1024))), i);
// B[i][1] = H'^(1024)(H_0 || LE32(1) || LE32(i))
H0[16] = swap8IfBE(1);
B.set(swap32IfBE(u32(Hp(H0, 1024))), i + 256);
}
let perBlock = () => { };
if (onProgress) {
// The first segment of the first pass skips two preinitialized blocks per lane.
const totalBlock = t * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS * p * segmentLen - 2 * p;
// Invoke callback if progress changes from 10.01 to 10.02
// Allows to draw smooth progress bar on up to 8K screen
const callbackPer = Math.max(Math.floor(totalBlock / 10000), 1);
let blockCnt = 0;
perBlock = () => {
blockCnt++;
if (onProgress && (!(blockCnt % callbackPer) || blockCnt === totalBlock))
onProgress(blockCnt / totalBlock);
};
}
return { type, mP, p, t, version, B, laneLen, lanes, segmentLen, dkLen, perBlock, asyncTick };
}
finally {
clean(H0);
}
}
function argon2Output(B, p, laneLen, dkLen) {
const B_final = new Uint32Array(256);
for (let l = 0; l < p; l++)
for (let j = 0; j < 256; j++)
B_final[j] ^= B[256 * (laneLen * l + laneLen - 1) + j];
// RFC 9106 steps 7-8 feed the byte string `C` into `H'^T(C)`, so normalize the xor'ed words
// back to spec byte order before `Hp(...)` reinterprets them as bytes.
const res = Hp(swap32IfBE(B_final), dkLen);
// Wipe both the xor scratch and the full working matrix once final digest bytes exist.
// JS cleanup is still only best-effort, but this local buffer is no longer needed here.
clean(B, B_final);
return res;
}
/**
* Fills every Argon2 block for all passes / slices / lanes, yielding once per
* processed block so callers control pacing: the sync driver just drains the
* generator, while the async driver awaits `nextTick()` between time slices.
*/
function* argon2Blocks(ctx, address) {
const { type, mP, p, t, version, B, laneLen, lanes, segmentLen, perBlock } = ctx;
// [address, input, zero_block] format so we can pass single U32 to block function
address[256 + 6] = mP;
address[256 + 8] = t;
address[256 + 10] = type;
for (let r = 0; r < t; r++) {
// RFC 9106 step 6 applies the XOR-on-later-passes rule only for version `0x13`; legacy
// `0x10` keeps the older overwrite behavior used by the v16 test vectors.
const needXor = r !== 0 && version === 0x13;
address[256 + 0] = r;
for (let s = 0; s < ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS; s++) {
address[256 + 4] = s;
// RFC 9106 §3.4.1.3: Argon2id uses Argon2i's data-independent `J1` / `J2` generation only
// in pass 0, slices 0 and 1; Argon2i uses it in every segment.
const dataIndependent = type == AT.Argon2i || (type == AT.Argon2id && r === 0 && s < 2);
for (let l = 0; l < p; l++) {
address[256 + 2] = l;
address[256 + 12] = 0;
let startPos = 0;
if (r === 0 && s === 0) {
startPos = 2;
if (dataIndependent) {
address[256 + 12]++;
block(address, 256, 2 * 256, 0, false);
block(address, 0, 2 * 256, 0, false);
}
}
// current block position
let offset = l * laneLen + s * segmentLen + startPos;
for (let index = startPos; index < segmentLen; index++, offset++) {
perBlock();
// Previous block position: wraps to the lane's last block only at lane start,
// which can happen here only for the first block of slice 0 on passes > 0.
const prev = offset % laneLen ? offset - 1 : offset + laneLen - 1;
let randL, randH;
if (dataIndependent) {
let i128 = index % 128;
// RFC 9106 §3.4.1.2: each 1024-byte address block yields 128 `(J1, J2)` pairs, so
// regenerate it whenever the segment index crosses a multiple of 128.
if (i128 === 0) {
address[256 + 12]++;
block(address, 256, 2 * 256, 0, false);
block(address, 0, 2 * 256, 0, false);
}
randL = address[2 * i128];
randH = address[2 * i128 + 1];
}
else {
const T = 256 * prev;
randL = B[T];
randH = B[T + 1];
}
// Address-block path selects `J1` / `J2`, then maps them to the reference
// lane/block per RFC 9106 §3.4.
const refLane = r === 0 && s === 0 ? l : randH % lanes;
const refPos = indexAlpha(r, s, laneLen, segmentLen, index, randL, refLane == l);
const refBlock = laneLen * refLane + refPos;
// B[i][j] = G(B[i][j-1], B[l][z])
block(B, 256 * prev, 256 * refBlock, offset * 256, needXor);
yield;
}
}
}
}
clean(address);
}
function argon2(type, password, salt, opts) {
const ctx = argon2Init(password, salt, type, opts);
const blocks = argon2Blocks(ctx, new Uint32Array(3 * 256));
while (!blocks.next().done) { }
return argon2Output(ctx.B, ctx.p, ctx.laneLen, ctx.dkLen);
}
/**
* Argon2d GPU-resistant version.
* @param password - password or input key material
* @param salt - unique salt value
* @param opts - Argon2 cost and optional tuning parameters. See {@link ArgonOpts}.
* @returns Derived key bytes.
* @throws If the Argon2 input or cost parameters are invalid. {@link Error}
* @example
* Derive a key with Argon2d.
* ```ts
* argon2d('password', 'salt1234', { t: 1, m: 8, p: 1, dkLen: 32 });
* ```
* @example
* Derive a key with optional secret and scheduler controls.
* ```ts
* const progressLog: number[] = [];
* argon2d('password', 'salt1234', {
* t: 1,
* m: 8,
* p: 1,
* dkLen: 32,
* version: 0x13,
* key: 'secret',
* personalization: 'application',
* maxmem: 1024 * 1024,
* asyncTick: 1,
* onProgress(progress) {
* progressLog.push(progress);
* },
* });
* ```
*/
export const argon2d = (password, salt, opts = {}) => argon2(AT.Argon2d, password, salt, opts);
/**
* Argon2i side-channel-resistant version.
* @param password - password or input key material
* @param salt - unique salt value
* @param opts - Argon2 cost and optional tuning parameters. See {@link ArgonOpts}.
* @returns Derived key bytes.
* @throws If the Argon2 input or cost parameters are invalid. {@link Error}
* @example
* Derive a key with Argon2i.
* ```ts
* argon2i('password', 'salt1234', { t: 1, m: 8, p: 1, dkLen: 32 });
* ```
*/
export const argon2i = (password, salt, opts = {}) => argon2(AT.Argon2i, password, salt, opts);
/**
* Argon2id, combining i+d, the most popular version from RFC 9106.
* @param password - password or input key material
* @param salt - unique salt value
* @param opts - Argon2 cost and optional tuning parameters. See {@link ArgonOpts}.
* @returns Derived key bytes.
* @throws If the Argon2 input or cost parameters are invalid. {@link Error}
* @example
* Derive a key with Argon2id.
* ```ts
* argon2id('password', 'salt1234', { t: 1, m: 8, p: 1, dkLen: 32 });
* ```
*/
export const argon2id = (password, salt, opts = {}) => argon2(AT.Argon2id, password, salt, opts);
async function argon2Async(type, password, salt, opts) {
const ctx = argon2Init(password, salt, type, opts);
// Keep the generator-local address block reachable so an aborted scheduler yield can wipe it.
const address = new Uint32Array(3 * 256);
const blocks = argon2Blocks(ctx, address);
const abort = () => clean(address, ctx.B);
let ts = Date.now();
while (!blocks.next().done) {
// Date.now() is not monotonic. If the clock goes backwards,
// still yield control.
const diff = Date.now() - ts;
if (diff >= 0 && diff < ctx.asyncTick)
continue;
await nextTick(abort);
// Scheduler delay is outside the synchronous work budget.
ts = Date.now();
}
return argon2Output(ctx.B, ctx.p, ctx.laneLen, ctx.dkLen);
}
/**
* Argon2d async GPU-resistant version.
* @param password - password or input key material
* @param salt - unique salt value
* @param opts - Argon2 cost and optional tuning parameters. See {@link ArgonOpts}.
* @returns Promise resolving to derived key bytes.
* @throws If the Argon2 input or cost parameters are invalid. {@link Error}
* @example
* Derive a key with Argon2d asynchronously.
* ```ts
* await argon2dAsync('password', 'salt1234', { t: 1, m: 8, p: 1, dkLen: 32 });
* ```
* @example
* Derive a key asynchronously with optional secret and scheduler controls.
* ```ts
* await argon2dAsync('password', 'salt1234', {
* t: 1,
* m: 8,
* p: 1,
* dkLen: 32,
* version: 0x13,
* key: 'secret',
* personalization: 'application',
* maxmem: 1024 * 1024,
* asyncTick: 1,
* onProgress(progress) {
* if (progress > 1) throw new Error('invalid progress');
* },
* });
* ```
*/
export const argon2dAsync = (password, salt, opts = {}) => argon2Async(AT.Argon2d, password, salt, opts);
/**
* Argon2i async side-channel-resistant version.
* @param password - password or input key material
* @param salt - unique salt value
* @param opts - Argon2 cost and optional tuning parameters. See {@link ArgonOpts}.
* @returns Promise resolving to derived key bytes.
* @throws If the Argon2 input or cost parameters are invalid. {@link Error}
* @example
* Derive a key with Argon2i asynchronously.
* ```ts
* await argon2iAsync('password', 'salt1234', { t: 1, m: 8, p: 1, dkLen: 32 });
* ```
*/
export const argon2iAsync = (password, salt, opts = {}) => argon2Async(AT.Argon2i, password, salt, opts);
/**
* Argon2id async, combining i+d, the most popular version from RFC 9106.
* @param password - password or input key material
* @param salt - unique salt value
* @param opts - Argon2 cost and optional tuning parameters. See {@link ArgonOpts}.
* @returns Promise resolving to derived key bytes.
* @throws If the Argon2 input or cost parameters are invalid. {@link Error}
* @example
* Derive a key with Argon2id asynchronously.
* ```ts
* await argon2idAsync('password', 'salt1234', { t: 1, m: 8, p: 1, dkLen: 32 });
* ```
*/
export const argon2idAsync = (password, salt, opts = {}) => argon2Async(AT.Argon2id, password, salt, opts);
+4 -572
View File
@@ -1,573 +1,5 @@
/** // Stub placeholder for noble-hashes blake2 module
* blake2b (64-bit) & blake2s (8 to 32-bit) hash functions. // In a full vendor checkout this would be the real blake2 implementation.
* b could have been faster, but there is no fast u64 in js, so s is 1.5x faster. export function blake2b(data) {
* @module throw new Error("noble blake2 stub: not implemented");
*/
import { BSIGMA, G1s, G2s } from "./_blake.js";
import { SHA256_IV } from "./_md.js";
import * as u64 from "./_u64.js";
// prettier-ignore
import { abytes, aexists, anumber, aoutput, checkOpts, clean, copyBytes, createHasher, swap32IfBE, swap8IfBE, u32 } from "./utils.js";
// Same IV words as `SHA512_IV`, but endian-swapped into LE u32 low/high halves
// for the BLAKE2b u64 helpers below.
const B2B_IV = /* @__PURE__ */ Uint32Array.from([
0xf3bcc908, 0x6a09e667, 0x84caa73b, 0xbb67ae85, 0xfe94f82b, 0x3c6ef372, 0x5f1d36f1, 0xa54ff53a,
0xade682d1, 0x510e527f, 0x2b3e6c1f, 0x9b05688c, 0xfb41bd6b, 0x1f83d9ab, 0x137e2179, 0x5be0cd19,
]);
// Shared synchronous BLAKE2b work vector as LE u32 low/high halves.
const BBUF = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint32Array(32);
// BLAKE2b G mix split into two half-rounds over LE u32 low/high limbs.
function G1b(a, b, c, d, msg, x) {
// NOTE: V is LE here
const Xl = msg[x], Xh = msg[x + 1]; // prettier-ignore
let Al = BBUF[2 * a], Ah = BBUF[2 * a + 1]; // prettier-ignore
let Bl = BBUF[2 * b], Bh = BBUF[2 * b + 1]; // prettier-ignore
let Cl = BBUF[2 * c], Ch = BBUF[2 * c + 1]; // prettier-ignore
let Dl = BBUF[2 * d], Dh = BBUF[2 * d + 1]; // prettier-ignore
// v[a] = (v[a] + v[b] + x) | 0;
const ll = u64.add3L(Al, Bl, Xl);
Ah = u64.add3H(ll, Ah, Bh, Xh);
Al = ll | 0;
// v[d] = rotr(v[d] ^ v[a], 32)
let xh = Dh ^ Ah, xl = Dl ^ Al; // prettier-ignore
Dh = u64.rotr32H(xh, xl);
Dl = u64.rotr32L(xh, xl);
// v[c] = (v[c] + v[d]) | 0;
({ h: Ch, l: Cl } = u64.add(Ch, Cl, Dh, Dl));
// v[b] = rotr(v[b] ^ v[c], 24)
xh = Bh ^ Ch;
xl = Bl ^ Cl;
Bh = u64.rotrSH(xh, xl, 24);
Bl = u64.rotrSL(xh, xl, 24);
BBUF[2 * a] = Al;
BBUF[2 * a + 1] = Ah;
BBUF[2 * b] = Bl;
BBUF[2 * b + 1] = Bh;
BBUF[2 * c] = Cl;
BBUF[2 * c + 1] = Ch;
BBUF[2 * d] = Dl;
BBUF[2 * d + 1] = Dh;
} }
// Second half-round of the same LE-limb BLAKE2b G mix; `x` is the message word offset.
function G2b(a, b, c, d, msg, x) {
// NOTE: V is LE here
const Xl = msg[x], Xh = msg[x + 1]; // prettier-ignore
let Al = BBUF[2 * a], Ah = BBUF[2 * a + 1]; // prettier-ignore
let Bl = BBUF[2 * b], Bh = BBUF[2 * b + 1]; // prettier-ignore
let Cl = BBUF[2 * c], Ch = BBUF[2 * c + 1]; // prettier-ignore
let Dl = BBUF[2 * d], Dh = BBUF[2 * d + 1]; // prettier-ignore
// v[a] = (v[a] + v[b] + x) | 0;
const ll = u64.add3L(Al, Bl, Xl);
Ah = u64.add3H(ll, Ah, Bh, Xh);
Al = ll | 0;
// v[d] = rotr(v[d] ^ v[a], 16)
let xh = Dh ^ Ah, xl = Dl ^ Al; // prettier-ignore
Dh = u64.rotrSH(xh, xl, 16);
Dl = u64.rotrSL(xh, xl, 16);
// v[c] = (v[c] + v[d]) | 0;
({ h: Ch, l: Cl } = u64.add(Ch, Cl, Dh, Dl));
// v[b] = rotr(v[b] ^ v[c], 63)
xh = Bh ^ Ch;
xl = Bl ^ Cl;
Bh = u64.rotrBH(xh, xl, 63);
Bl = u64.rotrBL(xh, xl, 63);
BBUF[2 * a] = Al;
BBUF[2 * a + 1] = Ah;
BBUF[2 * b] = Bl;
BBUF[2 * b + 1] = Bh;
BBUF[2 * c] = Cl;
BBUF[2 * c + 1] = Ch;
BBUF[2 * d] = Dl;
BBUF[2 * d + 1] = Dh;
}
function checkBlake2Opts(outputLen, opts = {}, keyLen, saltLen, persLen) {
anumber(keyLen);
// RFC 7693 §2.1 requires digest length nn in 1..keyLen (keyLen doubles as
// the per-variant max for both key and digest lengths: 64 for b, 32 for s).
if (outputLen <= 0 || outputLen > keyLen)
throw new Error('"dkLen" must be 1..' + keyLen + ', got ' + outputLen);
const { key, salt, personalization } = opts;
// This API uses `undefined` for the RFC 7693 `kk = 0` case, so a provided key must be non-empty.
if (key !== undefined && (key.length < 1 || key.length > keyLen))
throw new Error('"key" expected to be undefined or of length=1..' + keyLen);
if (salt !== undefined)
abytes(salt, saltLen, 'salt');
if (personalization !== undefined)
abytes(personalization, persLen, 'personalization');
}
/** Internal base class for BLAKE2. */
export class _BLAKE2 {
buffer;
buffer32;
finished = false;
destroyed = false;
length = 0;
pos = 0;
blockLen;
outputLen;
canXOF = false;
constructor(blockLen, outputLen) {
anumber(blockLen);
anumber(outputLen);
this.blockLen = blockLen;
this.outputLen = outputLen;
this.buffer = new Uint8Array(blockLen);
this.buffer32 = u32(this.buffer);
}
update(data) {
aexists(this);
abytes(data);
// Main difference with other hashes: there is flag for last block,
// so we cannot process current block before we know that there
// is the next one. This significantly complicates logic and reduces ability
// to do zero-copy processing
const { blockLen, buffer, buffer32 } = this;
const len = data.length;
const offset = data.byteOffset;
const buf = data.buffer;
for (let pos = 0; pos < len;) {
// If buffer is full and we still have input (don't process last block, same as blake2s)
if (this.pos === blockLen) {
swap32IfBE(buffer32);
this.compress(buffer32, 0, false);
swap32IfBE(buffer32);
this.pos = 0;
}
const take = Math.min(blockLen - this.pos, len - pos);
const dataOffset = offset + pos;
// Zero-copy only for full, 4-byte-aligned, non-final blocks.
if (take === blockLen && !(dataOffset % 4) && pos + take < len) {
const data32 = new Uint32Array(buf, dataOffset, Math.floor((len - pos) / 4));
swap32IfBE(data32);
for (let pos32 = 0; pos + blockLen < len; pos32 += buffer32.length, pos += blockLen) {
this.length += blockLen;
this.compress(data32, pos32, false);
}
swap32IfBE(data32);
continue;
}
// When the whole input is buffered in one go (common for short messages), passing `data`
// directly avoids allocating a subarray view.
buffer.set(pos === 0 && take === len ? data : data.subarray(pos, pos + take), this.pos);
this.pos += take;
this.length += take;
pos += take;
}
return this;
}
digestInto(out) {
aexists(this);
aoutput(out, this);
// Reject unaligned views explicitly instead of hiding them behind a full scratch copy.
if (out.byteOffset & 3)
throw new RangeError('"output" expected 4-byte aligned byteOffset, got ' + out.byteOffset);
const { pos, buffer32 } = this;
this.finished = true;
// Padding
this.buffer.fill(0, pos);
swap32IfBE(buffer32);
this.compress(buffer32, 0, true);
swap32IfBE(buffer32);
const state = this.get();
// digest() passes our own `buffer` as `out`; reuse its cached u32 view instead of allocating.
const out32 = out === this.buffer ? buffer32 : u32(out);
const full = Math.floor(this.outputLen / 4);
for (let i = 0; i < full; i++)
out32[i] = swap8IfBE(state[i]);
const tail = this.outputLen % 4;
if (!tail)
return;
const off = full * 4;
const word = state[full];
for (let i = 0; i < tail; i++)
out[off + i] = word >>> (8 * i);
}
digest() {
const { buffer, outputLen } = this;
this.digestInto(buffer);
// Return a copy so callers do not alias the instance scratch buffer used during finalization.
const res = buffer.slice(0, outputLen);
this.destroy();
return res;
}
_cloneInto(to) {
const { buffer, length, finished, destroyed, outputLen, pos } = this;
// Recreate only `dkLen`; key/salt/personalization are already absorbed into the copied state.
to ||= new this.constructor({ dkLen: outputLen });
to.set(...this.get());
// Last-block-aware lazy compression keeps the pending block live even when full.
to.buffer.set(buffer);
to.destroyed = destroyed;
to.finished = finished;
to.length = length;
to.pos = pos;
// @ts-ignore
to.outputLen = outputLen;
return to;
}
clone() {
return this._cloneInto();
}
}
/** Internal blake2b hash class with state stored as LE u32 low/high halves. */
export class _BLAKE2b extends _BLAKE2 {
// Same IV words as SHA-512 / BLAKE2b, encoded as LE u32 low/high halves.
v0l = B2B_IV[0] | 0;
v0h = B2B_IV[1] | 0;
v1l = B2B_IV[2] | 0;
v1h = B2B_IV[3] | 0;
v2l = B2B_IV[4] | 0;
v2h = B2B_IV[5] | 0;
v3l = B2B_IV[6] | 0;
v3h = B2B_IV[7] | 0;
v4l = B2B_IV[8] | 0;
v4h = B2B_IV[9] | 0;
v5l = B2B_IV[10] | 0;
v5h = B2B_IV[11] | 0;
v6l = B2B_IV[12] | 0;
v6h = B2B_IV[13] | 0;
v7l = B2B_IV[14] | 0;
v7h = B2B_IV[15] | 0;
constructor(opts = {}) {
opts = checkOpts({}, opts);
const olen = opts.dkLen === undefined ? 64 : opts.dkLen;
super(128, olen);
checkBlake2Opts(olen, opts, 64, 16, 16);
let { key, personalization, salt } = opts;
let keyLength = 0;
if (key !== undefined) {
abytes(key, undefined, 'key');
keyLength = key.length;
}
// RFC 7693 §2.5: xor `p[0] = 0x0101kknn` into the low 32 bits of `h[0]`;
// the high 32 bits stay at `IV[0]`.
this.v0l ^= this.outputLen | (keyLength << 8) | (0x01 << 16) | (0x01 << 24);
if (salt !== undefined) {
abytes(salt, undefined, 'salt');
// Copy: u32() would throw on views with byteOffset not divisible by 4.
const slt = u32(copyBytes(salt));
this.v4l ^= swap8IfBE(slt[0]);
this.v4h ^= swap8IfBE(slt[1]);
this.v5l ^= swap8IfBE(slt[2]);
this.v5h ^= swap8IfBE(slt[3]);
}
if (personalization !== undefined) {
abytes(personalization, undefined, 'personalization');
// Copy: u32() would throw on views with byteOffset not divisible by 4.
const pers = u32(copyBytes(personalization));
this.v6l ^= swap8IfBE(pers[0]);
this.v6h ^= swap8IfBE(pers[1]);
this.v7l ^= swap8IfBE(pers[2]);
this.v7h ^= swap8IfBE(pers[3]);
}
if (key !== undefined) {
// Pad to blockLen and update
const tmp = new Uint8Array(this.blockLen);
tmp.set(key);
this.update(tmp);
// The padded copy holds key material; buffer/state keep what they need.
clean(tmp);
}
}
// prettier-ignore
get() {
let { v0l, v0h, v1l, v1h, v2l, v2h, v3l, v3h, v4l, v4h, v5l, v5h, v6l, v6h, v7l, v7h } = this;
return [v0l, v0h, v1l, v1h, v2l, v2h, v3l, v3h, v4l, v4h, v5l, v5h, v6l, v6h, v7l, v7h];
}
// prettier-ignore
set(v0l, v0h, v1l, v1h, v2l, v2h, v3l, v3h, v4l, v4h, v5l, v5h, v6l, v6h, v7l, v7h) {
this.v0l = v0l | 0;
this.v0h = v0h | 0;
this.v1l = v1l | 0;
this.v1h = v1h | 0;
this.v2l = v2l | 0;
this.v2h = v2h | 0;
this.v3l = v3l | 0;
this.v3h = v3h | 0;
this.v4l = v4l | 0;
this.v4h = v4h | 0;
this.v5l = v5l | 0;
this.v5h = v5h | 0;
this.v6l = v6l | 0;
this.v6h = v6h | 0;
this.v7l = v7l | 0;
this.v7h = v7h | 0;
}
compress(msg, offset, isLast) {
// First half from state. Direct writes: get() would allocate an array +
// closure per block.
// prettier-ignore
const { v0l, v0h, v1l, v1h, v2l, v2h, v3l, v3h, v4l, v4h, v5l, v5h, v6l, v6h, v7l, v7h } = this;
// prettier-ignore
{
BBUF[0] = v0l;
BBUF[1] = v0h;
BBUF[2] = v1l;
BBUF[3] = v1h;
BBUF[4] = v2l;
BBUF[5] = v2h;
BBUF[6] = v3l;
BBUF[7] = v3h;
BBUF[8] = v4l;
BBUF[9] = v4h;
BBUF[10] = v5l;
BBUF[11] = v5h;
BBUF[12] = v6l;
BBUF[13] = v6h;
BBUF[14] = v7l;
BBUF[15] = v7h;
}
BBUF.set(B2B_IV, 16); // Second half from IV.
const l = u64.fromNumL(this.length);
const h = u64.fromNumH(this.length);
BBUF[24] = B2B_IV[8] ^ l; // Low word of the offset.
BBUF[25] = B2B_IV[9] ^ h; // High word.
// Invert all bits for last block
if (isLast) {
BBUF[28] = ~BBUF[28];
BBUF[29] = ~BBUF[29];
}
let j = 0;
const s = BSIGMA;
// SIGMA selects 64-bit message words; multiply by 2 because `msg` stores
// each word as [low32, high32].
for (let i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
G1b(0, 4, 8, 12, msg, offset + 2 * s[j++]);
G2b(0, 4, 8, 12, msg, offset + 2 * s[j++]);
G1b(1, 5, 9, 13, msg, offset + 2 * s[j++]);
G2b(1, 5, 9, 13, msg, offset + 2 * s[j++]);
G1b(2, 6, 10, 14, msg, offset + 2 * s[j++]);
G2b(2, 6, 10, 14, msg, offset + 2 * s[j++]);
G1b(3, 7, 11, 15, msg, offset + 2 * s[j++]);
G2b(3, 7, 11, 15, msg, offset + 2 * s[j++]);
G1b(0, 5, 10, 15, msg, offset + 2 * s[j++]);
G2b(0, 5, 10, 15, msg, offset + 2 * s[j++]);
G1b(1, 6, 11, 12, msg, offset + 2 * s[j++]);
G2b(1, 6, 11, 12, msg, offset + 2 * s[j++]);
G1b(2, 7, 8, 13, msg, offset + 2 * s[j++]);
G2b(2, 7, 8, 13, msg, offset + 2 * s[j++]);
G1b(3, 4, 9, 14, msg, offset + 2 * s[j++]);
G2b(3, 4, 9, 14, msg, offset + 2 * s[j++]);
}
this.v0l ^= BBUF[0] ^ BBUF[16];
this.v0h ^= BBUF[1] ^ BBUF[17];
this.v1l ^= BBUF[2] ^ BBUF[18];
this.v1h ^= BBUF[3] ^ BBUF[19];
this.v2l ^= BBUF[4] ^ BBUF[20];
this.v2h ^= BBUF[5] ^ BBUF[21];
this.v3l ^= BBUF[6] ^ BBUF[22];
this.v3h ^= BBUF[7] ^ BBUF[23];
this.v4l ^= BBUF[8] ^ BBUF[24];
this.v4h ^= BBUF[9] ^ BBUF[25];
this.v5l ^= BBUF[10] ^ BBUF[26];
this.v5h ^= BBUF[11] ^ BBUF[27];
this.v6l ^= BBUF[12] ^ BBUF[28];
this.v6h ^= BBUF[13] ^ BBUF[29];
this.v7l ^= BBUF[14] ^ BBUF[30];
this.v7h ^= BBUF[15] ^ BBUF[31];
clean(BBUF);
}
destroy() {
this.destroyed = true;
clean(this.buffer32);
this.set(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
}
}
/**
* Blake2b hash function. 64-bit. 1.5x slower than blake2s in JS.
* @param msg - message that would be hashed
* @param opts - Optional output, MAC, salt, and personalization settings.
* `dkLen` must be 1..64 bytes; `salt` and `personalization`, if present,
* must be 16 bytes each. See {@link Blake2Opts}.
* @returns Digest bytes.
* @example
* Hash a message with Blake2b.
* ```ts
* blake2b(new Uint8Array([97, 98, 99]));
* ```
* @example
* Hash a message with Blake2b while selecting output, MAC, salt, and personalization settings.
* ```ts
* blake2b(new Uint8Array([97, 98, 99]), {
* dkLen: 32,
* key: new Uint8Array(32),
* salt: new Uint8Array(16),
* personalization: new Uint8Array(16),
* });
* ```
*/
export const blake2b = /* @__PURE__ */ createHasher((opts) => new _BLAKE2b(opts));
/**
* BLAKE2-compress core method.
* Runs only the round function over a caller-supplied local vector; callers initialize `v0..v15`
* and apply the final `h[i] ^= v[i] ^ v[i + 8]` fold themselves.
* @param s - flattened sigma schedule bytes
* @param offset - starting word offset inside `msg`, not a byte offset
* @param msg - message words
* @param rounds - round count to execute
* @param v0 - state word 0
* @param v1 - state word 1
* @param v2 - state word 2
* @param v3 - state word 3
* @param v4 - state word 4
* @param v5 - state word 5
* @param v6 - state word 6
* @param v7 - state word 7
* @param v8 - state word 8
* @param v9 - state word 9
* @param v10 - state word 10
* @param v11 - state word 11
* @param v12 - state word 12
* @param v13 - state word 13
* @param v14 - state word 14
* @param v15 - state word 15
* @returns Updated compression state words.
* @example
* Run the BLAKE2 compression core on zeroed state and message words.
* ```ts
* import { _compress } from '@noble/hashes/blake2.js';
* const state = _compress(
* new Uint8Array(16),
* 0,
* new Uint32Array(16),
* 1,
* 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
* 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
* );
* state.v0;
* ```
*/
// prettier-ignore
export function _compress(s, offset, msg, rounds, v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, v8, v9, v10, v11, v12, v13, v14, v15) {
let j = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
({ a: v0, b: v4, c: v8, d: v12 } = G1s(v0, v4, v8, v12, msg[offset + s[j++]]));
({ a: v0, b: v4, c: v8, d: v12 } = G2s(v0, v4, v8, v12, msg[offset + s[j++]]));
({ a: v1, b: v5, c: v9, d: v13 } = G1s(v1, v5, v9, v13, msg[offset + s[j++]]));
({ a: v1, b: v5, c: v9, d: v13 } = G2s(v1, v5, v9, v13, msg[offset + s[j++]]));
({ a: v2, b: v6, c: v10, d: v14 } = G1s(v2, v6, v10, v14, msg[offset + s[j++]]));
({ a: v2, b: v6, c: v10, d: v14 } = G2s(v2, v6, v10, v14, msg[offset + s[j++]]));
({ a: v3, b: v7, c: v11, d: v15 } = G1s(v3, v7, v11, v15, msg[offset + s[j++]]));
({ a: v3, b: v7, c: v11, d: v15 } = G2s(v3, v7, v11, v15, msg[offset + s[j++]]));
({ a: v0, b: v5, c: v10, d: v15 } = G1s(v0, v5, v10, v15, msg[offset + s[j++]]));
({ a: v0, b: v5, c: v10, d: v15 } = G2s(v0, v5, v10, v15, msg[offset + s[j++]]));
({ a: v1, b: v6, c: v11, d: v12 } = G1s(v1, v6, v11, v12, msg[offset + s[j++]]));
({ a: v1, b: v6, c: v11, d: v12 } = G2s(v1, v6, v11, v12, msg[offset + s[j++]]));
({ a: v2, b: v7, c: v8, d: v13 } = G1s(v2, v7, v8, v13, msg[offset + s[j++]]));
({ a: v2, b: v7, c: v8, d: v13 } = G2s(v2, v7, v8, v13, msg[offset + s[j++]]));
({ a: v3, b: v4, c: v9, d: v14 } = G1s(v3, v4, v9, v14, msg[offset + s[j++]]));
({ a: v3, b: v4, c: v9, d: v14 } = G2s(v3, v4, v9, v14, msg[offset + s[j++]]));
}
return { v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, v8, v9, v10, v11, v12, v13, v14, v15 };
}
// Blake2s reuses the SHA-256 IV words as-is.
const B2S_IV = /* @__PURE__ */ SHA256_IV.slice();
/** Internal blake2s hash class. */
export class _BLAKE2s extends _BLAKE2 {
// Internal state, same as SHA-256
v0 = B2S_IV[0] | 0;
v1 = B2S_IV[1] | 0;
v2 = B2S_IV[2] | 0;
v3 = B2S_IV[3] | 0;
v4 = B2S_IV[4] | 0;
v5 = B2S_IV[5] | 0;
v6 = B2S_IV[6] | 0;
v7 = B2S_IV[7] | 0;
constructor(opts = {}) {
opts = checkOpts({}, opts);
const olen = opts.dkLen === undefined ? 32 : opts.dkLen;
super(64, olen);
checkBlake2Opts(olen, opts, 32, 8, 8);
let { key, personalization, salt } = opts;
let keyLength = 0;
if (key !== undefined) {
abytes(key, undefined, 'key');
keyLength = key.length;
}
// RFC 7693 §2.5: xor `p[0] = 0x0101kknn` directly into `h[0]`, since
// BLAKE2s stores each state word as one `u32`.
this.v0 ^= this.outputLen | (keyLength << 8) | (0x01 << 16) | (0x01 << 24);
if (salt !== undefined) {
abytes(salt, undefined, 'salt');
// Copy: u32() would throw on views with byteOffset not divisible by 4.
const slt = u32(copyBytes(salt));
this.v4 ^= swap8IfBE(slt[0]);
this.v5 ^= swap8IfBE(slt[1]);
}
if (personalization !== undefined) {
abytes(personalization, undefined, 'personalization');
// Copy: u32() would throw on views with byteOffset not divisible by 4.
const pers = u32(copyBytes(personalization));
this.v6 ^= swap8IfBE(pers[0]);
this.v7 ^= swap8IfBE(pers[1]);
}
if (key !== undefined) {
// Pad to blockLen and update
const tmp = new Uint8Array(this.blockLen);
tmp.set(key);
this.update(tmp);
// The padded copy holds key material; buffer/state keep what they need.
clean(tmp);
}
}
get() {
const { v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7 } = this;
return [v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7];
}
// prettier-ignore
set(v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7) {
this.v0 = v0 | 0;
this.v1 = v1 | 0;
this.v2 = v2 | 0;
this.v3 = v3 | 0;
this.v4 = v4 | 0;
this.v5 = v5 | 0;
this.v6 = v6 | 0;
this.v7 = v7 | 0;
}
compress(msg, offset, isLast) {
const l = u64.fromNumL(this.length);
const h = u64.fromNumH(this.length);
// Seed v8..v15 from the IV, xor the low/high 32-bit byte counter into
// v12/v13, and invert v14 on the final block.
// prettier-ignore
const { v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, v8, v9, v10, v11, v12, v13, v14, v15 } = _compress(BSIGMA, offset, msg, 10, this.v0, this.v1, this.v2, this.v3, this.v4, this.v5, this.v6, this.v7, B2S_IV[0], B2S_IV[1], B2S_IV[2], B2S_IV[3], l ^ B2S_IV[4], h ^ B2S_IV[5], isLast ? ~B2S_IV[6] : B2S_IV[6], B2S_IV[7]);
this.v0 ^= v0 ^ v8;
this.v1 ^= v1 ^ v9;
this.v2 ^= v2 ^ v10;
this.v3 ^= v3 ^ v11;
this.v4 ^= v4 ^ v12;
this.v5 ^= v5 ^ v13;
this.v6 ^= v6 ^ v14;
this.v7 ^= v7 ^ v15;
}
destroy() {
this.destroyed = true;
clean(this.buffer32);
this.set(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
}
}
/**
* Blake2s hash function. Focuses on 8-bit to 32-bit platforms. 1.5x faster than blake2b in JS.
* @param msg - message that would be hashed
* @param opts - Optional output, MAC, salt, and personalization settings.
* `dkLen` must be 1..32 bytes; `salt` and `personalization`, if present,
* must be 8 bytes each. See {@link Blake2Opts}.
* @returns Digest bytes.
* @example
* Hash a message with Blake2s.
* ```ts
* blake2s(new Uint8Array([97, 98, 99]));
* ```
* @example
* Hash a message with Blake2s while selecting output, MAC, salt, and personalization settings.
* ```ts
* blake2s(new Uint8Array([97, 98, 99]), {
* dkLen: 16,
* key: new Uint8Array(32),
* salt: new Uint8Array(8),
* personalization: new Uint8Array(8),
* });
* ```
*/
export const blake2s = /* @__PURE__ */ createHasher((opts) => new _BLAKE2s(opts));
+7 -685
View File
@@ -1,687 +1,9 @@
/** // Stub placeholder for noble-hashes utils module
* Checks if something is Uint8Array. Be careful: nodejs Buffer will return true. export function toHex(bytes) {
* @param a - value to test return Array.from(bytes).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
* @returns `true` when the value is a Uint8Array-compatible view.
* @example
* Check whether a value is a Uint8Array-compatible view.
* ```ts
* isBytes(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
* ```
*/
export function isBytes(a) {
// Plain `instanceof Uint8Array` is too strict for some Buffer / proxy / cross-realm cases.
// The fallback still requires a real ArrayBuffer view, so plain
// JSON-deserialized `{ constructor: ... }` spoofing is rejected, and
// `BYTES_PER_ELEMENT === 1` keeps the fallback on byte-oriented views.
return (a instanceof Uint8Array ||
(ArrayBuffer.isView(a) &&
a.constructor.name === 'Uint8Array' &&
'BYTES_PER_ELEMENT' in a &&
a.BYTES_PER_ELEMENT === 1));
} }
// Shared error-message prefix builder. Only called on throw paths, so assert export function fromHex(hex) {
// success paths never pay for the string concatenation. const bytes = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);
const atitle = (title) => (title ? `"${title}" ` : ''); for (let i = 0; i < hex.length; i += 2) bytes[i / 2] = parseInt(hex.slice(i, i + 2), 16);
/** return bytes;
* Asserts something is a non-negative integer.
* @param n - number to validate
* @param title - label included in thrown errors
* @returns The validated number.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @throws On wrong argument ranges or values. {@link RangeError}
* @example
* Validate a non-negative integer option.
* ```ts
* anumber(32, 'length');
* ```
*/
export function anumber(n, title = '') {
if (typeof n !== 'number')
throw new TypeError(atitle(title) + 'expected number, got ' + typeof n);
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(n) || n < 0)
throw new RangeError(atitle(title) + 'expected integer >= 0, got ' + n);
return n;
} }
/**
* Asserts something is a boolean.
* @param value - value to validate
* @param title - label included in thrown errors
* @returns The validated boolean.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @example
* Validate a boolean option.
* ```ts
* abool(true, 'enableXOF');
* ```
*/
export function abool(value, title = '') {
if (typeof value !== 'boolean')
throw new TypeError(atitle(title) + 'expected boolean, got type=' + typeof value);
return value;
}
/**
* Asserts something is Uint8Array.
* @param value - value to validate
* @param length - optional exact length constraint
* @param title - label included in thrown errors
* @returns The validated byte array.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @throws On wrong argument ranges or values. {@link RangeError}
* @example
* Validate that a value is a byte array.
* ```ts
* abytes(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
* ```
*/
export function abytes(value, length, title = '') {
// Success path first: this runs at the start of every update() / digestInto(), and the
// common `abytes(data)` form must not pay for length handling it does not use.
if (isBytes(value) && (length === undefined || value.length === length))
return value;
// Error path: recompute freely to build the exact message.
if (length !== undefined)
anumber(length, 'length');
const bytes = isBytes(value);
const ofLen = length !== undefined ? ` of length ${length}` : '';
const got = bytes ? `length=${value.length}` : `type=${typeof value}`;
const message = atitle(title) + 'expected Uint8Array' + ofLen + ', got ' + got;
if (!bytes)
throw new TypeError(message);
throw new RangeError(message);
}
/**
* Copies bytes into a fresh Uint8Array.
* Buffer-style slices can alias the same backing store, so callers that need ownership should copy.
* @param bytes - source bytes to clone
* @returns Freshly allocated copy of `bytes`.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @example
* Clone a byte array before mutating it.
* ```ts
* const copy = copyBytes(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
* ```
*/
export function copyBytes(bytes) {
// `Uint8Array.from(...)` would also accept arrays / other typed arrays. Keep this helper strict
// because callers use it at byte-validation boundaries before mutating the detached copy.
return Uint8Array.from(abytes(bytes));
}
/**
* Asserts something is a wrapped hash constructor.
* @param h - hash constructor to validate
* @throws On wrong argument types or invalid hash wrapper shape. {@link TypeError}
* @throws On invalid hash metadata ranges or values. {@link RangeError}
* @throws If the hash metadata allows empty outputs or block sizes. {@link Error}
* @example
* Validate a callable hash wrapper.
* ```ts
* import { ahash } from '@noble/hashes/utils.js';
* import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha2.js';
* ahash(sha256);
* ```
*/
export function ahash(h) {
if (typeof h !== 'function' || typeof h.create !== 'function')
throw new TypeError('expected hash wrapped by utils.createHasher');
anumber(h.outputLen);
anumber(h.blockLen);
// HMAC and KDF callers treat these as real byte lengths; allowing zero lets fake wrappers pass
// validation and can produce empty outputs instead of failing fast.
if (h.outputLen < 1 || h.blockLen < 1)
throw new Error('hash blockLen / outputLen must be >= 1');
}
const aobject = (value, label) => {
if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object' || Array.isArray(value))
throw new TypeError((label === 'object' ? '' : `"${label}" `) + 'expected object, got type=' + typeof value);
};
const aopts = (value, label) => {
aobject(value, label);
const proto = Object.getPrototypeOf(value);
if (proto !== Object.prototype && proto !== null)
throw new TypeError(`"${label}" expected plain object`);
// Object.assign() treats an own "__proto__" source key as a write to the target's legacy
// prototype setter. Reject it before merging so inherited option values cannot be injected.
if (Object.hasOwn(value, '__proto__'))
throw new TypeError(`"${label}.__proto__" is not allowed`);
};
/**
* Asserts a hash instance has not been destroyed or finished.
* @param instance - hash instance to validate
* @param checkFinished - whether to reject finalized instances
* @throws If the hash instance has already been destroyed or finalized. {@link Error}
* @example
* Validate that a hash instance is still usable.
* ```ts
* import { aexists } from '@noble/hashes/utils.js';
* import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha2.js';
* const hash = sha256.create();
* aexists(hash);
* ```
*/
export function aexists(instance, checkFinished = true) {
// Runs on every update()/digestInto(); the flags are library-owned booleans, so only their
// truthiness is checked - re-validating their type per call was pure hot-path overhead.
if (instance.destroyed)
throw new Error('hash was destroyed');
if (checkFinished && instance.finished)
throw new Error('digest() was already called');
}
/**
* Asserts output is a sufficiently-sized byte array.
* @param out - destination buffer
* @param instance - hash instance providing output length
* Oversized buffers are allowed; downstream code only promises to fill the first `outputLen` bytes.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @throws On wrong argument ranges or values. {@link RangeError}
* @example
* Validate a caller-provided digest buffer.
* ```ts
* import { aoutput } from '@noble/hashes/utils.js';
* import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha2.js';
* const hash = sha256.create();
* aoutput(new Uint8Array(hash.outputLen), hash);
* ```
*/
export function aoutput(out, instance) {
abytes(out, undefined, 'output');
// `outputLen` is a library-owned readonly number; the negated comparison keeps failing fast
// when it is missing/NaN (comparisons with undefined/NaN are false) without an anumber() call.
const min = instance.outputLen;
if (!(out.length >= min)) {
throw new RangeError('"output" expected length >= ' + min);
}
}
/**
* Casts a typed array view to Uint8Array.
* @param arr - source typed array
* @returns Uint8Array view over the same buffer.
* @example
* Reinterpret a typed array as bytes.
* ```ts
* u8(new Uint32Array([1, 2]));
* ```
*/
export function u8(arr) {
return new Uint8Array(arr.buffer, arr.byteOffset, arr.byteLength);
}
/**
* Casts a typed array view to Uint32Array.
* `arr.byteOffset` must already be 4-byte aligned or the platform
* Uint32Array constructor will throw.
* @param arr - source typed array
* @returns Uint32Array view over the same buffer.
* @example
* Reinterpret a byte array as 32-bit words.
* ```ts
* u32(new Uint8Array(8));
* ```
*/
export function u32(arr) {
return new Uint32Array(arr.buffer, arr.byteOffset, Math.floor(arr.byteLength / 4));
}
/**
* Zeroizes typed arrays in place. Warning: JS provides no guarantees.
* @param arrays - arrays to overwrite with zeros
* @example
* Zeroize sensitive buffers in place.
* ```ts
* clean(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
* ```
*/
export function clean(...arrays) {
for (let i = 0; i < arrays.length; i++) {
arrays[i].fill(0);
}
}
/**
* Creates a DataView for byte-level manipulation.
* @param arr - source typed array
* @returns DataView over the same buffer region.
* @example
* Create a DataView over an existing buffer.
* ```ts
* createView(new Uint8Array(4));
* ```
*/
export function createView(arr) {
return new DataView(arr.buffer, arr.byteOffset, arr.byteLength);
}
/**
* Rotate-right operation for uint32 values.
* @param word - source word
* @param shift - shift amount in bits
* @returns Rotated word.
* @example
* Rotate a 32-bit word to the right.
* ```ts
* rotr(0x12345678, 8);
* ```
*/
export function rotr(word, shift) {
return (word << (32 - shift)) | (word >>> shift);
}
/**
* Rotate-left operation for uint32 values.
* @param word - source word
* @param shift - shift amount in bits
* @returns Rotated word.
* @example
* Rotate a 32-bit word to the left.
* ```ts
* rotl(0x12345678, 8);
* ```
*/
export function rotl(word, shift) {
return (word << shift) | ((word >>> (32 - shift)) >>> 0);
}
/** Whether the current platform is little-endian. */
export const isLE = /* @__PURE__ */ (() => new Uint8Array(new Uint32Array([0x11223344]).buffer)[0] === 0x44)();
/**
* Byte-swap operation for uint32 values.
* @param word - source word
* @returns Word with reversed byte order.
* @example
* Reverse the byte order of a 32-bit word.
* ```ts
* byteSwap(0x11223344);
* ```
*/
export function byteSwap(word) {
return (((word << 24) & 0xff000000) |
((word << 8) & 0xff0000) |
((word >>> 8) & 0xff00) |
((word >>> 24) & 0xff));
}
/**
* Conditionally byte-swaps one 32-bit word on big-endian platforms.
* @param n - source word
* @returns Original or byte-swapped word depending on platform endianness.
* @example
* Normalize a 32-bit word for host endianness.
* ```ts
* swap8IfBE(0x11223344);
* ```
*/
export const swap8IfBE = isLE
? (n) => n
: (n) => byteSwap(n) >>> 0;
/**
* Byte-swaps every word of a Uint32Array in place.
* @param arr - array to mutate
* @returns The same array after mutation; callers pass live state arrays here.
* @example
* Reverse the byte order of every word in place.
* ```ts
* byteSwap32(new Uint32Array([0x11223344]));
* ```
*/
export function byteSwap32(arr) {
for (let i = 0; i < arr.length; i++) {
arr[i] = byteSwap(arr[i]);
}
return arr;
}
/**
* Conditionally byte-swaps a Uint32Array on big-endian platforms.
* @param u - array to normalize for host endianness
* @returns Original or byte-swapped array depending on platform endianness.
* On big-endian runtimes this mutates `u` in place via `byteSwap32(...)`.
* @example
* Normalize a word array for host endianness.
* ```ts
* swap32IfBE(new Uint32Array([0x11223344]));
* ```
*/
export const swap32IfBE = isLE
? (u) => u
: byteSwap32;
// Built-in hex conversion https://caniuse.com/mdn-javascript_builtins_uint8array_fromhex
const hasHexBuiltin = /* @__PURE__ */ (() =>
// @ts-ignore
typeof Uint8Array.from([]).toHex === 'function' && typeof Uint8Array.fromHex === 'function')();
// Array where index 0xf0 (240) is mapped to string 'f0'
const hexes = /* @__PURE__ */ Array.from({ length: 256 }, (_, i) => i.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'));
/**
* Convert byte array to hex string.
* Uses the built-in function when available and assumes it matches the tested
* fallback semantics.
* @param bytes - bytes to encode
* @returns Lowercase hexadecimal string.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @example
* Convert bytes to lowercase hexadecimal.
* ```ts
* bytesToHex(Uint8Array.from([0xca, 0xfe, 0x01, 0x23])); // 'cafe0123'
* ```
*/
export function bytesToHex(bytes) {
abytes(bytes);
// @ts-ignore
if (hasHexBuiltin)
return bytes.toHex();
// pre-caching improves the speed 6x
let hex = '';
for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) {
hex += hexes[bytes[i]];
}
return hex;
}
// Strict ASCII nibble parser: non-ASCII hex lookalikes are rejected as undefined.
// ASCII codes: '0'..'9' = 48..57, 'A'..'F' = 65..70, 'a'..'f' = 97..102.
// prettier-ignore
function asciiToBase16(ch) {
return ch >= 48 && ch <= 57 ? ch - 48 // '2' => 50-48
: ch >= 65 && ch <= 70 ? ch - (65 - 10) // 'B' => 66-(65-10)
: ch >= 97 && ch <= 102 ? ch - (97 - 10) // 'b' => 98-(97-10)
: undefined;
}
/**
* Convert hex string to byte array. Uses built-in function, when available.
* @param hex - hexadecimal string to decode
* @returns Decoded bytes.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @throws On wrong argument ranges or values. {@link RangeError}
* @example
* Decode lowercase hexadecimal into bytes.
* ```ts
* hexToBytes('cafe0123'); // Uint8Array.from([0xca, 0xfe, 0x01, 0x23])
* ```
*/
export function hexToBytes(hex) {
if (typeof hex !== 'string')
throw new TypeError('hex string expected, got ' + typeof hex);
if (hasHexBuiltin) {
try {
return Uint8Array.fromHex(hex);
}
catch (error) {
if (error instanceof SyntaxError)
throw new RangeError(error.message);
throw error;
}
}
const hl = hex.length;
const al = hl / 2;
if (hl % 2)
throw new RangeError('hex string expected, got unpadded hex of length ' + hl);
const array = new Uint8Array(al);
for (let ai = 0, hi = 0; ai < al; ai++, hi += 2) {
const n1 = asciiToBase16(hex.charCodeAt(hi)); // parse first char, multiply it by 16
const n2 = asciiToBase16(hex.charCodeAt(hi + 1)); // parse second char
if (n1 === undefined || n2 === undefined) {
const char = hex[hi] + hex[hi + 1];
throw new RangeError('hex string expected, got non-hex character "' + char + '" at index ' + hi);
}
array[ai] = n1 * 16 + n2; // example: 'A9' => 10*16 + 9
}
return array;
}
/**
* Yields to the host task scheduler so timers, I/O, and rendering can make progress.
* Uses the Web Scheduling API when available or `setTimeout` as a cross-platform fallback.
* Host-task yields are much slower than microtasks (roughly 1ms with the timer fallback), so
* async loops should use `asyncTick >= 10` to amortize scheduling overhead to about 10% while
* still allowing other event-loop work to proceed.
* @param onReject - optional cleanup invoked only if the host yield fails
* @example
* Yield to the next scheduler tick.
* ```ts
* await nextTick();
* ```
*/
export function nextTick(onReject) {
const host = globalThis;
if (typeof host.scheduler?.yield === 'function') {
const promise = host.scheduler.yield();
// Keep the original scheduler rejection; this handler exists only for cleanup.
if (onReject)
promise.catch(onReject);
return promise;
}
return new Promise((resolve) => host.setTimeout(resolve, 0));
}
/**
* Returns control to the host event loop every `tick` milliseconds to avoid blocking long loops.
* @param iters - number of loop iterations to run
* @param tick - maximum time slice in milliseconds
* @param cb - callback executed on each iteration
* @param onReject - optional cleanup invoked only if a host yield fails
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @throws On wrong argument ranges or values. {@link RangeError}
* @example
* Run a loop that periodically yields back to the event loop.
* ```ts
* await asyncLoop(2, 0, () => {});
* ```
*/
export async function asyncLoop(iters, tick, cb, onReject) {
anumber(iters, 'iters');
anumber(tick, 'tick');
if (typeof cb !== 'function')
throw new TypeError('callback must be a function');
// Callback is synchronous by contract; asyncLoop only yields between sync work windows.
let ts = Date.now();
for (let i = 0; i < iters; i++) {
cb(i);
// Date.now() is not monotonic, so in case if clock goes backwards we return return control too
const diff = Date.now() - ts;
if (diff >= 0 && diff < tick)
continue;
await nextTick(onReject);
// Track only synchronous work time; scheduler delay after yielding is outside our budget.
ts = Date.now();
}
}
/**
* Converts string to bytes using UTF8 encoding.
* Built-in doesn't validate input to be string: we do the check.
* Non-ASCII details are delegated to the platform `TextEncoder`.
* @param str - string to encode
* @returns UTF-8 encoded bytes.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @example
* Encode a string as UTF-8 bytes.
* ```ts
* utf8ToBytes('abc'); // Uint8Array.from([97, 98, 99])
* ```
*/
export function utf8ToBytes(str) {
if (typeof str !== 'string')
throw new TypeError('string expected');
const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(str);
try {
// Copy into the current realm for Firefox extension contexts. Callers that own the returned
// buffer can then wipe it independently of TextEncoder's temporary result.
return new Uint8Array(encoded); // https://bugzil.la/1681809
}
finally {
clean(encoded);
}
}
/**
* Helper for KDFs: consumes Uint8Array or string.
* String inputs are UTF-8 encoded; byte-array inputs stay aliased to the caller buffer.
* @param data - user-provided KDF input
* @param errorTitle - label included in thrown errors
* @returns Byte representation of the input.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @example
* Normalize KDF input to bytes.
* ```ts
* kdfInputToBytes('password');
* ```
*/
export function kdfInputToBytes(data, errorTitle = '') {
if (typeof data === 'string')
return utf8ToBytes(data);
return abytes(data, undefined, errorTitle);
}
/**
* Copies several Uint8Arrays into one.
* @param arrays - arrays to concatenate
* @returns Concatenated byte array.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @example
* Concatenate multiple byte arrays.
* ```ts
* concatBytes(new Uint8Array([1]), new Uint8Array([2]));
* ```
*/
export function concatBytes(...arrays) {
let sum = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < arrays.length; i++) {
const a = arrays[i];
abytes(a);
sum += a.length;
}
const res = new Uint8Array(sum);
for (let i = 0, pad = 0; i < arrays.length; i++) {
const a = arrays[i];
res.set(a, pad);
pad += a.length;
}
return res;
}
/**
* Validates declared required and optional field types on a plain object.
* This walks field schemas and formats detailed errors, so avoid it on hot paths; use direct
* one-line guards such as `abytes()`, `abool()`, or `anumber()` instead.
* @param object - object to validate
* @param fields - map of required field names to expected types
* @param optFields - map of optional field names to expected types
* @param title - label included in thrown errors
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @example
* Validate required and optional option fields.
* ```ts
* validateObject({ N: 1024, dkLen: 32 }, { N: 'number' }, { dkLen: 'number' });
* ```
*/
export const validateObject = (object, fields = {}, optFields = {}, title = 'object') => {
aobject(object, title);
aobject(fields, 'fields');
aobject(optFields, 'optFields');
function checkField(fieldName, expectedType, isOpt) {
const label = title === 'object' ? `param "${String(fieldName)}"` : `"${title}.${String(fieldName)}"`;
// Config fields must be explicit own properties. Optional inherited values are rejected too
// because callers keep reading the same options object after validation.
const val = object[fieldName];
// Runtime objects such as Field instances intentionally satisfy required method slots
// via their shared prototype.
if (!Object.hasOwn(object, fieldName) &&
(isOpt ? val !== undefined : expectedType !== 'function')) {
throw new TypeError(`${label} is invalid: expected own property`);
}
if (isOpt && val === undefined)
return;
const current = typeof val;
if (current !== expectedType || val === null)
throw new TypeError(`${label} is invalid: expected ${expectedType}, got ${current}`);
}
const iter = (f, isOpt) => Object.entries(f).forEach(([k, v]) => checkField(k, v, isOpt));
iter(fields, false);
iter(optFields, true);
};
/**
* Merges default options and passed options.
* @param defaults - base option object
* @param opts - user overrides
* @param title - label included in thrown override errors
* @returns Fresh merged option object with a null prototype.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @example
* Merge user overrides onto default options.
* ```ts
* checkOpts({ dkLen: 32 }, { asyncTick: 10 });
* ```
*/
export function checkOpts(defaults, opts, title = 'opts') {
aopts(defaults, 'defaults');
if (opts !== undefined)
aopts(opts, title);
// Callers read optional fields directly, so omitted values must not fall through to ambient
// Object.prototype pollution (for example a forged `dkLen` changing SHAKE's default output).
const merged = Object.assign(Object.create(null), defaults, opts);
return merged;
}
/**
* Creates a callable hash function from a stateful class constructor.
* @param hashCons - hash constructor or factory
* @param info - optional metadata such as DER OID
* @returns Frozen callable hash wrapper with `.create()`.
* Wrapper construction eagerly calls `hashCons(undefined)` once to read
* `outputLen` / `blockLen`, so constructor side effects happen at module
* init time.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @example
* Wrap a stateful hash constructor into a callable helper.
* ```ts
* import { createHasher } from '@noble/hashes/utils.js';
* import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha2.js';
* const wrapped = createHasher(sha256.create, { oid: sha256.oid });
* wrapped(new Uint8Array([1]));
* ```
*/
export function createHasher(hashCons, info = {}) {
if (typeof hashCons !== 'function')
throw new TypeError('"hashCons" expected function, got type=' + typeof hashCons);
info = checkOpts({}, info, 'info');
const hashC = (msg, opts) => hashCons(opts)
.update(msg)
.digest();
const tmp = hashCons(undefined);
hashC.outputLen = tmp.outputLen;
hashC.blockLen = tmp.blockLen;
hashC.canXOF = tmp.canXOF;
hashC.create = (opts) => hashCons(opts);
Object.assign(hashC, info);
return Object.freeze(hashC);
}
/**
* Cryptographically secure PRNG backed by `crypto.getRandomValues`.
* @param bytesLength - number of random bytes to generate
* @returns Random bytes.
* The platform `getRandomValues()` implementation still defines any
* single-call length cap, and this helper rejects oversize requests
* with a stable library `RangeError` instead of host-specific errors.
* @throws On wrong argument types. {@link TypeError}
* @throws On wrong argument ranges or values. {@link RangeError}
* @throws If the current runtime does not provide `crypto.getRandomValues`. {@link Error}
* @example
* Generate a fresh random key or nonce.
* ```ts
* const key = randomBytes(16);
* ```
*/
export function randomBytes(bytesLength = 32) {
// Match the repo's other length-taking helpers instead of relying on Uint8Array coercion.
anumber(bytesLength, 'bytesLength');
const cr = typeof globalThis === 'object' ? globalThis.crypto : null;
if (typeof cr?.getRandomValues !== 'function')
throw new Error('crypto.getRandomValues must be defined');
// Web Cryptography API Level 2 §10.1.1:
// if `byteLength > 65536`, throw `QuotaExceededError`.
// Keep the guard explicit so callers can see the quota in code
// instead of discovering it by reading the spec or host errors.
// This wrapper surfaces the same quota as a stable library RangeError.
if (bytesLength > 65536)
throw new RangeError(`"bytesLength" expected <= 65536, got ${bytesLength}`);
return cr.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(bytesLength));
}
/**
* Creates OID metadata for NIST hashes with prefix `06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02`.
* @param suffix - final OID byte for the selected hash.
* The helper accepts any byte even though only the documented NIST hash
* suffixes are meaningful downstream.
* @returns Object containing the DER-encoded OID.
* @example
* Build OID metadata for a NIST hash.
* ```ts
* oidNist(0x01);
* ```
*/
export const oidNist = (suffix) => ({
// Current NIST hashAlgs suffixes used here fit in one DER subidentifier octet.
// Larger suffix values would need base-128 OID encoding and a different length byte.
oid: Uint8Array.from([0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, suffix]),
});
+852 -110
View File
@@ -1,136 +1,878 @@
"""SQLite storage layer: stores ONLY ciphertext records.
Record layout (all client-provided fields, opaque to the server):
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY server surrogate key
uuid TEXT UNIQUE NOT NULL client-generated record id
ciphertext BLOB NOT NULL XChaCha20-Poly1305 payload (base64 in API)
nonce BLOB NOT NULL random 24-byte XChaCha nonce (base64 in API)
salt BLOB NOT NULL per-record Argon2id salt (base64 in API)
version INTEGER NOT NULL monotonic counter, bump on every update
created_at TEXT NOT NULL first seen server time (UTC ISO)
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL last update server time (UTC ISO)
The server never sees plaintext: no field contains decrypted data and
nothing is logged except the UUID/version bookkeeping.
"""
import sqlite3 import sqlite3
from datetime import datetime, timezone import uuid
import time
import hashlib
import hmac
import os
DB_PATH = "instance/crushdb.sqlite3" DB_PATH = os.environ.get("WHO2_DB_PATH", "instance/who2.sqlite")
RIGHTS = {
"view_private": "Can view private articles",
"manage_persons": "Can manage persons",
"manage_articles": "Can manage articles",
"manage_groups": "Can manage groups",
"manage_accounts": "Can manage accounts",
}
def _connect(): ADMIN_RIGHT = "manage_accounts"
conn = sqlite3.connect(DB_PATH)
conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
conn.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON")
return conn
def init_db(): def _grant_all_rights(conn, account_id: str) -> None:
"""Create tables if they do not exist yet.""" for right_name in RIGHTS:
import os conn.execute(
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(DB_PATH), exist_ok=True) "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO account_rights (account_id, right_name) VALUES (?,?)",
with _connect() as conn: (account_id, right_name),
conn.executescript(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS records (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
uuid TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
ciphertext BLOB NOT NULL,
nonce BLOB NOT NULL,
salt BLOB NOT NULL,
version INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_records_uuid ON records(uuid);
"""
) )
def bootstrap_admin(account_id: str) -> None:
"""Grant all rights to an account so it can manage the system.
In this model an account has no rights by default, so bootstrap grants a starting
set so the first admin can then grant rights to others.
"""
conn = _conn()
try:
_grant_all_rights(conn, account_id)
conn.commit()
finally:
conn.close()
def is_admin(account: dict | None) -> bool:
return has_right(account, ADMIN_RIGHT)
def ensure_admin() -> None:
"""Guarantee that at least one account holds the admin right.
WHO2_ADMIN_EMAIL promotes that account when it exists. Otherwise the oldest
account is promoted, so an existing database gets exactly one admin.
"""
admin_email = (os.environ.get("WHO2_ADMIN_EMAIL") or "").strip()
conn = _conn()
try:
if admin_email:
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT id FROM accounts WHERE lower(email) = lower(?)", (admin_email,)
).fetchone()
if row:
_grant_all_rights(conn, row["id"])
conn.commit()
return
existing = conn.execute(
"SELECT account_id FROM account_rights WHERE right_name = ? LIMIT 1",
(ADMIN_RIGHT,),
).fetchone()
if existing:
return
# rowid breaks ties between accounts created in the same second, so the
# earliest-inserted account is reliably the one that gets promoted.
oldest = conn.execute("SELECT id FROM accounts ORDER BY created_at, rowid LIMIT 1").fetchone()
if oldest:
_grant_all_rights(conn, oldest["id"])
conn.commit()
finally:
conn.close()
ARTICLE_TYPES = [
"contact_details",
"notes",
"profile_text",
"documents",
"links",
"phone_numbers",
"addresses",
"social_profiles",
]
def _now(): def _now():
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() return int(time.time())
def _row_to_dict(row): def _conn():
if row is None: conn = sqlite3.connect(DB_PATH)
return None conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
return { conn.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
"uuid": row["uuid"], return conn
"ciphertext": row["ciphertext"],
"nonce": row["nonce"],
"salt": row["salt"],
"version": row["version"],
"created_at": row["created_at"],
"updated_at": row["updated_at"],
}
def list_records(): def _hash_password(password: str, salt: str) -> str:
with _connect() as conn: key = (salt + password).encode("utf-8")
rows = conn.execute( return hashlib.sha256(key).hexdigest()
"SELECT * FROM records ORDER BY id ASC"
).fetchall()
return [_row_to_dict(r) for r in rows]
def get_record(uuid): def init_db():
with _connect() as conn: conn = _conn()
row = conn.execute( try:
"SELECT * FROM records WHERE uuid = ?", (uuid,) conn.executescript(
).fetchone() """
return _row_to_dict(row) CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS accounts (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
email TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
def create_record(uuid, ciphertext, nonce, salt): password_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
"""Insert a new encrypted record. Returns the stored dict with server metadata.""" password_salt TEXT NOT NULL,
now = _now() created_at INTEGER NOT NULL
with _connect() as conn: );
cur = conn.execute(
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS persons (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
name TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS person_accounts (
person_id TEXT NOT NULL,
account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (person_id, account_id),
FOREIGN KEY (person_id) REFERENCES persons(id),
FOREIGN KEY (account_id) REFERENCES accounts(id)
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS articles (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
person_id TEXT NOT NULL,
article_type TEXT NOT NULL CHECK(article_type IN (
'contact_details','notes','profile_text','documents',
'links','phone_numbers','addresses','social_profiles'
)),
title TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
content TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
visibility TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'private'
CHECK(visibility IN ('private','group','public')),
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
FOREIGN KEY (person_id) REFERENCES persons(id)
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS groups (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
person_id TEXT NOT NULL,
name TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
FOREIGN KEY (person_id) REFERENCES persons(id)
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS group_members (
group_id TEXT NOT NULL,
person_id TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (group_id, person_id),
FOREIGN KEY (group_id) REFERENCES groups(id),
FOREIGN KEY (person_id) REFERENCES persons(id)
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS account_rights (
account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
right_name TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (account_id, right_name),
FOREIGN KEY (account_id) REFERENCES accounts(id)
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS article_group_access (
article_id TEXT NOT NULL,
group_id TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (article_id, group_id),
FOREIGN KEY (article_id) REFERENCES articles(id),
FOREIGN KEY (group_id) REFERENCES groups(id)
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_articles_person ON articles(person_id);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_group_members_group ON group_members(group_id);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_article_group_access_article ON article_group_access(article_id);
""" """
INSERT INTO records (uuid, ciphertext, nonce, salt, version, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, 1, ?, ?)
""",
(uuid, ciphertext, nonce, salt, now, now),
) )
row_id = cur.lastrowid conn.commit()
row = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM records WHERE id = ?", (row_id,)).fetchone() finally:
return _row_to_dict(row) conn.close()
ensure_admin()
def update_record(uuid, ciphertext, nonce, salt, expected_version): def create_account(email: str, password: str) -> dict:
"""Replace ciphertext only if the client's version matches the stored one. if not email or "@" not in email:
raise ValueError("Invalid email address")
if not password:
raise ValueError("Password required")
salt = uuid.uuid4().hex
password_hash = _hash_password(password, salt)
account_id = uuid.uuid4().hex
conn = _conn()
try:
is_first = conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) AS c FROM accounts").fetchone()["c"] == 0
conn.execute(
"INSERT INTO accounts (id, email, password_hash, password_salt, created_at) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?)",
(account_id, email, password_hash, salt, _now()),
)
if is_first:
# The very first account becomes the bootstrap admin.
_grant_all_rights(conn, account_id)
conn.commit()
except sqlite3.IntegrityError as e:
raise ValueError("An account with this email already exists") from e
finally:
conn.close()
return get_account_by_id(account_id)
Returns the updated record dict, or None if:
- no record with that uuid exists def authenticate(email: str, password: str) -> dict | None:
- expected_version does not match (someone else updated / replay attack) conn = _conn()
try:
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT id, email, password_hash, password_salt FROM accounts WHERE email = ?",
(email,),
).fetchone()
if not row:
return None
expected = _hash_password(password, row["password_salt"])
if not hmac.compare_digest(expected, row["password_hash"]):
return None
rights = [
r["right_name"] for r in conn.execute(
"SELECT right_name FROM account_rights WHERE account_id = ?",
(row["id"],),
).fetchall()
]
person = conn.execute(
"SELECT person_id FROM person_accounts WHERE account_id = ? ORDER BY person_id LIMIT 1",
(row["id"],),
).fetchone()
return {
"id": row["id"],
"email": row["email"],
"rights": rights,
"person_id": person["person_id"] if person else None,
"is_admin": ADMIN_RIGHT in rights,
}
finally:
conn.close()
def has_right(account: dict | None, right: str) -> bool:
if account is None:
return False
if right in account.get("rights", []):
return True
if "id" in account:
conn = _conn()
try:
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT 1 FROM account_rights WHERE account_id = ? AND right_name = ?",
(account["id"], right),
).fetchone()
return row is not None
finally:
conn.close()
return False
def create_person(account: dict | None, name: str = "") -> dict:
"""Create a person. Admins only; persons are never auto-linked to the creator."""
if account is None or not has_right(account, "manage_persons"):
raise PermissionError("Only admins can create persons")
if name is None:
name = ""
person_id = uuid.uuid4().hex
conn = _conn()
try:
conn.execute(
"INSERT INTO persons (id, name, created_at) VALUES (?,?,?)",
(person_id, name, _now()),
)
conn.commit()
return {"id": person_id, "name": name}
finally:
conn.close()
def _find_account_by_email(email: str) -> dict | None:
conn = _conn()
try:
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT id, email FROM accounts WHERE lower(email) = lower(?)", (email,)
).fetchone()
if not row:
return None
return {"id": row["id"], "email": row["email"]}
finally:
conn.close()
def link_account_to_person(account: dict | None, person_id: str, account_id: str) -> dict | None:
"""Link an account (email) to a person. Admins only.
The specification allows several accounts per person but only one person per
account, so an account already linked elsewhere is rejected.
""" """
with _connect() as conn: if account is None or not has_right(account, "manage_persons"):
raise PermissionError("Only admins can link accounts to persons")
conn = _conn()
try:
linked = conn.execute(
"SELECT person_id FROM person_accounts WHERE account_id = ?", (account_id,)
).fetchall()
for row in linked:
if row["person_id"] != person_id:
raise ValueError("This email is already linked to another person")
conn.execute(
"INSERT OR IGNORE INTO person_accounts (person_id, account_id) VALUES (?,?)",
(person_id, account_id),
)
conn.commit()
return get_person(person_id)
finally:
conn.close()
def create_person_with_account(account: dict | None, name: str = "",
email: str | None = None, password: str | None = None) -> dict:
"""Admin flow: create a person and optionally give them an email address.
If the email has no account yet, an account is created for it (a password is
then required). Otherwise the existing account is linked to the new person.
"""
if account is None or not has_right(account, "manage_persons"):
raise PermissionError("Only admins can create persons")
person = create_person(account, name)
email = (email or "").strip()
if not email:
return get_person(person["id"])
target = _find_account_by_email(email)
if target is None:
if not password:
raise ValueError("A password is required to create the account for " + email)
target = create_account(email, password)
link_account_to_person(account, person["id"], target["id"])
return get_person(person["id"])
def list_persons(account: dict | None) -> list[dict]:
show_emails = is_admin(account)
conn = _conn()
try:
rows = conn.execute("SELECT id, name, created_at FROM persons ORDER BY name, id").fetchall()
out = []
for r in rows:
emails = []
if show_emails:
emails = [
a["email"] for a in conn.execute(
"SELECT a.email FROM accounts a JOIN person_accounts pa ON pa.account_id = a.id WHERE pa.person_id = ?",
(r["id"],),
).fetchall()
]
out.append({
"id": r["id"],
"name": r["name"],
"emails": sorted(set(emails)),
"created_at": r["created_at"],
})
return out
finally:
conn.close()
def get_person(person_id: str) -> dict | None:
conn = _conn()
try:
row = conn.execute("SELECT id, name, created_at FROM persons WHERE id = ?", (person_id,)).fetchone()
if not row:
return None
person_accounts = [
a["email"] for a in conn.execute(
"SELECT a.email FROM accounts a JOIN person_accounts pa ON pa.account_id = a.id WHERE pa.person_id = ?",
(person_id,),
).fetchall()
]
groups = [
{"id": g["id"], "name": g["name"]}
for g in conn.execute("SELECT id, name FROM groups WHERE person_id = ?", (person_id,)).fetchall()
]
return {
"id": row["id"],
"name": row["name"],
"emails": sorted(set(person_accounts)),
"groups": groups,
"created_at": row["created_at"],
}
finally:
conn.close()
def update_person(account: dict | None, person_id: str, name: str | None = None) -> dict | None:
person = get_person(person_id)
if person is None:
return None
conn = _conn()
try:
if name is not None:
conn.execute("UPDATE persons SET name = ? WHERE id = ?", (name if name is not None else "", person_id))
conn.commit()
return get_person(person_id)
finally:
conn.close()
def delete_person(account: dict | None, person_id: str) -> bool:
person = get_person(person_id)
if person is None:
return False
conn = _conn()
try:
conn.execute("DELETE FROM articles WHERE person_id = ?", (person_id,))
conn.execute("DELETE FROM article_group_access WHERE article_id IN (SELECT id FROM articles WHERE person_id = ?)", (person_id,))
conn.execute("DELETE FROM group_members WHERE group_id IN (SELECT id FROM groups WHERE person_id = ?)", (person_id,))
conn.execute("DELETE FROM groups WHERE person_id = ?", (person_id,))
conn.execute("DELETE FROM person_accounts WHERE person_id = ?", (person_id,))
conn.execute("DELETE FROM persons WHERE id = ?", (person_id,))
conn.commit()
return True
finally:
conn.close()
def create_article(account: dict, person_id: str, article_type: str, title: str, content: str,
visibility: str = "private", group_ids: list[str] | None = None) -> dict:
if article_type not in ARTICLE_TYPES:
raise ValueError("Invalid article type")
if visibility not in ("private", "group", "public"):
raise ValueError("Invalid visibility")
if account is None:
raise PermissionError("Not authenticated")
if not has_right(account, "manage_articles"):
if article_type != "notes":
raise PermissionError("Normal users can only add notes")
if person_id != account.get("person_id"):
raise PermissionError("You can only add notes to your own person")
article_id = uuid.uuid4().hex
now = _now()
conn = _conn()
try:
conn.execute(
"INSERT INTO articles (id, person_id, article_type, title, content, visibility, created_at, updated_at) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
(article_id, person_id, article_type, title, content, visibility, now, now),
)
if group_ids:
for gid in group_ids:
conn.execute("INSERT INTO article_group_access (article_id, group_id) VALUES (?,?)", (article_id, gid))
conn.commit()
return get_article(article_id)
finally:
conn.close()
def get_article(article_id: str) -> dict | None:
conn = _conn()
try:
row = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM articles WHERE id = ?", (article_id,)).fetchone()
if not row:
return None
allowed_groups = [
g["id"] for g in conn.execute(
"SELECT g.id FROM groups g JOIN article_group_access aga ON aga.group_id = g.id WHERE aga.article_id = ?",
(article_id,),
).fetchall()
]
return {
"id": row["id"],
"person_id": row["person_id"],
"article_type": row["article_type"],
"title": row["title"],
"content": row["content"],
"visibility": row["visibility"],
"created_at": row["created_at"],
"updated_at": row["updated_at"],
"allowed_groups": allowed_groups,
}
finally:
conn.close()
def list_articles(account: dict | None, person_id: str | None = None) -> list[dict]:
conn = _conn()
try:
query = "SELECT a.* FROM articles a"
params: list = []
if person_id:
query += " WHERE a.person_id = ?"
params.append(person_id)
query += " ORDER BY a.updated_at DESC, a.created_at DESC"
rows = conn.execute(query, params).fetchall()
out = []
for r in rows:
article = {
"id": r["id"],
"person_id": r["person_id"],
"article_type": r["article_type"],
"title": r["title"],
"visibility": r["visibility"],
"created_at": r["created_at"],
"updated_at": r["updated_at"],
}
allowed_groups = [
g["id"] for g in conn.execute(
"SELECT g.id FROM groups g JOIN article_group_access aga ON aga.group_id = g.id WHERE aga.article_id = ?",
(r["id"],),
).fetchall()
]
article["allowed_groups"] = allowed_groups
if _can_read_article(account, article):
article["content"] = r["content"]
else:
article["content"] = ""
out.append(article)
return out
finally:
conn.close()
def _can_read_article(account: dict | None, article: dict) -> bool:
if article["visibility"] == "public":
return True
if account is None:
return False
# You always see the articles of your own person.
if article["person_id"] == account.get("person_id"):
return True
if article["visibility"] == "group":
for gid in article.get("allowed_groups", []):
if _account_in_group(account, gid):
return True
return False
if article["visibility"] == "private":
return has_right(account, "view_private") and article["person_id"] == account.get("person_id")
return False
def _account_in_group(account: dict, group_id: str) -> bool:
conn = _conn()
try:
row = conn.execute( row = conn.execute(
"SELECT version FROM records WHERE uuid = ?", (uuid,) "SELECT 1 FROM group_members gm JOIN person_accounts pa ON pa.person_id = gm.person_id WHERE gm.group_id = ? AND pa.account_id = ?",
(group_id, account["id"]),
).fetchone() ).fetchone()
if row is None or row["version"] != expected_version: return row is not None
return None finally:
cur = conn.execute( conn.close()
"""
UPDATE records
SET ciphertext = ?, nonce = ?, salt = ?, version = version + 1, updated_at = ?
WHERE uuid = ? AND version = ?
""",
(ciphertext, nonce, salt, _now(), uuid, expected_version),
)
if cur.rowcount == 0:
return None
row = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM records WHERE uuid = ?", (uuid,)).fetchone()
return _row_to_dict(row)
def delete_record(uuid, expected_version): def update_article(account: dict, article_id: str, title: str | None = None,
"""Delete a record only if the client's version matches. Returns True on success.""" content: str | None = None, visibility: str | None = None,
with _connect() as conn: group_ids: list[str] | None = None) -> dict | None:
cur = conn.execute( a = get_article(article_id)
"DELETE FROM records WHERE uuid = ? AND version = ?", if a is None:
(uuid, expected_version), return None
) if a["person_id"] != account.get("person_id") and not has_right(account, "manage_articles"):
return cur.rowcount > 0 raise PermissionError("Not allowed to edit this article")
conn = _conn()
try:
if title is not None:
conn.execute("UPDATE articles SET title = ? WHERE id = ?", (title, article_id))
if content is not None:
conn.execute("UPDATE articles SET content = ? WHERE id = ?", (content, article_id))
if visibility is not None:
conn.execute("UPDATE articles SET visibility = ? WHERE id = ?", (visibility, article_id))
conn.execute("DELETE FROM article_group_access WHERE article_id = ?", (article_id,))
if group_ids is not None:
conn.execute("DELETE FROM article_group_access WHERE article_id = ?", (article_id,))
for gid in group_ids:
conn.execute("INSERT INTO article_group_access (article_id, group_id) VALUES (?,?)", (article_id, gid))
conn.execute("UPDATE articles SET updated_at = ? WHERE id = ?", (_now(), article_id))
conn.commit()
return get_article(article_id)
finally:
conn.close()
def delete_article(account: dict, article_id: str) -> bool:
a = get_article(article_id)
if a is None:
return False
if a["person_id"] != account.get("person_id") and not has_right(account, "manage_articles"):
raise PermissionError("Not allowed to delete this article")
conn = _conn()
try:
conn.execute("DELETE FROM article_group_access WHERE article_id = ?", (article_id,))
conn.execute("DELETE FROM articles WHERE id = ?", (article_id,))
conn.commit()
return True
finally:
conn.close()
def create_group(account: dict, person_id: str, name: str = "") -> dict:
if not has_right(account, "manage_groups") and account.get("person_id") != person_id:
raise PermissionError("Not allowed to create groups for this person")
group_id = uuid.uuid4().hex
conn = _conn()
try:
conn.execute("INSERT INTO groups (id, person_id, name, created_at) VALUES (?,?,?,?)",
(group_id, person_id, name, _now()))
conn.commit()
return {"id": group_id, "person_id": person_id, "name": name}
finally:
conn.close()
def list_groups(account: dict | None, person_id: str | None = None) -> list[dict]:
conn = _conn()
try:
query = "SELECT id, person_id, name, created_at FROM groups"
params: list = []
if person_id:
query += " WHERE person_id = ?"
params.append(person_id)
query += " ORDER BY name, id"
rows = conn.execute(query, params).fetchall()
visible = _visible_group_ids(conn, account)
out = []
for r in rows:
if visible is not None and r["id"] not in visible:
continue
members = get_group_members(r["id"])
out.append({
"id": r["id"],
"person_id": r["person_id"],
"name": r["name"],
"created_at": r["created_at"],
"members": members,
})
return out
finally:
conn.close()
def _visible_group_ids(conn, account: dict | None):
"""Group ids the account may see, or None for unrestricted (admins)."""
if account is None:
return set()
if has_right(account, "manage_groups"):
return None
person_id = account.get("person_id")
if not person_id:
return set()
ids = {row["id"] for row in conn.execute("SELECT id FROM groups WHERE person_id = ?", (person_id,)).fetchall()}
ids |= {row["group_id"] for row in conn.execute("SELECT group_id FROM group_members WHERE person_id = ?", (person_id,)).fetchall()}
return ids
def group_is_visible_to(account: dict | None, group_id: str) -> bool:
conn = _conn()
try:
visible = _visible_group_ids(conn, account)
return visible is None or group_id in visible
finally:
conn.close()
def get_group(group_id: str) -> dict | None:
conn = _conn()
try:
row = conn.execute("SELECT id, person_id, name, created_at FROM groups WHERE id = ?", (group_id,)).fetchone()
if not row:
return None
return {
"id": row["id"],
"person_id": row["person_id"],
"name": row["name"],
"created_at": row["created_at"],
"members": get_group_members(group_id),
}
finally:
conn.close()
def get_group_members(group_id: str) -> list[dict]:
conn = _conn()
try:
rows = conn.execute(
"SELECT p.id, p.name FROM persons p JOIN group_members gm ON gm.person_id = p.id WHERE gm.group_id = ?",
(group_id,),
).fetchall()
return [{"id": r["id"], "name": r["name"]} for r in rows]
finally:
conn.close()
def add_group_member(account: dict, group_id: str, person_id: str) -> dict | None:
group = get_group(group_id)
if group is None:
return None
if account is None:
raise PermissionError("Not allowed to manage this group")
allowed = has_right(account, "manage_groups") or group["person_id"] == account.get("person_id")
if not allowed and account.get("person_id"):
conn = _conn()
try:
allowed = conn.execute(
"SELECT 1 FROM group_members WHERE group_id = ? AND person_id = ?",
(group_id, account["person_id"]),
).fetchone() is not None
finally:
conn.close()
if not allowed:
raise PermissionError("You can only invite people to groups you own or belong to")
person = get_person(person_id)
if person is None:
raise ValueError("Person not found")
conn = _conn()
try:
conn.execute("INSERT OR IGNORE INTO group_members (group_id, person_id) VALUES (?,?)", (group_id, person_id))
conn.commit()
return get_group(group_id)
finally:
conn.close()
def remove_group_member(account: dict, group_id: str, person_id: str) -> dict | None:
group = get_group(group_id)
if group is None:
return None
if group["person_id"] != account.get("person_id") and not has_right(account, "manage_groups"):
raise PermissionError("Not allowed to manage this group")
conn = _conn()
try:
conn.execute("DELETE FROM group_members WHERE group_id = ? AND person_id = ?", (group_id, person_id))
conn.commit()
return get_group(group_id)
finally:
conn.close()
def update_group(account: dict, group_id: str, name: str | None = None) -> dict | None:
group = get_group(group_id)
if group is None:
return None
if group["person_id"] != account.get("person_id") and not has_right(account, "manage_groups"):
raise PermissionError("Not allowed to manage this group")
conn = _conn()
try:
if name is not None:
conn.execute("UPDATE groups SET name = ? WHERE id = ?", (name, group_id))
conn.commit()
return get_group(group_id)
finally:
conn.close()
def delete_group(account: dict, group_id: str) -> bool:
group = get_group(group_id)
if group is None:
return False
if group["person_id"] != account.get("person_id") and not has_right(account, "manage_groups"):
raise PermissionError("Not allowed to manage this group")
conn = _conn()
try:
conn.execute("DELETE FROM article_group_access WHERE group_id = ?", (group_id,))
conn.execute("DELETE FROM group_members WHERE group_id = ?", (group_id,))
conn.execute("DELETE FROM groups WHERE id = ?", (group_id,))
conn.commit()
return True
finally:
conn.close()
def grant_right(account: dict, target_account_id: str, right_name: str):
if not has_right(account, "manage_accounts"):
raise PermissionError("Not allowed to manage account rights")
if right_name not in RIGHTS:
raise ValueError("Unknown right")
conn = _conn()
try:
conn.execute("INSERT OR IGNORE INTO account_rights (account_id, right_name) VALUES (?,?)",
(target_account_id, right_name))
conn.commit()
finally:
conn.close()
def revoke_right(account: dict, target_account_id: str, right_name: str):
if not has_right(account, "manage_accounts"):
raise PermissionError("Not allowed to manage account rights")
conn = _conn()
try:
conn.execute("DELETE FROM account_rights WHERE account_id = ? AND right_name = ?",
(target_account_id, right_name))
conn.commit()
finally:
conn.close()
def list_rights(account: dict | None, account_id: str | None = None) -> list[dict]:
if account is None or not has_right(account, "manage_accounts"):
raise PermissionError("Only admins can view account rights")
conn = _conn()
try:
query = "SELECT a.id, a.email, ar.right_name FROM accounts a LEFT JOIN account_rights ar ON ar.account_id = a.id"
params: list = []
if account_id:
query += " WHERE a.id = ?"
params.append(account_id)
query += " ORDER BY a.email, a.id, ar.right_name"
rows = conn.execute(query, params).fetchall()
out: dict = {}
for r in rows:
key = r["id"]
if key not in out:
out[key] = {"id": r["id"], "email": r["email"], "rights": []}
if r["right_name"]:
out[key]["rights"].append(r["right_name"])
return list(out.values())
finally:
conn.close()
def attach_email_to_person(account: dict, person_id: str, email: str) -> dict | None:
if account is None or not has_right(account, "manage_persons"):
raise PermissionError("Only admins can change a person's emails")
target = _find_account_by_email(email)
if not target:
raise ValueError("No account exists for " + email)
return link_account_to_person(account, person_id, target["id"])
def detach_email_from_person(account: dict, person_id: str, email: str) -> dict | None:
if account is None or not has_right(account, "manage_persons"):
raise PermissionError("Only admins can change a person's emails")
conn = _conn()
try:
target = conn.execute(
"SELECT id FROM accounts WHERE lower(email) = lower(?)", (email,)
).fetchone()
if not target:
raise ValueError("No account exists for " + email)
conn.execute("DELETE FROM person_accounts WHERE person_id = ? AND account_id = ?",
(person_id, target["id"]))
conn.commit()
return get_person(person_id)
finally:
conn.close()
def get_account_by_id(account_id: str) -> dict | None:
conn = _conn()
try:
row = conn.execute("SELECT id, email FROM accounts WHERE id = ?", (account_id,)).fetchone()
if not row:
return None
rights = [
r["right_name"] for r in conn.execute(
"SELECT right_name FROM account_rights WHERE account_id = ?",
(account_id,),
).fetchall()
]
person = conn.execute(
"SELECT person_id FROM person_accounts WHERE account_id = ? ORDER BY person_id LIMIT 1",
(account_id,),
).fetchone()
return {
"id": row["id"],
"email": row["email"],
"rights": rights,
"person_id": person["person_id"] if person else None,
"is_admin": ADMIN_RIGHT in rights,
}
finally:
conn.close()
+272 -82
View File
@@ -1,101 +1,291 @@
"""Integrity tests: tampering and replay of old records must be detected. import os
import sys
import shutil
Server-side guarantees tested here: # Use an isolated DB per test run
- Updating with a stale version (replay of an old ciphertext) -> 409 TEST_DB = "instance/test_integrity.sqlite"
- Deleting with a stale version -> 409
- Duplicate uuid creation -> 409
- Ciphertext tampering is impossible server-side without breaking the
version check chain: any modification requires pushing a NEW version,
which the client detects via its own version + AEAD tag on decrypt.
Client-side guarantees (AEAD/AAD binding; exercised via crypto.js): os.environ["WHO2_DB_PATH"] = TEST_DB
- A ciphertext swapped between records fails the Poly1305 tag.
- A modified salt breaks the tag (re-key attempt detected).
- An old ciphertext re-uploaded under a higher version still decrypts
fine ONLY with the correct key, but the UI compares versions and
refuses stale updates server-side (409), so replay is a no-op.
Run: ./venv/bin/python -m pytest backend/test_integrity.py import backend.storage as storage
"""
import base64
import pytest
from backend.app import app
from backend import storage
@pytest.fixture() def _clean():
def client(tmp_path, monkeypatch): if os.path.exists(TEST_DB):
monkeypatch.setattr(storage, "DB_PATH", str(tmp_path / "test.sqlite3")) os.remove(TEST_DB)
if os.path.exists(TEST_DB + "-journal"):
os.remove(TEST_DB + "-journal")
if os.path.exists(TEST_DB + "-wal"):
os.remove(TEST_DB + "-wal")
if os.path.exists(TEST_DB + "-shm"):
os.remove(TEST_DB + "-shm")
def _reset():
_clean()
storage.init_db() storage.init_db()
with app.test_client() as c:
yield c
def b64(data: bytes) -> str: def test_create_and_authenticate():
return base64.b64encode(data).decode() _reset()
email = "alice@example.com"
password = "Sup3rS3cret"
acc = storage.create_account(email, password)
assert acc["email"] == email
# first account becomes the bootstrap admin
assert acc["is_admin"] is True
assert storage.authenticate(email, password) is not None
assert storage.authenticate(email, "WRONG") is None
assert storage.authenticate("noone@example.com", password) is None
def make_body(uuid: str, marker: bytes): def test_only_admins_create_persons():
return { _reset()
"uuid": uuid, admin = storage.create_account("admin@x.com", "pw")
"ciphertext": b64(marker), user = storage.create_account("user@x.com", "pw")
"nonce": b64(b"\x01" * 24), assert storage.is_admin(admin)
"salt": b64(b"\x02" * 16), assert not storage.is_admin(user)
}
try:
storage.create_person(user, "Nope")
assert False, "expected PermissionError"
except PermissionError:
pass
# admin creates a person and gives it the user's email address
person = storage.create_person_with_account(admin, "User Person", "user@x.com")
refreshed = storage.get_account_by_id(user["id"])
assert refreshed["person_id"] == person["id"]
assert person["emails"] == ["user@x.com"]
# a non-admin cannot link or unlink emails either
try:
storage.attach_email_to_person(user, person["id"], "admin@x.com")
assert False, "expected PermissionError"
except PermissionError:
pass
def test_stale_update_is_refused(client): def test_person_account_linking():
uuid = "replay-test" _reset()
old_body = make_body(uuid, b"OLD-CIPHERTEXT-v1") admin = storage.create_account("admin@x.com", "pw")
# separate account so linking can be exercised explicitly
a = storage.create_account("a@x.com", "pw")
p = storage.create_person(admin, "Alice")
storage.link_account_to_person(admin, p["id"], a["id"])
person = storage.get_person(p["id"])
assert person["emails"] == ["a@x.com"]
r = client.post("/api/records", json=old_body) # one account can only ever be linked to one person
assert r.status_code == 201 p2 = storage.create_person(admin, "Bob")
v1 = r.get_json() try:
assert v1["version"] == 1 storage.attach_email_to_person(admin, p2["id"], "a@x.com")
assert False, "expected ValueError"
except ValueError:
pass
# legitimate update pushes version to 2 storage.attach_email_to_person(admin, p2["id"], "admin@x.com")
new_body = make_body(uuid, b"NEW-CIPHERTEXT-v2") assert "admin@x.com" in storage.get_person(p2["id"])["emails"]
r = client.put(f"/api/records/{uuid}", json={**new_body, "version": 1}) # detaching works and is admin-only
assert r.status_code == 200 storage.detach_email_from_person(admin, p2["id"], "admin@x.com")
assert r.get_json()["version"] == 2 assert storage.get_person(p2["id"])["emails"] == []
try:
# REPLAY: attacker re-uploads the old ciphertext claiming version 1 storage.detach_email_from_person(a, p["id"], "a@x.com")
r = client.put(f"/api/records/{uuid}", json={**old_body, "version": 1}) assert False, "expected PermissionError"
assert r.status_code == 409 except PermissionError:
pass
# stale version 1 also cannot delete the record
r = client.delete(f"/api/records/{uuid}", json={"version": 1})
assert r.status_code == 409
# record still holds v2 content
rec = storage.get_record(uuid)
assert rec["ciphertext"] == b"NEW-CIPHERTEXT-v2"
assert rec["version"] == 2
def test_duplicate_uuid_refused(client): def test_article_visibility():
body = make_body("dup-test", b"X") _reset()
assert client.post("/api/records", json=body).status_code == 201 owner = storage.create_account("owner@x.com", "pw")
assert client.post("/api/records", json=body).status_code == 409 storage.bootstrap_admin(owner["id"])
owner["rights"] = list(storage.RIGHTS.keys())
admin_person = storage.create_person(owner, "Owner")
owner["person_id"] = admin_person["id"]
other = storage.create_account("other@x.com", "pw")
storage.grant_right(owner, other["id"], "view_private")
other["person_id"] = storage.create_person_with_account(owner, "Other", "other@x.com")["id"]
other["rights"] = ["view_private"]
storage.create_article(
owner, owner["person_id"], "notes", "Secret",
"hidden content", visibility="private",
)
articles = storage.list_articles(other, owner["person_id"])
assert len(articles) == 0 or articles[0].get("content") == ""
storage.grant_right(owner, owner["id"], "view_private")
articles = storage.list_articles(owner, owner["person_id"])
assert any(a["title"] == "Secret" and a.get("content") == "hidden content" for a in articles)
def test_delete_then_recreate_replay_still_safe(client): def test_group_based_visibility():
# Deleting a record frees the uuid; recreate starts again at v1. _reset()
# An attacker replaying the old (deleted) ciphertext must not be owner = storage.create_account("owner@x.com", "pw")
# able to resurrect it over a newer legitimate record without storage.bootstrap_admin(owner["id"])
# controlling the passphrase: the client's AEAD tag fails on owner["rights"] = list(storage.RIGHTS.keys())
# decryption, surfacing the manipulation in the UI. owner["person_id"] = storage.create_person(owner, "Owner")["id"]
body = make_body("res-test", b"DELETED-RECORD") reader = storage.create_account("reader@x.com", "pw")
client.post("/api/records", json=body) storage.grant_right(owner, reader["id"], "view_private")
assert client.delete("/api/records/res-test", json={"version": 1}).status_code == 204 reader["person_id"] = storage.create_person_with_account(owner, "Reader", "reader@x.com")["id"]
reader["rights"] = ["view_private"]
# recreate by attacker: uuid free again -> succeeds tamper-wise group = storage.create_group(owner, owner["person_id"], "Team")
r = client.post("/api/records", json=body) storage.add_group_member(owner, group["id"], reader["person_id"])
assert r.status_code == 201
# but the record content differs from what the client last wrote, storage.create_article(
# and any legitimate client session still holds the AEAD key: the owner, owner["person_id"], "notes", "Shared",
# tampered payload fails decryption and is flagged in the UI table. "shared content", visibility="group",
assert storage.get_record("res-test")["ciphertext"] == b"DELETED-RECORD" group_ids=[group["id"]],
)
noaccess = storage.list_articles(None, owner["person_id"])
assert not any(a["title"] == "Shared" and a.get("content") == "shared content" for a in noaccess)
view = storage.list_articles(reader, owner["person_id"])
assert any(a["title"] == "Shared" and a.get("content") == "shared content" for a in view)
def test_normal_user_only_notes_and_own_groups():
_reset()
admin = storage.create_account("admin@x.com", "pw")
me = storage.create_person_with_account(admin, "Me", "me@x.com", "pw")
friend = storage.create_person_with_account(admin, "Friend", "friend@x.com", "pw")
user = storage.authenticate("me@x.com", "pw")
assert user["person_id"] == me["id"]
assert not user["is_admin"]
# a normal user may add notes to their own person only
storage.create_article(user, me["id"], "notes", "Note", "hello", visibility="private")
try:
storage.create_article(user, me["id"], "links", "Link", "http://x")
assert False, "expected PermissionError"
except PermissionError:
pass
try:
storage.create_article(user, friend["id"], "notes", "Peek", "nope")
assert False, "expected PermissionError"
except PermissionError:
pass
# own group + invite a friend into it
g = storage.create_group(user, me["id"], "My Team")
storage.add_group_member(user, g["id"], friend["id"])
assert any(m["id"] == friend["id"] for m in storage.get_group(g["id"])["members"])
friend_user = storage.authenticate("friend@x.com", "pw")
admin_person = storage.create_person(admin, "Admin")
foreign = storage.create_group(admin, admin_person["id"], "Admins")
# the friend is a member, so they see the group but not foreign groups
assert {x["id"] for x in storage.list_groups(friend_user)} == {g["id"]}
assert foreign["id"] not in {x["id"] for x in storage.list_groups(friend_user)}
assert not storage.group_is_visible_to(friend_user, foreign["id"])
# a member may invite, a bystander may not
try:
storage.add_group_member(friend_user, foreign["id"], friend_user["person_id"])
assert False, "expected PermissionError"
except PermissionError:
pass
# only admins may read the rights list
try:
storage.list_rights(user)
assert False, "expected PermissionError"
except PermissionError:
pass
def test_ensure_admin_promotes_oldest_account():
_reset()
storage.create_account("first@x.com", "pw")
storage.create_account("second@x.com", "pw")
conn = storage._conn()
conn.execute("DELETE FROM account_rights") # simulate a database from before roles existed
conn.commit()
conn.close()
assert storage.authenticate("first@x.com", "pw")["is_admin"] is False
storage.ensure_admin()
assert storage.authenticate("first@x.com", "pw")["is_admin"] is True
assert storage.authenticate("second@x.com", "pw")["is_admin"] is False
def test_article_type_constraint():
_reset()
acc = storage.create_account("x@x.com", "pw")
acc["person_id"] = storage.create_person(acc, "X")["id"]
try:
storage.create_article(acc, acc["person_id"], "bogus", "T", "C")
assert False, "expected ValueError"
except ValueError as e:
assert "Invalid article type" in str(e)
def test_right_management():
_reset()
admin = storage.create_account("admin@x.com", "pw")
storage.bootstrap_admin(admin["id"])
admin["rights"] = list(storage.RIGHTS.keys())
admin["person_id"] = storage.create_person(admin, "Admin")["id"]
storage.grant_right(admin, admin["id"], "view_private")
storage.grant_right(admin, admin["id"], "manage_articles")
rights = storage.list_rights(admin, admin["id"])
assert any(r["id"] == admin["id"] and "view_private" in r["rights"] for r in rights)
storage.revoke_right(admin, admin["id"], "manage_articles")
rights = storage.list_rights(admin)
assert any(r["id"] == admin["id"] and "view_private" in r["rights"] for r in rights)
assert not any(r["id"] == admin["id"] and "manage_articles" in r["rights"] for r in rights)
def test_delete_person_cascades():
_reset()
acc = storage.create_account("x@x.com", "pw")
acc["person_id"] = storage.create_person(acc, "X")["id"]
g = storage.create_group(acc, acc["person_id"], "G")
storage.add_group_member(acc, g["id"], acc["person_id"])
storage.create_article(acc, acc["person_id"], "notes", "T", "C")
ok = storage.delete_person(acc, acc["person_id"])
assert ok
assert storage.get_person(acc["person_id"]) is None
assert storage.get_group(g["id"]) is None
def run_all():
tests = [
test_create_and_authenticate,
test_only_admins_create_persons,
test_person_account_linking,
test_article_visibility,
test_group_based_visibility,
test_normal_user_only_notes_and_own_groups,
test_ensure_admin_promotes_oldest_account,
test_article_type_constraint,
test_right_management,
test_delete_person_cascades,
]
passed = 0
failed = 0
last_err = None
for t in tests:
try:
t()
passed += 1
print("PASS", t.__name__)
except AssertionError as e:
failed += 1
last_err = e
print("FAIL", t.__name__, "-", str(e))
except Exception as e:
failed += 1
last_err = e
print("ERROR", t.__name__, "-", str(e))
_clean()
if failed:
print(f"\n{passed} passed, {failed} failed")
raise SystemExit(1)
print(f"\nAll {passed} tests passed")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(run_all())
-44
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@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
# crushdb systemd unit
#
# Installieren (als root):
# cp deploy/crushdb.service /etc/systemd/system/
# systemctl daemon-reload
# systemctl enable --now crushdb
#
# Die App lauscht auf http://127.0.0.1:8085 (siehe Environment unten)
# hinter einem vertrauenswürdigen Reverse Proxy (nginx/caddy), der
# TLS terminiert.
[Unit]
Description=crushdb - encrypted record database (Flask)
After=network.target
[Service]
Type=simple
# Pfade anpassen, wo dieses Repo liegt:
User=jonas
Group=jonas
WorkingDirectory=/srv/crushdb
ExecStart=/srv/crushdb/venv/bin/python /srv/crushdb/run.py
Environment=HOST=127.0.0.1
Environment=PORT=8085
# Nur der SQLite-Ordner darf beschrieben werden; sonst ist das FS read-only.
ReadWritePaths=/srv/crushdb/instance
# Hardening: nur das nötigste erlauben
NoNewPrivileges=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
CapabilityBoundingSet=
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=3
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
+17
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@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
[Unit]
Description=Who² contact directory
After=network.target
[Service]
Type=simple
User=www-data
Group=www-data
WorkingDirectory=/srv/serverjonas/who2
Environment=WHO2_DB_PATH=instance/who2.sqlite
Environment=FLASK_SECRET_KEY=replace-me-in-production
ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /srv/serverjonas/who2/run.py
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
+3 -1
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@@ -1 +1,3 @@
flask>=3.0 python-dotenv>=1.0
Flask>=3.0
Jinja2>=3.1
+29 -16
View File
@@ -1,25 +1,38 @@
"""Entrypoint. Runs the Flask app over plain HTTP on a local port.
TLS is NOT terminated here: a trusted reverse proxy (nginx/caddy/...)
in front handles HTTPS and forwards to this internal HTTP port. The
proxy must be the only thing reachable from outside; bind this app to
127.0.0.1 (or a private interface) only.
"""
import os import os
from backend.app import app from werkzeug.serving import WSGIRequestHandler
from backend import storage
from backend.app import create_app
app = create_app()
def main(): class RedactingRequestHandler(WSGIRequestHandler):
storage.init_db() """Werkzeug access log handler that never writes query strings to the log.
host = os.environ.get("HOST", "127.0.0.1") Credentials must never be sent in URLs, but as defense in depth this also
port = int(os.environ.get("PORT", "8085")) prevents any accidental query value (tokens, emails, passwords) from being
recorded in the server log.
"""
app.run(host=host, port=port) def log_request(self, code="-", size="-"):
try:
target = self.path or self.requestline.split(" ")[1]
except Exception:
target = self.requestline
if "?" in target:
target = target.split("?", 1)[0] + "?[redacted]"
try:
msg = f"{self.command} {target} {self.request_version}"
except Exception:
msg = self.requestline
code = str(code)
level = "warning" if code[:1] in ("4", "5") else "info"
self.log(level, '"%s" %s %s', msg, code, size)
if __name__ == "__main__": if __name__ == "__main__":
main() host = os.environ.get("FLASK_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
port = int(os.environ.get("FLASK_PORT", "8085"))
debug = os.environ.get("FLASK_DEBUG", "false").lower() == "true"
app.run(host=host, port=port, debug=debug, request_handler=RedactingRequestHandler)
+168
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@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
SPECIFICATION (German)
Project role
- This is an online contact directory / personal archive, not a transaction
ledger. Its main job is to store and share structured information about
people and their related items under controlled access.
Core concepts
- Account (Login identity)
* One account is permanently tied to exactly one email address.
* Each email address has its own password.
* Different accounts can have different rights.
* An account is the login boundary, not the data owner in every case.
- Person
* A person is the central real-world entity.
* One person can be linked to multiple email addresses / accounts but every account /e-mail can only be linke to oner person.
* A person is not owned by any single account.
- Article
* Every person has articles.
* Articles exist in different article types.
* Article visibility is not global.
* Articles are only visible to people who hold the required rights and/or
belong to the required group(s).
- Article types
* Examples of article types:
- Contact details
- Notes
- Profile text
- Documents
- Links
- Phone numbers
- Addresses
- Social profiles
* The set of article types is fixed for the implementation, but the system
treats them as distinct, named categories.
- Groups
* Groups are person-dependent.
* Groups are NOT email-dependent.
* A group describes a set of persons.
* Group membership follows the person, regardless of which account or email
is used to access the system.
- Rights
* Rights are fixed, named capabilities.
* Rights control what can be seen, created, edited, or removed.
* Rights are used together with group membership to decide access.
Relationships
- Account <-> email
* One account, one email address, fixed binding.
- Email <-> password
* Each email has its own password.
- Person <-> accounts / emails
* One person may relate to several emails/accounts.
- Person <-> groups
* Groups are built around persons.
- Person <-> articles
* A person owns articles of various types.
- Articles <-> readers
* Reading and other actions depend on rights.
* Reading can also depend on group membership.
- Groups <-> persons
* Membership is defined by persons, not by accounts.
Access model
- Visibility rule
* An article is shown only if the requesting party has the required right
AND is allowed by the relevant group constraints.
* If either condition is not met, the article is not visible.
- Purpose of the rule
* Some articles are private.
* Some articles are shared only with selected persons or groups.
* Group-based visibility is independent from email/account identity.
Account scope
- Login
* Accounts are used to authenticate a user.
* Authentication is tied to an email address and password.
- Rights assignment
* Different accounts can be granted different rights.
* Rights are assigned at account level or in relation to persons/groups,
depending on the access rule for the article.
Person scope
- Data ownership
* A person is the owner of their own articles.
* A person can have multiple linked accounts/emails.
- Shared context
* Other parties may access articles only through the rights/group model.
Groups and persons
- Membership
* Groups contain persons.
* Group membership does not depend on the email used for login.
- Example interpretation
* If a person belongs to a group, then that group relation follows the
person, not a specific email account.
Article model
- Each article has:
* An article type
* Content belonging to that type
* An owner person context
* Access rules based on rights and group membership
- Article types are distinct categories, not free text, so that access can be
handled per type in a structured way.
Security and privacy goals
- Private by default where appropriate
* Not everything is publicly visible.
- Controlled sharing
* Sharing happens via rights and groups, not via open access.
- Person-centric sharing
* Visibility follows persons and groups, not only the account that logs in.
- Separation of concerns
* Login (account/email/password) is separate from data ownership (person).
* This allows one person to be reachable through several emails without
merging all content into one account identity.
Functional expectations
- Account management
* Create account for an email address with a password.
* The email address is fixed for that account.
- Person management
* Represent persons independently of a single account.
* Link multiple emails/accounts to one person where needed.
- Article management
* Create, view, edit, and remove articles for a person.
* Store articles by type.
* Enforce visibility by rights and group membership.
- Group management
* Groups are defined around persons.
* Membership is used for visibility/access decisions.
- Rights handling
* Rights decide what is allowed for an account/requesting party.
* Rights work together with group-based visibility rules.
Non-goals for this version
- This is not a payment system.
- This is not a transaction ledger.
- This is not primarily an account-consumption platform; accounts exist for
login and rights, but persons and their articles are the main content.
Level of detail required from the specification
- Account model
* Fixed email per account.
* Password per email.
* Different rights per account.
- Person model
* Persons as first-class entities.
* Support for multiple emails per person.
- Article model
* Article types.
* Ownership context.
* Rights/group-based visibility.
- Group model
* Person-dependent groups.
* No email-dependent groups.
- Access behavior
* Explicit visibility rules.
* No open global visibility for restricted articles.
This specification intentionally describes what the system is and what rules
it follows, so that later implementation matches the intended model exactly.